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REGULATION OF VARIABLE LIFE INSURANCE
Tamar Frankel*
I. Introduction
On November 29, 1971 the American Life Convention and Life Insurance
Association of America filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) to exempt certain variable life insurance policies and separate
accounts funding them from the provisions of the federal securities acts.' The
petition had been preceded by informal negotiations by the insurance industry for
a decision by the SEC "not to assert jurisdiction" over such policies and ac-
counts.2 The Commission's staff declined to recommend primarily because the
staff felt that other interested parties ought to be heard before a determination
was made which might adversely affect them.' After lengthy hearings the Com-
mission decided that the securities acts should apply to variable life insurance
policies. The Commission further determined to exempt certain policies from the
provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Ad-
visors Act of 1940." This article discusses the nature of variable life insurance
policies, the problems concerning their regulation, and the implications of the
Commission's decision.
A. Variable Life Insurance
Variable life insurance policies are novel in this country. The proclaimed
purpose of the policies is to provide, in addition to conventional insurance, pro-
tection from loss of the purchasing power of the dollar. They are alleged to be a
hedge against inflation.5 Whether or not these policies can fully achieve this
* Professor of Law, Boston University; LL.B., Jerusalem Law Classes, 1947; LL.M.,
Harvard, 1964; S.J.D., Harvard, 1972.
1 For notice of hearings see, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5234, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9494, Investment Company Act Release No. 6999, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 310 (Feb. 15, 1972). BNA SEc. RGo. L. REP., no. 147, at A-16 (1972).
2 Gustin, Details Industry Task Force Dealings With SEC On Variable Life Products,
The National Underwriter, Mar. 27, 1971, no. 13 at 1, 9.
3 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5175; Investment Company Act Release No. 6662 (Aug.
5, 1971). The insurance industry favored a rule making proceeding to which the staff agreed.
See Report of the Division of Investment Management Regulations, In the Matter of American
Life Convention and Life Insurance Association of America, Hearings Before the SEC (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Staff Report).
4 Letter of SEC chairman William J. Casey to Counsel for the petitioners, January 31,
1973. The exemptions granted under rules 3c-4 and 202-1 are now under attack by Welling-
ton Management Co. in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals File No. 73-1188 (Feb. 20, 1973).
5 This claim was questioned by the investment industry. It was admitted by witnesses
that in order to obtain appreciation of 3 per cent a year (to keep pace with inflation) the
insurance companies would have to earn 13-23 per cent in their investments. See Testimony of
Henry Walker, In the Matter of American Life Convention and Life Insurance Association of
America, Hearings Before the SEC, 1029 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SEC Hearings]. Tr.
1029. Memorandum of the Mutual Group at 10, In the Matter of American Life Convention
and Life Insurance Association of America, Hearings Before the SEC 1589, 1028, 1416 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Phillips].
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purpose, they might afford to policyholders the opportunity to participate in
the growth of the country's economy.
The policies resemble conventional insurance.' Premiums and death benefits
are calculated on the basis of age, health, and, sometimes, sex of the insured.
Furthermore, the policies are based on the same scheme as conventional level
premium life insurance. In the early years of the policies the insurance company
collects premiums which are far in excess of the cost of insurance. This excess
is in fact advanced by the policyholder to cover the cost of insurance in later
years, when the premiums will not be sufficient. Monies so prepaid by policy-
holders are invested by the insurance company for the benefit of the policyholders.
Therefore, the higher the benefit, the lower the cost of insurance to the policy-
holder.
The basic difference between conventional and variable life insurance lies
in the nature and terms of this benefit. In conventional life insurance the
benefit is calculated on the basis of a fixed assumed interest, whether or not in-
vestments of the insurance company produce sufficient income. The company
risks the loss through unwise or unlucky investments or through downturn of the
economy generally. The policyholder risks only that the company will not be able
to honor its obligations. Strict state regulation has rendered this hazard minimal.
In variable life insurance the reserves of the policies are placed in a separate
account and invested in equity securities. The dollar amount of the premiums,
or death benefits, or both (depending on the terms of the policies), is affected
by the investment performance of the separate account." The policyholder shares
in the profits of the investment. He has a chance to receive more than a fixed
assumed interest rate. However, he takes the chance that the profits will be lower
than the assumed rate of return, in which case the payments affected by invest-
ment performance (variable payments) will be lower than the same payments
over a previous period of years. (The insurance company, however, guarantees
that the death benefits will not be reduced below a certain minimum.)
Policy purchasers were satisfied with the low-risk investment that insurance
offered. But they were dissatisfied with the low-yield assumed interest that ac-
companied it. This dissatisfaction grew with inflation. Mainly as a result of this
discontent, the insurance industry steadily lost its share of the savings-dollars of
6 For a definition of insurance see Denenberg, The Legal Definition of Insurance, XXX
J. INS. 319 (1963) reprinted in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 210 (J.
Hammond ed. 1968).
7 For a full description of conventional life insurance and the level premium plan see W.
VANCE, INSURANCE 71 (3rd ed. 1951); J. MACLEAN, LIFE- INSURANCE 13-15 (9th ed. 1962),
1 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 3 (1965). Memorandum of the Investment
Company Institute at 8-23, In the Matter of American Life Convention and Life Insurance
Association of America, Hearings Before the SEC (1972) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum
of Silver].
8 The calculation follows this pattern: The policies assume a certain rate of return; say
31/2 per cent, on investments. If the net profits on investments are higher than the assumed
rate of return, the payments that are affected by the investment performance will be higher
than the same payments over a previous period of years, though not necessarily in proportion
to the amount of profits. The same formula is used to measure the effect of investment per-
formance for all policies; but companies use different formulas. In some policies the formula
affects the death benefits. In others, the formula affects the reserves funding the policies.
In the first instance death benefits will fluctuate more than in the second instance. Variable
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the public.' During the past twenty years the insurance industry has increasingly
attempted to enter into the equity investment market. This effort began in the
1950's with the offer of variable annuities in connection with pension plans. It
culminated in variable life insurance.
B. Federal Regulation of Variable Life Insurance
The question of whether variable life insurance policies are subject to the
securities acts is of great importance to the insurance and investment industries
because regulation, or lack of it, affects their competitive positions. The question
is also important to the states because they have an interest in taxing and regulat-
ing insurance. The question is equally important to investors. Variable insurance
might replace a large proportion of life insurance and of mutual fund shares as
an investment medium.
Generally speaking, with regard to variable life insurance, the basic issue
involving the 1933 and the 1934 securities Acts is whether the policies are
"securities." The 1940 Act involves the question of whether the separate accounts
are "investment companies." The application of the securities acts to a hybrid
insurance policy is difficult. However, the application of the 1940 Act raises more
problems. The petitioners themselves were reconciled to a greater measure of
disclosure.'0 As to the antifraud provisions in the 1933 and the 1934 Acts it was
understood by the parties that they would apply. Since insurance companies
that sell variable annuities have already entered the self-regulatory organization
of broker-dealers organized under the 1934 Act and have made many of the
adjustments necessary to conduct brokerage businesses, the application of the
1934- Act would in all probability not be unduly burdensome. Neither Act
interferes with the operation of the company's insurance business. The 1940 Act,
on the other hand, regulates the activities of the account itself and determines
such questions as who controls investments in the account, and how much sales
load may be charged to purchasers. The application or nonapplication of the
1940 Act may have a more serious effect on either industry.
The success of marketing mutual fund shares and of insurance policies de-
pends as much on the good graces of the salesmen as on the objective attraction
of the product." Higher commissions may divert mutual fund sales forces to
payments may also be affected by the method and date of valuation of the assets in the ac-
count, by the amount of money reserved for future taxes, and by the amount of deductible
expenses. In policies that carry variable benefits but permit the policyholder to pay a fixed
dollar premium (even if at the time of payment the investment performance of the account is
higher than that of the previous year), the formula includes an adjustment factor to take this
into account. Variable payments may also be affected by the magnitude of assumed rate of
interest because increases in payments are made only if the investment performance exceeds the
assumed interest. SEC Hearings, supra note 5, presentation by Harry Walker at 10; presentation
by John C. Fraser at 4; presentation by Arthur L. Blakeslee III at 10, 11. For a detailed descrip-
tion of variable life insurance policies and their potential development see VARIABLE LIFE IN-
SURANCE: CURRENT ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS (Olson and Winklevoss eds. 1971); 22
SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES TRANSACTIONS pt. 2, D 144 (1970).
9 Memorandum of Silver, supra note 7, at 3.
10 The petition to the SEC was based on the assumption that most states will adopt a
Model Act and Model Regulations. The Model Regulations require that each purchaser be
given a miniprospectus along the lines of a prospectus under the 1933 Act.
11 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 110 (1963) [herein-
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variable life insurance. On the other hand, lower commissions may discourage
the sale of variable life insurance in favor of conventional policies. A great deal
depends on how the public will view variable life insurance. If it is considered
a variation of an insurance policy, then commissions for both must be equal, or
the marketing of the new product will fail. If variable life insurance is accepted
as an alternative to mutual fund shares, then the investment industry might suffer
if commissions on variable life are higher.
The ability of the insurance industry to offer variable life insurance as pro-
posed may well depend on who will control investments. Since the insurance
company guarantees a fixed amount of death benefits regardless of the separate
account investment results, the company must have some control over investment
policies. Under the 1940 Act, in theory at least, this control is with the share-
holders. 2
One should also bear in mind that the variable life insurance policy seems
like an attractive alternative to a mutual fund share. The policy can be described
as the best possible investment: it purports to serve as a hedge against inflation,
it offers participation in the growth of the economy, utilization of excellent in-
vestment advisory service, plus diversification of investment, and, to top it all,
protection for the beneficiaries in the event of premature death. No wonder the
investment industry is concerned. In addition, inflation and other factors are
slowing the growth of conventional life insurance. Most life insurance companies
are convinced that their future lies with variable products. The stakes are there-
fore high.
C. The Regulation of Variable Annuities
The effort of the insurance industry to enter the equities investment market
began in the 1950's with the offer of variable annuities. Conventional annuities,
like conventional insurance, promise a fixed return on funds which are prepaid
by the contractholders, and impose the investment risk on the insurance company.
Since insurance laws require the company to invest its reserves in low risk, and
therefore, low income investments, the promised-or assumed-interest to con-
tractholders is also low."
In order to obtain a higher income for contractholders state laws permitted
insurance companies to invest the reserves in equity securities, and to pay the full
gain to the contractholders. But the contractholders bore the investment risk,
the risk that the income and value of the securities will decline. In variable an-
nuities the investment risk conventionally borne by the insurance company was
shifted to the contractholders.
after cited as SEC REPoRT]. No-load funds, funds that sell their shares directly to the public
without the benefit of salesman's services, constitute a small fraction of the industry, measured
by assets. The growth of these funds is more rapid as compared to load funds, and is a function
of the growing sophistication of investors. Yet the average investor still pays 8.5 per cent com-
mission to the load fund rather than look for a no-load fund.
12 See p. 1079 infra.
13 In insurance policies low assumed interest means higher cost of insurance to the policy-
holder. In annuities, low assumed interest means lower annuity payments.
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In SEC v. Variable Life Insurance Company' the Supreme Court held
that variable annuities were securities within the meaning of the federal securities
acts. The Court found that these annuities were not insurance policies and
annuity contracts, which the securities acts exempt. 5 Since the investment
risk was borne by the contractholders, the annuities were deemed to be invest-
ment contracts presenting the evils that the securities acts were designed to
protect against. State laws that classified and regulated variable annuities as
insurance did not adequately protect purchasers against these evils.'
A few years later, United Benefit Life Insurance Company attempted un-
successfully to devise a variable annuity that would be exempt from the federal
securities acts. The contract contained two periods. In the first-the pay-in
period-payments were made to the insurance company, which invested the
funds in equity securities at the risk of the contractholder. During this period
and up to its termination the contractholder could receive the value of his in-
vested payments on demand. In the second period-the pay-out period-the
insurance company paid the contractholder an annuity for life. This annuity was
made in fixed dollar amounts." In addition, if the contractholder wished to
receive his savings during the pay-in period, the insurance company assured him
a guaranteed minimum.
The Supreme Court held in SEC u. United Benefit Life Insurance Com-
pany' that the annuity was a security. First, the pay-in and pay-out periods
were severable.' The pay-out period involved some insurance because the in-
surance company promised to make payments to the contractholder throughout
his life. This part of the annuity was an exempt insurance contract. The pay-in
period involved no insurance and was pure investment. This part of the annuity
did not become an exempt insurance policy simply by being tacked to an insur-
ance arrangement. Second, for qualification as an insurance policy, the invest-
ment risk of the insurance company should be significant. A guarantee of a
minimum payment, which guarantee would in all probability never result in a
liability to the insurance company," was, in the Court's opinion, not sufficient
to convert an investment into an insurance policy. By the same token, the Court
added in dictum, a guaranteed minimum funded by conservative investments
(nonguaranteed amount invested in equity securities at the risk of the contract-
holder) was not sufficient to characterize the investment as an insurance contract.
14 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
15 § 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1970); 1 L. Loss,
SEcuRrrlas REoULATION 497 (2d ed. 1961).
16 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 78 (1959).
17 SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
18 Id.
19 Payment for these annuities was usually made by installments during a long period of
time, "pay-in period," ending with the retirement of the employee. At that point he could
either accept the cash accumulated or choose an annuity for a fixed number of years, or an
annuity for life. The period during which the annuity is paid is called the "pay-out period."
For a description of variable annuities see Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable Insurance and
Separate Accounts, 51 B.U.L. Rav. 177, 188 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Frankel].
20 In the light of stock market past performance in the last 80 years with the exception of
the depression era, the guarantee would have never come into effect. SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 209 n.12 (1967).
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In sum, the determination of whether variable annuities are securities2'
regulated by the federal securities acts, or insurance contracts which are exempted
from the acts, depends on: (a) the extent to which the investment risk is divided
between the contractholder and the insurance company, (b) the extent to which
the contract deviates from conventional insurance so as to expose purchasers
to dangers similar to those which face purchasers of securities, (c) the degree
of relevant protection offered by state insurance laws,22 and (d) the form and
manner in which the contract is advertised and sold. If the contract is advertised
for its investment opportunities, it may be classified as an investment contract.
23
Under these tests individual variable annuities were held to be securities.
II. Status of Variable Life Insurance Policies as Securities
The petition of the insurance industry to the SEC requested an exemption
of variable life insurance policies from the securities acts without conceding
that the policies were securities. The industry sought to avoid a decision on that
issue. However, the Commission's jurisdiction rested on the classification of the
policies as securities. It addition, a major consideration in granting an exemp-
tion is the need for investor protection. This is also a factor in determining
whether the policies are securities. The question was therefore extensively dis-
cussed and the Commission held that variable life insurance policies are securities.
The petition was restricted to policies that answer four conditions. The
petitioners explained that these conditions would limit the investment component
in the policies and ensure the predominance of their insurance characteristics.24
Two conditions were designed to eliminate from the definition policies that
would permit a large portion of the premiums to be allocated to investment
instead of insurance coverage. The first condition was that the policies should
be whole-life policies. Endowment policies were excluded because they contain
a heavy investment component in terms of dollars. It is unclear why term
policies that contain almost no investment were also excluded (perhaps because
they do not contain a sufficient investment component). The proposed variable
policies are based on level premium life insurance and scheme. Hence, the
21 Except when specifically exempted by the Commission or under § 3(c) (11) of the
1940 Act.
22 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 77-8 (1959) (Brennan J., con-
curring).
23 Id. See also SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 212 (1967).
24 Rule 3c-4 under the Investment Company Act adopted in SEC Investment Company
Act of 1940 Release No. 7644 (Jan. 30, 1973).
Rule 3c-4 . Definition of "Insurance Company" for Purposes of Section 3(c) (3) of
the Act.
(a) The term "insurance company," in Section 3(c) (3) of the Act, shall include
a separate account established and maintained by an insurance company
(1) the assets of which separate account are derived solely from the sale
of variable life insurance policies, as herein defined, and advances made by
the insurance company in connection with the operation of such separate
account, and
(2) which separate account is not used for variable annuity contracts or
for the investment of funds corresponding to dividend accumulations or
other policy liabilities not involving life contingencies.
(b) For the purpose of this rule, a "variable life insurance policy" shall mean
any policy of insurance issued by an insurance company which, so long as pre-
1022 [JTune, 1973]
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petitioners argued, they were predominantly "insurance." 25 The investment in-
dustry claimed that the investment-dollar component in level premium life in-
surance was sufficiently large to constitute the policy a security under the cir-
cumstances. 2' The second condition was that the amount payable as a minimum
should be not less than a stated multiple of the gross premiumsY The petitioners
explained that since older persons pay higher premiums for the same insurance
coverage, the premiums on which the guaranteed face amount is computed
should be adjusted to reflect the higher cost. This device, the petitioner stated,
would also preclude payment of premiums over a shorter period of time,25 which
would also result in a larger investment. In the opinion of the investment in-
dustry and of the SEC staff, the proposed rule did not produce the claimed
results.2" The number of years over which premiums could be paid and the
miums are paid when due, provides a death benefit which varies to reflect the
investment experience of a separate account established and maintained by such
insurance company and
(1) provides for life insurance coverage for the whole of life, and the
mortality and expense risks thereunder are assumed by such insurance
company;
(2) provides for an initial stated amount of death benefit and guarantees
payment of a death benefit at least equal to such amount;
(3) provides that the amount payable upon the death of the insured under
such policy in any year will be no less than a minimum multiple of the gross
premium payable in that year (exclusive of that portion allocable to any
incidental insurance benefit) by a person who meets standard underwriting
















71 and over 7;
and (4) in its entirety is a life insurance contract subject to regulation
under the insurance laws of any State in which such policy is offered, in-
cluding all required approvals by the insurance commissioner of such State.
25 Memorandum of Petitioners at 8, In the Matter of American Life Convention and Life
Insurance Association of America, Hearings Before the SEC (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum of Kroll].
26 Memorandum of Phillips, supra note 5, at 45. In the first year only 9 per cent of the
premium of the policy of New York Life represents the cost of insurance. 62 per cent of the
premium under the policy of New York Life is prepaid.
At no time does the cost of insurance amount to more than 31 per cent of the premium.
Memorandum of Silver, supra note 7, at 18-20.
27 Memorandum of Kroll, supra note 25, at 8. Proposed Rule 3c-4.
28 Memorandum of Kroll, supra note 25, at 9.
29 Memorandum of Phillips, supra note 5, at 47-48. See contra, Memorandum of Kroll,
supra note 25, at 8, 9.
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assumed interest may be reduced to increase the investment leverage; even with-
out these devices, the proposed rule would permit a company to charge for a
variable policy double the premiums charged for a conventional policy of the
same face amount and apply the excess to investments.3"
Apparently, in order to escape the definition of a security based on policy-
holders' investment risk, the proposed policies should be for an initially stated
amount, and death benefits should be guaranteed to be not less than that amount.
However, the cash surrender value need not be guaranteed. The industry
pointed out that the death-benefit guarantee represented a real and substantial
investment risk for the company. This risk was greater than in conventional life
insurance because all the assets funding the reserves are invested in equity securi-
ties; greater than in the variable annuity, because the insurance obligation is
assumed immediately upon the first premium payment; and greater than in the
annuity of United Benefit because the "policy has a significant minimum
or floor."'" The company might lose on its investment guarantee if the invest-
ment performance was unfavorable when the mortality experience is standard.
Loss may be even greater if the investment performance is more favorable than
that of the general account when the mortality experience is unfavorable.
The SEC staff and the investment industry questioned the significance of
the guarantee. They pointed out that mortality experience was very rarely un-
favorable,32 that the charges for the risk involving the guarantee were very low, 8
and that the insurance company would establish an additional contingency fund
to be invested in conservative investments. The risk to the insurance company,
they argued, was negligible.3 4 In addition, the guarantee did not cover the cash
surrender value.
The last characteristics of the policy dealt with the issue of adequate pro-
tection. First, it required that the entire policy be a life insurance contract, and
second, it required that the policy be subject to regulation under the state insur-
ance laws. Thus, by assuring that the policy was a life insurance policy, so the
reasoning seems to have been, the protection of state regulation would, by defini-
tion, be satisfactory.
As to the first characteristic, the insurance industry emphasized that the
proposed policies were predominantly insurance contracts because the insurance
company assumed mortality risks by their pooling and distribution, as in conven-
tional life insurance policies. Furthermore, the policies contained the usual non-
forfeiture, loan, grace, reinstatement and noncontestability features. 5 Accord-
ing to the investment industry it was immaterial that the policies contained an
insurance arrangement." Such policies could still be securities depending on
how they differed from conventional insurance.
30 Memorandum of Kroll, supra note 25, at 18.
31 Memorandum of Kroll, swpra note 25, at 27.
32 Memorandum of Phillips, supra note 5, at 45; Staff Report, supra note 3, at 93.
33 Eight cents per $1,000. Memorandum of Phillips, supra note 5, at 46; Staff Report,
supra note 3, at 94.
34 The first two features of the scheme may indicate a low risk. The last feature may
indicate the reverse, that the insurance company cannot cover its risk from charges alone,
and must reserve its own funds.
35 Memorandum of Kroll, supra note 25, at 23.
36 Memorandum of Silver, supra note 7, at 25-26.
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A basic deviation of variable life insurance from conventional insurance
is that policyholders bear the entire investment risk with respect to the cash
surrender value. Since their right to loans depends on the amount of cash value,
the right is partially dependent on the investment performance of the ac-
count .3  This feature raises a preliminary question of whether the investment
component in the policy should be viewed separately, as the pay-in period in
variable annuities was viewed separately from the pay-out period in the United
Benefit case. If we consider the investment component without regard to the
rest of the policy it is difficult to distinguish it from an ordinary investment con-
tract or not to characterize it as a security. It was argued by the investment
industry that the only difference between the cash surrender value in a variable
life insurance policy and the pay-in period in variable annuities is that in the
annuities the pay-in period precedes the pay-out period, whereas in a variable
policy the investment is accumulated simultaneously with the insurance cover-
age.
s
It is submitted that in level premium policies, the insurance and investment
components should not be viewed separately. First, the investment component
in the level premium policy is an essential and integral part of the insurance
scheme. 9 If the investment part is eliminated, if the cash value is withdrawn,
the insurance coverage is extinguished. No analogy can be drawn to variable
annuities. The annuity is not dependent on the pay-in period, (except to the
extent that the insurance company is bound in the future to the annuity rates
at the date of the beginning of the pay-in period). In addition, lapses of policies
affect the whole insurance scheme and may change the mortality experience of
the group. 0 There is no such effect in annuities.
When the variable policy is considered as a whole, the policyholders bear
all the investment risk regarding the cash value, and the insurance company
bears the major part of the risk regarding the death benefit. As to death benefits
it is arguable that policyholders bear some part of the investment risk with res-
pect to it, because their premiums are higher as compared with premiums of
the conventional life insurance policy bearing the guaranteed face amount.
What is, then, the relationship between the insurance and investment com-
ponents in the policies and which of them is predominant?
The investment industry described the policies as interests in a pool of
securities, redeemable as cash surrender value, to which an insurance protection
is attached, at a cost of a fraction of the premiums. The insurance industry
described the policies as regular insurance policies, at assumed interest of 3 per
cent or more, which offer their holders benefits keyed to the investment perform-
ance of an investment fund, above a guaranteed death benefit. The cash sur-
37 Staff Report, supra note 3, at 92.
38 Memorandum of Silver, supra note 7, at 16.
The I.C.I. argued, in this writer's opinion, erroneously that the payments in the pay-in
period are calculated according to mortality tables, as in life insurance. The correct view is
that only the annuity payments, not the periodic payments, are so calculated.
39 Memorandum of Kroll, supra note 25, at n.8 & n.9.




render values were relegated to a subordinate position on the assumption that
people purchase insurance for insurance protection.
The accuracy of these descriptions depends on the importance of cash
surrender values in the policies, and on how variable policies will be sold and
how they will be viewed by the purchasing public. Cash surrender value is an
important feature of life insurance policies. Regardless of how cash surrender
is viewed by purchasers, more than 50 per cent of the purchasers1 of conven-
tional life insurance lapse or surrender their policies. There is no reason to as-
sume that the experience in variable life insurance will be different. The invest-
ment risk carried by policyholders in variable life policies is therefore substantial.
Usually, economic arrangements have a predominant purpose which an-
swers specific needs. The primary purpose of insurance is to create an estate
when savings alone will not suffice. Theoretically, at least, the cash surrender
value is therefore of secondary importance. On the other hand, mutual fund
shares are purchased as investment for appreciation and enjoyment in the in-
vestor's lifetime. The purpose for which a particular investor buys an instrument
is usually immaterial to the characterization of the instrument. Thus, the intent
of a purchaser of mutual fund shares to create an estate in the hope that he
would live long enough to save and invest does not convert the shares into an
insurance contract. Conversely, the intent of a purchaser of a policy to utilize
the loan provisions or cash surrender value of a policy does not create an invest-
ment contract. But if the policy is changed intrinsically, if the cash surrender
value and other investment aspects become so prominent that they overshadow
the insurance protection, if the main purpose of the economic arrangement-the
creation of an estate-is merged with investment, then the policy might be
deemed to offer both, because the average man might purchase such a policy
for both purposes-creation of an estate and investment. Here the intent of
the "average purchaser" is relevant.
Insurance policies were exempt from securities regulation so long as their
nature and paramount purpose were clear. But the public does not have the
same conception of the nature and purpose of variable policies. Furthermore,
the policies are uniquely prone to misrepresentation of their nature. For example,
the purchase of a conventional policy for its cash surrender value only is un-
likely. But once a policy is presented as an investment device, a hedge against
inflation, or a "guaranteed investment," a person might well be moved to pur-
chase the policy for its investment features. Indeed, if the optimal investment is
maximum profits at minimum risk, the variable policy seems to be it. It combines
security and stability of insurance with profits through investments.4 2 The
description of variable policies as a variation on the insurance theme is therefore
unconvincing.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners argued that variable
41 Staff Report, supra note 3, at 90.
42 For this reason insurers use every opportunity to describe policies as investments. They
are tempted to liken the policies to stock, to liken premiums to a withdrawable fund, and to
liken the position of a policyholder to that of a stockholder. These descriptions are sometimes
forbidden by statute, e.g., ILL. INS. DEPT. REG. 9.09 (11.63); CoLo. R v. STAT. ANN. § 72-3-
16 (1964).
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policies are merely a further development of the conventional participating
policies, and that they should be treated as such for the purpose of securities
regulation.43 It is submitted that the description does not bear closer scrutiny
unless the word "participating" is used in a metaphorical sense only, in which
case the resemblance ends with the name. First, the industry indicated that it
proposes to sell participating and nonparticipating variable policies. This
means that variable features are not an extension of participation but a new
feature altogether. Second, the departures of variable policies from conventional
participating policies are many and basic, so much so that variable policies
resemble in many aspects mutual fund shares rather than participating policies.
For example, in participating policies the insurance company bears the invest-
ment risk resulting from investment decision and general economic adversities.
In variable policies, the policyholders bear this type of risk at least with respect
to the cash surrender value.44 In participating policies the dividend, once de-
clared, belongs to the policyholder. In variable policies the right to comparable
dividends, the additional death benefits, may disappear at any time before actual
payment is made. In participating policies, the directors of the insurance com-
pany decide whether dividends will be paid at all, and if so, the amount of the
dividends to be paid. In variable policies, management has limited discretion
to determine if and how much will be paid under the policies as a result of
investment performance because payments are determined according to a formula
that is fixed and applies automatically. In participating policies, dividends are
in fact returned excess premiums. The dividends represent profits of insurance
business, although some profits may come from investments. Variable policy pay-
ments stem from investments, mostly in equity securities. Last, in participating
policies the insurance company does not offer investment advisory services and
does not charge a fee calculated as a percentage of the assets of a segregated
fund. In variable policies, like the investment adviser in a mutual fund, the
insurance company does. All these features distinguish variable policies from
participating policies and make their resemblance to mutual fund shares more
pronounced. The cumulative effect of all the features of the proposed policies
led this writer to the conclusion that they should not be considered to be insur-
ance contracts.4"
As to the second aspect concerning investor protection, the insurance in-
dustry argued that state regulation would afford purchasers of these policies ade-
43 Memorandum of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners at 8, In the
Matter of American Life Convention and Life Insurance Association of America, Hearings
Before the SEC (1972). [Hereinafter cited as NAIC Brief]. The same contention was made
unsuccesssfully in the case of variable annuities. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. 359
U.S. 65, 89-90 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
44 The fact that a minimum of the death benefit is guaranteed does not necessarily pre-
clude the characterization of the transaction as an investment contract and a security. In
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) withdrawable share capital was only partially
risk capital and could be withdrawn under Illinois statute [ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 773
(1963)]. The shares bore investment risk only after other accounts. The Court held that
these shares were securities, because they participated in a common enterprise, a moneylend-
ing operation, which was dependent on the success and skill of management. Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
45 This writer testified in the SEC Hearings to this effect. SEC Hearings, supra note 5, at
2100, 2107.
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quate protection. It is submitted that state insurance laws would not be an
adequate substitute for the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. This conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court in the case
of variable annuities.4
The petition was based on the assumption that most states would adopt a
Model Law and Model Regulation. The Model Regulation contained a pro-
vision for a mini-prospectus." In addition it was assumed that the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 acts" would apply. These two safeguards would
be in addition to present state regulation.
State laws protect purchasers by requiring that policies be filed with insur-
ance agencies, by prohibiting fraudulent practices, and by applying the common
law of fraud and misrepresentation to the sale of policies. As to filing, the pro-
posed Model Regulations require the company to file "a general description of
the kinds of variable contracts it [the company] intends to issue"" and to follow
filing requirements otherwise applicable under existing statutes "to the extent
appropriate."" ° In 1968, forty-six states and the District of Columbia required
some form of filing of contracts 1 and permitted sale after approval 2 or after
the expiration of a certain period unless disapproved. Many laws specifically
require filing of variable contract forms with insurance agencies."
State insurance regulation of policy forms varies greatly. It seems that
generally the main concern of insurance commissioners is to insure the inclusion
of statutory mandatory provisions in the policies. Minnesota55 and New Jersey'
permit the Commissioner to disapprove contracts that do not comply with the
law, or contain provisions that are unjust, unfair, inequitable, ambiguous or
misleading. New York permits the Superintendent to disapprove a policy form
that is unfair, unjust and inequitable. It is worthy of note that only New
Hampshire requires disclosure in addition to direct regulation. 8 The supervision
of state authorities over fied policy forms is not an effective substitute for an
informed decision by purchasers.
As to insurance statutory antifraud provisions, as early as 1947 the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners promulgated a Model Unfair Trade
46 SEC v. Variable Annuity Co. 359 U.S. 65, 78-79 (1959) (Breman, J., concurring).
47 See note 68 infra.
48 Formally, however, the petitioners argued against any application of the acts. Mem-
orandum of Kroll, supra note 25, at 55.
49 PROPOSED MODEL VARIABLE CONTRACT REGULATIONS, Art. III, § 3 attached to the
Petition, In the Matter of American Life Convention and Life Insurance Association of Amer-
ica, Hearings Before the SEC (1972) [hereinafter cited as MODEL REGULATIONS].
50 Id., Art. V.
51 Jones, State Regulation of Policy Form Content, AsS'N oF LIFE INS. COUNSEL PRO-
CEEDINGS, 773, 775-777 (1967-68).
52 See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAw § 154 (McKinney 1966). The Superintendent may disapprove
a policy form if "it contains provisions which are unjust, unfair, or unequitable." It is not
clear whether the Superintendent approaches his role, as the California Commissioner of
Corporations used to, by evaluating the investment arrangement in lieu of and for the investor,
for example, by regulating investment fees.
53 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-18 (Supp. 1971).
54 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 175, § 132G (Supp. 1971).
55 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.18 (1968).
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-18 (Supp. 1971).
57 N.Y. INS. LAw § 154 (McKinney 1966).
58 N.1. REv. STAT. ANN. § 408:52 (1968) (applicable to variable annuities).
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Practices Act. Many of the Act's provisions are similar to those of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.59 In addition, the Act prohibits certain practices which
are peculiar to the insurance business. All states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the Act or enacted similar provisions in their insurance statutes.
The Model Trade Unfair Practices Act differs from the antifraud provisions
of the Exchange Act of 1934 in three aspects: first, fraud and misrepresentation
in these statutes were interpreted according to the common law concepts of
fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.60 Second, enforcement of the provisions of
the law is by a fine and/or imprisonment,61 or by injunctive relief applied for
by state authorities. In addition, the state agency may issue a cease and desist
order or use its power to revoke or suspend the certificate of authority of the in-
surer or the license of the selling agent. Violations of the unfair trade practices
laws do not, it seems, give rise to a private right of action.62
As to the common law of misrepresentation in the sale of insurance policies,
the law is neither clear nor uniform, especially with respect to available reme-
dies.6" In addition, it is doubtful whether policyholders could successfully sue
as a class on misrepresentation or misleading statements in the sales literature
or in the policies,64 in marked contrast to class actions under the antifraud pro-
visions of the 1934 Act. 5
59 Regulation has not been found as effective as the Federal Trade Commission Act. Note,
Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices: A jurisdictional Inquiry, 67 YALE L.J. 452, 458-
64 (1958). 11 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 341, 355 (1971).
60 See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 273, 127 (McKinney Supp. 1972). Violation of section
127 was dealt with in McLaughlin v. Hepburn, 185 Misc. 290, 54 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1945) but
the remedy was based on fraud and breach of contract. See also Brandt v. Beha, 217 App. Div.
644, 216 N.Y.S. 178 (1926). See alo, N.Y. INS. LAW § 211 (McKinney 1966). In California
misrepresentation must be intentional. CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 790.03 (1972), (replacing §
780 (1955), interpreted in Collins v. Caminetti, 24 Cal. 2d 766, 151 P.2d 105, 154 A.L.R. 1141
(1944)).
61 See Note, Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices: A jurisdictional Inquiry, 67
YALE L. J. 452, 459 n. 31, 465 n. 54 (1958).
62 The writer has not found a case in which a private right of action based on violations
of state insurance laws was recognized. Decisions point the other way. State insurance agencies
are deemed to possess primary jurisdiction even when policyholders are given a specific statutory
right of action. E.g., Gordon v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Company, 281 N.E.2d 573 (Mass.
1972); Southern Cal. Title Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 60 Cal. Rptr. 114, 124-25
(1967); Clifford v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 264 App. Div. 168, 34 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1942).
63 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1624 '(on remedies), 1430 (on fraud), (2d ed.
1961). See note 60 supra. R. KEETON, BASIC INSURANCE ch. 5 (1960); see also Morris,
Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Policy Litigation, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1957) empha-
sizing the changing attitude of courts towards insurance contracts "from a service safely bought
only by sophisticated businessmen to a commodity bought with confidence by untrained
consumers." Id.
64 If reliance by plaintiff members of the class has to be proved, then a class action is
virtually precluded.
65 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970). This holding virtually elimi-
nates the requirement of proof of reliance by plaintiff members of a class, in favor of an
objective test of materiality.
Variable life insurance policies may present difficult questions under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There may be some question as to whether policyholders
of policies funded by the same account constitute a class. See generally 3B MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, g 23.04 at 23-25 (2d ed. 1969). Even if they are a class, there may be doubts as
to their coextensive interest. Rescission, for example, may not be in the interest of some
policyholders, but may be in the interest of others. See generally id. 23.07(2). See, e.g.,
Gordon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 467 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (common questions were not
found in an action on a group insurance policy for damages and a declaration that certain
expenses fall within the coverage of the policy). The decision was criticized as to the finding
that there was no common question. 3B Moore, supras 23-327 (Supp. 1972).
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Let us assume that the insurance agent violated state law by failing to
give the insured a mini-prospectus. The investment index of the separate account
falls by 50 per cent and the policyholder wishes to cancel the policy. Under
the 1933 Act the sale of the policy is a violation of § 5 for which the remedy
of rescission is readily available." In all probability the omission to provide the
mini-prospectus is not by itself a violation of the antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act. Under state insurance laws the situation is far from clear. This
writer searched in vain for a case that held a policy voidable at the instance
of the insured, so long as there were no misleading statements."' The purchaser's
remedy is to complain to the insurance authorities and his only consolation is
that the insurance company might be fined or that it might lose its certificate of
authority.
Even if the purchaser received a mini-prospectus, the quality and extent
of the information would fall short of a § 10 prospectus.6 Also, it is doubtful
whether the mini-prospectus will be considered as a part of the policy. In New
66 § 12(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1970).
67 Statutory law may have additional provisions. New York, for example, permits a policy-
holder who was misled by incomplete comparisons between policies, to sue the violator for
the commission that he had received. N.Y. INs. LAw § 127 (McKinney 1966). The insurer
who induced a sale of a policy by misleading statements or omissions in comparisons of
policies may be sued for the amount of premiums and any other compensation that it had
received in connection with the sale. Id. at § 211. It is not at all clear that this prospectus or
information will form part of the policy. Therefore, any information in the prospectus which
conflicts with the terms of the policy might be held to be an estimate or an illustration which
is not binding on the insurer. 29 N.Y. JuR. Insurance § 638 (1963).
68 The mini prospectus proposed by the insurance industry is contained in the MODEL
VARIABLE CONTRACT REGULATION, supra note 49.
The following information shall be furnished to an applicant for a contract of
variable life insurance prior to execution of the application:
(a) A summary description of the insurance company and its principal activities.
(b) A summary explanation in non-technical terms of the principal variable
features of the contract and of the manner in which any variable benefits
reflect the investment experience of a separate account.
(c) A brief description of the investment policy for the separate account with
respect to such contract.
(d) A list of investments in the separate account as of a date not earlier than the
end of the last year for which an annual statement has been filed with the
Commissioner of the state of domicile.
(e) Summary financial statements of the insurance company and such separate
account based upon the last annual statement filed with such Commissioner,
except that for a period of four months after the filing of any annual state-
ment the summary required hereby may be based upon the annual statement,
immediately preceding such last annual statement, filed with such Com-
missioner.
The insurance company may include such additional information as it deems ap-
propriate. A copy of the statement containing the foregoing information shall be
filed with such Commissioner prior to any use thereof, and shall be subject to dis-
approval if found to be inaccurate or misleading.
Compare Summary of the provisions of Form S-1, the Registration Statement under
the Securities Act of 1933, which requires the following information: Distribution spread;
detailed plan of distribution; use of proceeds to registrant; sale otherwise than for cash;
capital structure; summary of earnings; organization of registrant; parents of registrant;
description of business and property; organization within 5 years; pending legal proceedings;
capital stock; long-term debt and other securities being registered; directors and executive
officers; and their remuneration; options to purchase securities; principal holders of securities;
interest of management and others in certain transactions; financial statements; marketing
arrangements; other expenses of issuance and distribution; relationship with registrant of
experts named in statement; sales to special parties; recent sales of unregistered securities;
subsidiaries of registrant; franchises and concessions; indemnification of directors and officers;
treatment of proceeds from stock being registered; and financial statements and exhibits.
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York, for example, prospectuses which are not referred to in the policy do not
form part of the contract," although when the advertisements were knowingly
false, they have been regarded as rendering the company liable to one who
acted upon the statements.'0 It should be noted that (for the purchaser) the
crucial time for disclosure is before the purchaser signs the application to the
insurance company. This application is deemed to be an offer to which the
policy constitutes acceptance."
The whole proposal is fraught with legal uncertainties.72 The extent of the
protection of the mini-prospectus is unclear. On the other hand, experience with
variable annuities shows that the application of the 1933 Act to variable products
will not raise serious difficulties for the industry." The Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"7 should therefore apply to variable
insurance. As previously mentioned, the Commission so held.
III. The Applicability of the Investment Company Act of 1940
The application of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to variable life
insurance raises three questions: first, whether separate accounts which fund
variable life insurance policies are investment companies within the meaning of
the Investment Company Act of 1940; second, whether state insurance laws
conflict with the provisions of the 1940 Act; and third, whether the McCarran-
Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, which prohibits federal statutes from im-
pairing state laws regulating the business of insurance, limits the applicability
of the 1940 Act.
A. Interpretation of the 1940 Act: Variable Life Insurance Separate
Accounts Are Investment Companies and Not Insurance Companies
Separate accounts invest, reinvest, and trade in securities. The 1940 Act
defines an investment company as:
any issuer which-(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or
trading in securities;
... (3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, rein-
vesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of
the value of such issuer's total assets.., on an unconsolidated basis.7 5
69 Fowler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 116 N.Y. 389, 22 N.E. 576 (1889); 29 N.Y.
JUR. Insurance § 638 (1963).
70 Rohrschneider v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 216 (1879).
71 12 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7156, at 224 (1943).
72 See notes 60 & 63 supra.
73 Sections 11 and 12 might require some interpretative adjustments when the investment
performance follows an investment factor rather than unit value. But the same is true of
variable annuities. Furthermore, the SEC rather than state insurance agencies has the
expertise and tradition of administering this type of regulation. It should also be emphasized
that blue sky laws do not usually apply to variable insurance products. Between state blue
sky administration and the SEC, the latter is probably also the choice of the insurance
industry.
74 The staff argued that by engaging more actively in the securities markets insurance
companies are in a position to effect the market and should therefore be regulated. Staff
Report, supra note 3, at 50-54.
75 § 3(a)(1),(3); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1),(3) (1970).
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If variable insurance policies are securities, then accounts which fund them are
issuers." They are therefore investment companies.
The 1940 Act excepts insurance companies from the definition of invest-
ment companies. 7 In 1963 the SEC held in the Matter of Prudential Insurance
Company, 8 that separate accounts, established by such excepted insurance com-
panies to issue variable annuities, were not themselves insurance companies. The
Third Circuit upheld the decision." But when the same questions came before
the Supreme Court, in another case, the Court said:
[T]he provisions of that Act [the 1940 Act] are substantive and go well beyond
the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. Thus the question whether
the fund may be separated from United's other activities and considered an
investment company is a difficult one.... An investigation into the rela-
tionship between the "Flexible Fund" and United's insurance business, as
well as an investigation of the possible conflicts between state and federal
regulation, is required for a proper resolution. The SEC has requested us
to remand the case for further consideration of this issue, and in view of
its complexity, we deem this the wisest course. 0
The case never reached the Supreme Court again. The insurance industry
argued that the SEC decision in Prudential is not applicable to variable life
insurance policies, because the investment and insurance components are insepar-
able, 1 and the separate accounts that fund the policies are a part of the insur-
ance company's business, and not a separate investment business. These argu-
ments were made in Prudential in connection with variable annuities. SEC's
answer there was that investors in variable annuities need securities-protection
and that the insurance company was the creator of another company, the ac-
count in which it sold interests.82 Furthermore, at the SEC Hearings the staff
argued that the fact that the shareholders and policyholders were interested in
the performance of the account did not preclude the applicability of the 1940
Act.
83
The 1940 Act defines a separate account as:
... an account established and maintained by an insurance company pur-
suant to the laws of any State or territory of the United States, or of Canada
or any province thereof, under which income, gains and losses, whether or
not realized, from assets allocated to such account, are, in accordance with
the applicable contract, credited to or charged against such account without
regard to other income, gains, or losses of the insurance company.84
76 Issuer is defined in § 2(a) (22); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)'(22) (1970). See generally
Frankel, supra note 19, at 231.
77 § 3(c)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1970).
78 In re The Prudential Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963), aff'd 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
79 Prudential Ins. Co. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964).
80 SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 212 (1967). The petitioners argued
that this statement cast doubt on the status of separate accounts as investment companies.
Memorandum of Kroll at 45-46. The investment industry emphasized that the Supreme Court
simply did not decide the issue upon a recommendation of the SEC. Reply Memorandum of
Phillips, SEC Hearings, supra note 5, at 32. Staff Report, supra note 3, at 113.
81 Memorandum of Kroll, supra note 25, at 46.
82 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963).
83 Staff Report, supra note 3, at 116-17.
84 § 2(a) (37); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (37) (1970).
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Separate accounts perform a dual role. They are depositories of the reserves
funding variable life insurance policies, and they are also a device to keep
separate the assets of the separate account, and measure the investment perform-
ance of these assets. The first role is part of the insurance company's business;
the second role is investment business. The classification of separate accounts
is a federal question." State law does not govern here, and thus it is of little
assistance.8 6
An insurance company is defined in the Act as "a company which is organ-
ized as an insurance company, whose primary and predominant business activity
is the writing of insurance... and which is subject to supervision by the insur-
ance commissioner or a similar official or agency of a State... ."" A separate
account is not organized as an insurance company,s nor does it comply with
state laws' conditions for doing insurance business. An account is not organized
as a separate entity under state law."9 It is a tool used by an insurance company
to carry on its insurance business. 0 Yet the primary and predominant business
of a separate account is securities investments.
The question of what is "primary business" has been discussed frequently
in connection with another section of the Act 9' that exempts, either automatically
or by order of the Commission, certain investment companies from the Act.
One condition for exemption is that the company be "primarily engaged" in a
business other than investment.
In evaluating the extent of the noninvestment business of a company, the
Commission compares the assets used in investment and noninvestment busi-
ness,"2 the ratio of investment income to noninvestment income," the purpose
for which the corporation was established, and the history of its operations. 4
Cases which tested primary business by assets and income dealt with assets used
exclusively for one purpose or another. Since the assets in a separate account
serve both investment and insurance purposes, the tests of investment-insurance
ratio are inconclusive.
Purposes and history of the corporation are more helpful criteria. These
criteria were applied in the somewhat analogous case of In re Filbert Corp.9"
85 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); Modem Life and Accident
Ins. Co. v. C.I.R., 420 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1970). '(For the purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code, state law definition of a mutual insurance company does not control.)
86 Frankel, supra note 19, at 238, 248-51.
87 § 2(a)(17); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(17) (1970).
88 See Frankel, supra note 19, at 255, 259.
89 Id. at 256.
90 Id. at 248-49.
91 § 3(b)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2) (1970).
92 In the Matter of M.A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581 (1941) (examination of the amount
of assets and source of income from mining operations as compared to investments); In the
Matter of International Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 3986 (June 4,
f964) (over 2/3 of assets and income came from banking companies); In the Matter of
Business Property Associates, 12 S.E.C. 845 (1943) (test was ownership of assets and source
of income). See also SEC v. S&P. Nat. Corp., 360 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1966). '(Investments
in real estate were small in comparison with the total amount of assets invested in securities;
under this test the company was not primarily engaged in real estate.)
93 Id.
94 In the Matter of M.A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581 (1941); Bankers Sec. Corp. v.
S.E.C., 146 F.2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1944).
95 15 S.E.C. 667 (1944).
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Three closely held companies wished to enable their employees to invest in the
companies' shares. The issue was whether a corporation organized by the em-
ployees for this purpose was an investment company. The argument seemed to
be that the primary business of the corporation was other than investment, be-
cause it served a function within the employer companies' operations, such as
providing incentives to employees. The Commission looked to the immediate
purpose of the corporation, and concluded that the corporation was an invest-
ment company. The purpose was to "provide an investment medium for the
employees of the several companies .... It is apparent that Filbert's existence
[employee company] is not necessary for the operation of the general business
of the enterprises. .. ."" By the same token, separate accounts are not necessary
for the operation of the business of issuing variable life insurance policies,
although they may be helpful. Accounts are established to separate and segregate
the investment business in equity securities from the other investments of the in-
surance company and to facilitate separate accounting of such investments."7
If the primary business of separate accounts is determined according to the pur-
oose for which they were established, the accounts are not insurance companies.9"
Another relevant test is the need for investor protection. Insurance com-
panies were excepted from the definition of an investment company even though
they invested and reinvested in securities.99 It was felt that policyholders did
not need the protection of the 1940 Act because insurance companies invested
at their own risk. In addition, rigorous state regulation prevented financial
irresponsibility that could arise from the issuance of long-term debt securities, as
in the case of face amount certificate companies. On the other hand, when
policyholders assume the investment risk, the Supreme Court held that state
supervision is not a substitute for the protection of the 1940 Act. 0 0
Separate accounts funding variable life insurance are similar to mutual
funds and may pose some of the problems that the 1940 Act was designed to
solve. Policyholders bear part of the investment risk; payments under the policies
are automatically affected by the investment results of the account; cash values,
like the redemption price, depend on the value of the underlying securities in
the account; the investment performance of the account will, no doubt, serve as
an important sales feature in competition with mutual funds; last, the insurance
company charges a percentage of the assets in the account for investment advice.
It is true that the insurance company, unlike a mutual fund, has a stake
in the account's investment policies because it provides policyholders with guar-
anteed death benefits, the company's other assets back its insurance obligations
96 Id. at 672.
97 Frankel, supra note 19, at 248-49.
98 For a similar reasoning see Frankel, supra note 19, at 378-80, with respect to definition
of insurance companies under the federal Bankruptcy Act. For an analysis of mutual com-
panies for the purpose of classification under the Internal Revenue Code, an analysis which
included an examination of the company's purposes as announced by it, see Modern Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. C.I.R., 420 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1970).
99 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 74 (1959) (Brennan J. con-
curring). See Hearings Before Subcom. of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency on S.
3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., at 181 '(1940).
100 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 90-91 (1959).
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to policyholders, and the account's assets are also the reserves for the policies.-'-
Nevertheless, these characteristics are not sufficient to eliminate potential abuses
which are present in the variable insurance separate account. If state insurance
laws do not afford adequate alternatives to federal regulation," 2 the 1940 Act
applies to separate accounts, and the insurance companies exception should not
apply to them. The Commission held that separate accounts are investment
companies. It also held that separate accounts are not insurance companies.
B. Separate Accounts Are Open-End Investment Companies - Variable
Life Insurance Policies Are Not Periodic Payment Plan Certificates
The 1940 Act contains special provisions regulating companies that offer
and sell redeemable securities (open-end investment companies or mutual
funds) ." The Act also regulates the sale of mutual fund shares by installments
(periodic payment plan certificates).4 It is therefore important to determine
whether variable life insurance policies are redeemable securities or periodic
payment plan certificates, or both, and hence subject with their accounts to addi-
tional regulation.'
1. REDEEmABLE Scurrrs
There are two ways to determine whether variable policies are redeemable
securities: one is by comparing and distinguishing the features of these legal
arrangements, and the other is by comparing the need for investor protection
to which the two arrangements give rise.
The first approach leads to the conclusion that variable life insurance policies
are neither redeemable securities nor periodic payment plan certificates.' The
SEC staff argued that the terms of the policies satisfy the definition of redeemable
securities in that nonforfeiture provisions permit the holder to present his policy,
and obtain his proportionate share of the assets of the account. However, the
argument does not recognize the fact that the policyholder must surrender not
101 Frankel, supra note 19, at 317-18.
102 See pp. 1081 infra, as to § 15; and pp. 1071-72 infr4, as to § 22(c).
103 § 5(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1970). Redeemable security is defined as"any security, other than short-term paper, under the terms of which the holder, upon its
presentation to the issuer or to a person designated by the issuer, is entitled (whether
absolutely or only out of surplus) to receive approximately his proportionate share of the
issuer's current net assets, or the cash equivalent thereof." § 2(a)(32); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a) (32) (1970).
104 § 2(a) (27); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (27) (1970). A periodic payment plan certificate is
defined as:
(A) any certificate, investment contract, or other security providing for a series
of periodic payments by the holder, and representing an undivided interest in cer-
tain specified securities or in a unit or fund of securities purchased wholly or partly
with the proceeds of such payments, and (B) any security the issuer of which is
also issuing securities of the character described in clause (A) and the holder of
which has substantially the same rights and privileges as those which holders of
securities of the character described in clause (A) have upon completing the periodic
payments for which such securities provide.
105 See §§ 11, 12(b), 12(d)(1)'(B), 18(f), 22, 24(b), 24(c), 24(f); 15 U .S.C. §§
80a-11, 12(b), 12(d)(1)(B), 18(f), 22, 24(b), 24(e), 24(f) (1970).
106 Frankel, supra note 19, at 386-87.
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only his right to cash value but the whole policy. The surrender of a policy means
the surrender of insurance coverage, which may be valuable, 0 7 It is not clear
whether cash value is synonymous with the policyholder's "proportionate share'
of the account's assets. At present, a policy has no cash value for the first few
years of its life. Arguably, the cash surrender value could constitute a "propor-
tionate share." Another view is that cash surrender value ought to constitute the
full proportionate share of the policyholder in the reserve. This view ventures into
the insurance field, and may be too simplistic. Lapses affect remaining policy-
holders as such, in addition to their participation in investments of the separate
account. The better view seems to this writer to be that the payment of
cash value is not redemption wi.thin the meaning of the 1940 Act, because sur-
render of the policy is more than surrender of the investment contract which it
contains.
On the other hand, the second approach to the problem, based on the need
of investors for the protection of the federal acts,1s indicates that variable policies
are indeed redeemable securities, and that the accounts that issue them should
be deemed to be open-end investment companies.
The special regulation of mutual funds is the result of some unique features
of these companies. The redeemable securities which mutual funds sell °9
raised special problems. Valuation of assets for the purpose of establishing re-
demption price was inaccurate and redemption price was not promptly paid.
In addition, the investment adviser generated high-pressure sales techniques
because its fee was based on the value of the company's assets. Aggressive sales-
manship led to undesirable practices, such as misleading advertisement. Since
mutual fund shares are ordinarily "sold rather than bought," the key factor in
successful marketing is the compensation of salesmen. Companies therefore
permitted exorbitant sales commissions." 0
The purpose of the 1940 Act regulation is to curb these abuses. Mutual
funds must price their shares according to the value of the underlying portfolio,
pursuant to prescribed valuation methods."' Companies must redeem the shares
within seven days of demand." 2 The Commission supervises sales literature,"3
and projections based on past performance are prohibited." The rate of com-
missions that purchasers pay is controlled and must not be "excessive.
The abuses inherent in the sale of redeemable securities are also inherent in
the sale of variable life insurance policies. First, insurance is also sold rather than
bought. The insurance industry also caters to salesmen by offering high com-
missions, rather than to purchasers by reducing insurance cost. Further, invest-
107 E.g., if the insured became in the meantime uninsurable.
108 Sae SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). See also SEC v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 210, 211 (1967).
109 § 2(a)(32); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32) (1970).
110 SEC REPORT, supra note 11, at 95-95, 196; Hearings H.R. 9510 & H.R. 9511 Before
the Subcom. on Commerce & Fin. of the House Com. on Inter. & Foreign Commerce, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 49 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Mutual Fund Hearings].
111 § 2(a) (41); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (41) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 270. 22c-1 (1972).
112 § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1970).
113 § 24(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b) (1970).
114 17 C.F.R. § 271.2621 (1972).
115 § 22(a)'(1); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(a)(1) (1970).
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ment occupies an important role in the policies. There is no reason to assume
that the insurance industry will not make the most of the investment perform-
ance of its accounts, and use investment results as a prominent sales feature. The
potential for abuse in the sale of variable life insurance policies is greater than in
the sale of mutual fund shares since investment might be confused with protec-
tion and security which insurance offers. Purchasers might be led to believe
that investment with insurance companies is "safer" than with other investment
media. Since commissions to salesmen are calculated as part of the premiums,
purchasers of insurance are unable to compare commissions charged to them by
various companies for the same product. As to redemptions, there is similar need
for protection in connection with valuation and measuring of investment per-
formance. In addition, the need for prompt payment of cash surrender value is
similar to the need for prompt redemptions." 6 The second approach leads to the
conclusion that the protection offered by the 1940 Act is relevant to variable
life insurance except where federal regulation is rendered unnecessary by ade-
quate state protection.
2. PERIODIC PAYMENT PLAN CERTIFICATES
Section 27 of the 1940 Act regulates the purchases of periodic payment plan
certificates."' The buyers of these certificates are usually small unsophisticated
investors. They generally pay a high sales load and most of it is paid in advance
(front-end load). If installment payments are not continued, as in many cases
they are not, purchasers lose the front-end load. The least experienced and
smallest investors therefore lose the most."
8
The 1940 Act requires that periodic payment plan certificates be redeem-
able, regardless of contract provisions." 9 The load is limited to 9 per cent,"'
and the front-end load is limited to various percentages of actual payments."
The company must repay part of the front-end load if the purchaser surrenders
his certificate at an early stage. Purchasers must receive notice specifying all
charges and expenses, whereupon they have an opportunity to terminate the
contract before starting payment. 2'
Level premium life insurance posed some similar problems. Nothing in the
law of contracts required an insurance company to pay holders of lapsed policies
the savings that they had accumulated. Originally, the companies argued that
withdrawing policyholders should receive nothing because life insurance was
designed to give protection from loss only in the event of death; the savings of
116 On the question of liquidity separate accounts may be subject to different requirements.
The amount of death benefits plus demands for cash surrender value -may be different than
anticipated redemptions in mutual funds. Separate accounts may therefore need either more
or less ready cash.
117 § 2(a)(27); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (27) (1970). See Mutual Fund Hearings, supra
note 110, at 114.
118 See generally SEC REPoRT, supra note 11, at 169-204, 187 (statistics on lapsed con-
tracts).
119 § 27(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(c)(1) (1970).
120 § 27(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a)(1) (1970).
121 § 27(a) (h); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a)(h) (1970).
122 § 27(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(e) (1970).
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the withdrawing policyholders should be divided among the remaining policy-
holders through reduced premiums. This harsh view has been completely
abandoned." 3 All fifty states and the District of Columbia require the company
to provide minimum nonforfeiture benefits to the withdrawing policyholder.',
Statutory minimum nonforfeiture benefits are below what most insurance
companies offer. In this area, competition plays a role. Even so, nonforfeiture
benefits offer less than the full reserve funding of the policy.
2 5 This amount would
have been the equivalent of redemption price under the 1940 Act. If this
measure were adopted, the remaining policyholders would have borne the un-
liquidated acquisition expenses of the policies. 2
Various reasons are offered for giving policyholders less than their full
savings. 12 7 First, policyholders may utilize the privilege during times of economic
depression and thereby endanger the financial position of the insurance company
to the detriment of the remaining policyholders. Second, withdrawals force the
company to adopt a more conservative investment policy to keep a portion of
the assets liquid. Third, nonforfeiture privilege tends to create an adverse mortal-
ity selection because healthy policyholders in need of money will lapse their
policies more readily than policyholders whose health is failing. Some writers
argue that withdrawing policyholders should continue to make contribution to
123 HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 40, at 401-3. 3A. APPLEMAN, suprm note 71, at § 1864.
Meyers v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 10 (1967); Fayman v. Franklin Life Ins.
Co., 386 S.W.2d 52 (1965) (the purpose of nonforfeiture statutes was to prevent unfair
situations in which insurance companies could keep all of the net value of a lapsed life
policy).
124 For explanation of computations of cash value under the Standard Non-Forfeiture Act,
see HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 40, at 407-15. J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 180-83
(9th ed. 1962), N. KRUEGER & L. WAGGONNER, THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT
196-98 (1953). ALA. CODE Tit. 28, § 373 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.300 (1968);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1231 (1956); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 66-3327 (ii) (1966); CAL.
INS. CODE § 10159.1 - 10163 (Supp. 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-A-2 to -19 - 7
(1963); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 18 § 2929 (1971); D. C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35 - 705b
(1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0225 (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2504 (1971);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 431-561 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1927 (12) (Supp. 1971);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 841.2 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4206b, 39-4208c (1965);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 508.37 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-428 (Supp. 1971); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.15-310 to -360 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:168 (Supp.
1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2524-34 '(1971); MI. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 414
(1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §§ 144, 146 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.14060
(Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.24 (1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 5669-03 (Supp.
1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 376.630, 376.670 (1968); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 40-3831
(Supp. 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-407 to - 407.09 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 57,
§§ 688A.290 - .360 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 409:1 -:8 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17B:25-19 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-8-3 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. INS. LAW § 208-a
(McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-201.2 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-03-26
(1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3915.07 (Page 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4029
(Supp. 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 743.204 - 743.222 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 510.1 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-4-15 (1968); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-171
to -175.7 (Supp. 1971); S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 58-15-31 to -43 (1967); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-1113 (1968); TEX. INS. CODE art. 3.44a (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-
22-13(2) (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 3741 - 49 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-461
to -468.2 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.23.350 (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE § 33-13-
30 (1966); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 206.181 (Supp. 1972); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-364 (1957).
125 HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 40, at 402. This amount is all the premiums paid (less
dividends) plus assumed interest less a pro rata share of the policyholder of death claims and
average expenses of the company.
126 Id. at 403.
127 Id. at 404.
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the special contingency fund of the company, like the remaining policyholders.
In addition, the prevailing philosophy is that the cost of marketing and handling
the surrendered policy should be deducted from the amount due to the policy-
holder.
Both insurance and mutual funds industries follow the principle that the
purchaser alone should bear the sales-load. In mutual funds the payment of
sales commissions is not considered a legitimate fund expense' because such a
payment would directly affect the share value, and because, so the argument
runs, increase in fund assets through sales is not one of the fund's purposes.
Insurance companies have more flexibility. The shareholders of the company are
only indirectly affected by payment of sales commissions. The only possible con-
cern to nonparticipating policyholders would be that the payments might en-
danger the financial stability of the company. Commissions may, but need not,
affect participating policies, because they might affect the dividends. Hence, state
insurance laws usually permit insurance companies to pay and finance sales com-
missions from their general accounts. The laws of three states impose an over-
all limitation on the amounts which insurance companies may spend on salesmen
to ensure that these payments will not deplete the companies' resources.
Even though both industries charge the sales-load to the purchaser, the
sales-load on insurance policies differs from that on mutual fund shares in two
aspects. The 1940 Act limits the load and front-end load that may be charged on
periodic payment plan certificates, whereas insurance statutes dealing with the
subject limit the amount which the insurance company may pay its salesmen.
Second, the amount which state insurance laws permit far exceeds the limitation
of the 1940 Act. 29 The result is that in most cases a policy has a cash value equal
to the reserves (the investment component) only after nine years, and that a
policyholder will lose all or part of his investment if the policy is lapsed during
this period. A purchaser of a periodic payment plan certificate, on the other
hand, would lose upon lapse of his plan in the first year only 15 per cent of his
investment."' Furthermore, even though the insurance industry argues that lapses
are less compatible with insurance policies than with investments-because in in-
surance the investment is forced and earmarked for a specific use-this argument
flies in the face of the staggering percentage of lapses of policies in their early
years.' In the last analysis, insurance salesmen receive higher commissions than
their brethren who sell mutual fund shares, and policyholders pay the difference.
Notwithstanding these facts, it seems to the writer that the protection
of § 27 regarding load should not apply to variable policies without further re-
search. First, when cash value is not available the policyholders usually receive,
after the first year of the policy, a substitute paid-up policy. It may also be
128 Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 374 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994- (1971).
The decision was based on the charter provision that upon sale of its shares the company
receives their full asset value.
129 Some companies spend more than 100 per cent of the first year's premium on sales
expenses out of which 55 per cent may be paid to the salesman.
130 § 27(d); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(d) (1970).
131 Memorandum of Phillips, supra note 5, at 31. In the first year of the policy termination
may range from 15 per cent to 25 per cent. 10 per cent of the remaining policyholders termi-
nate their policies in the second year of the policy; an aggregate of 4,4 per cent terminate by
the end of the fifth year, 53 per cent by the end of the tenth year.
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argued that whether or not variable policyholders take an investment risk is not
necessarily relevant to the amount of the load. In addition, the services and
qualification of salesmen of variable life insurance might merit different com-
pensation. Moreover, the usual purchase of mutual fund shares is for cash, not
by installments, whereas the normal life insurance policy is for annual level
premiums rather than a single premium. Savings in life insurance is accumula-
tion of sufficient funds to cover death benefits in later years. To replace annual
premiums with a single premium is to lay out more money in advance, rather
than to pay for shares that can be delivered now. Finally, if § 27 applied only
to the investment component in the premiums of variable policies, the company
could charge the rest of its front-end load and commissions under the insurance
rate and thus avoid the limitation. If the section applied to the whole amount of
premium, the section would directly regulate the sale of life insurance.
As to the right under § 27 to terminate the contract without losses, insurance
laws grant a similar right to the unsophisticated purchasers of industrial policies,
by permitting them to cancel the policies within two to three weeks for the full
amount of their premiums."5 2 Conventional policyholders do not get this pro-
tection.
It may be argued that variable policyholders need, for their protection, the
right to terminate their policies upon perusal of the charges and costs to them,
although it is difficult to see the difference between variable and conventional
policies in this respect. It may also be wise and desirable to give variable life in-
surance policyholders termination rights. They are more sophisticated than the
purchasers of industrial policies, but they might be as ignorant and gullible with
respect to a novel product such as this. However, the purpose of the 1940 Act
was to enable purchasers to examine, free of sales pressure, all charges and ex-
penses in connection with the sale. The purpose did not extend to other features
of the contract, complex as they might be. It would therefore be inappropriate
to apply these provisions to variable insurance without express congressional
intent.
Another aspect of the problem, and perhaps the real issue in this matter, is
the competitive position of the three products: mutual fund shares, conventional
life insurance, and variable life insurance. That it is socially desirable to provide
the public with as many alternative modes of investments as possible, is presumed
to be axiomatic. It follows that to the extent that a mode of investment is
offered by a certain industry, the welfare of that industry is in the public interest.
As equally axiomatic is the principle that healthy competition among members of
an industry and among industries offering alternative investments is in the public
interest. It is therefore important to keep the competitive position of the insur-
ance and investment industries and their various products reasonably balanced.
The difficulty in applying § 27 to variable life insurance stems from the unknown
nature of the variable insurance policy and from the fact that the key to suc-
cessful sale of mutual fund shares and insurance policies is in the hands of the
132 R. KEETON, BASIC INSURANCE LAW 55 (1960). During this period the policyholders
are covered. The premiums are usually very low at weekly payments. Purchasers of these
policies are usually factory workers; hence their name. J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 413
(9th ed. 1962).
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salesmen. It is interesting to note that although only about a third of the mutual
funds are sold by installments, subject to § 27 of the 1940 Act, the industry has
been selling shares for cash at the same rate of commissions as the maximum
permitted under § 27, namely, about 8.5 per cent. Mutual fund salesmen, there-
fore, have less incentive to prefer periodic payment plan certificates to cash
transactions."' In the insurance field, companies use commissions to promote
products that they favor and to demote products that they do not. If variable life
is considered by the public as an alternative to life insurance, the Commission
might hand a disincentive to insurance salesmen by applying the limitations of §
27, and determine in advance the fate of the policy. On the other hand, if the
public considers mutual funds and variable life policies as interchangeable,
mutual fund salesmen might be directed to the sale of variable life insurance if §
27 is not applied. The answer may be in the manner in which the policies will be
advertised and sold, and in full or partial competition among salesmen." 4
Proponents of the investment industry suggested that the high load on in-
surance policies reflects the higher value which society places on life insurance as
compared with mere investments. This idea leads us back to the question of how
much insurance is variable life insurance. There is consensus that the policies
have sufficiently redeeming features to warrant their sale to the public. But their
place on the list of socially desirable economic arrangements is open to debate.
If the place depends on public evaluation, then the sales commissions should be
subject to free competition with full and clear disclosure to investors. Past ex-
perience shows that since incentive to the salesmen is crucial to the marketing
of shares and policies, free competition is hard to achieve. But because today's
public is more sophisticated and educated, free competition among salesmen and
members of the investment and insurance industries may result in placing com-
mission levels where they ought to be.
In any event, before identical rules apply to mutual fund shares and vari-
able insurance a closer examination of the expenses and competitive positions of
the two industries and their products should be made.
IV. Rules Governing the Relationship Between State Insurance Laws and
the Investment Company Act
A. General Background
If separate accounts are open-end investment companies, they are subject
to regulation by state insurance laws and by the 1940 Act. The relationship
between federal and state laws is governed by the Supremacy Clause. The 1940
Act expressly preserves state laws," 5 provided that the two do not conflict. How-
133 The front-end load, however, still provides an incentive for salesmen to prefer periodic
payment plans.
134 See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7475 (Nov. 3, 1972); SEC Investment
Company Act Release No. 7555 (Dec. 8, 1972) (Proposal to permit competition among sales-
men of mutual fund shares).
135 § 50; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-50 (1971). 1 L. Loss, Sacuarrms REGULATioN 155-56 (2d ed.
1961). § 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 is similar. With respect to this section, it has
been held that since Congress did not limit the application of the Securities Act to interstate
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ever, in 1945 Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act
[hereinafter the McCarran-Ferguson, or McCarran Act].3 which gives a special
status to state laws regulating the business of insurance. In searching for the ap-
plicable law, therefore, the first question is whether the 1940 Act and state laws
conflict so as to preclude, under federal law, concurrent application of both laws.
The second question, regardless of the answer to the first, is whether the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act applies.
When state law is stricter than the federal act the two may conflict. In
Investors Diversified Services v. Diggles"7 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that a state law which requires a face-amount certificate company to deposit
with a state agency $500,000 conflicted with the provisions of § 28(b) of the
1940 Act that specifies the type of investments in which the company may main-
tain its reserves. State law rendered illegal some investments which federal law
did not prohibit. The court saw such a clear conflict "as to require no citation
of authority," but added that state law might also place an undue burden on
interstate commerce and therefore be constitutionally objectionable. The de-
cision was criticized on the grounds that the case may not have presented a real
conflict, since the state statute required a deposit, and the federal act did not,
and further that company could comply with both statutes.'
In Crosby v. Weil... the Supreme Court of Illinois considered the validity
of an Illinois statute that imposed stricter civil remedies for securities' violations
than those provided in the Securities Act of 1933. "It is entirely possible" said
the court, "that a security which the Securities Exchange Commission would
authorize to be sold could not be sold in Illinois under the Illinois law."' 40 The
court noted that when the 1933 Act was passed state laws existed and since
Congress expressly preserved state laws, they are presumably not in conflict with
the securities act, or are deemed preserved by Congress. The transaction was
local, and the state law was not clearly repugnant to federal law since it would
not have a detrimental effect on the national regulatory policy declared by the
federal securities acts.
When state law produces a result which is contrary to the policy of the
federal act, a conflict arises. In Public Service Commission of New York v.
Securities and Exchange Commission'4' it was held that the SEC could exercise
its power under the Public Utility Company Act of 1935 without first obtaining
a state commission's approval. The power of the SEC was to require a plan not
commerce, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction is permitted. SEC v. Timetrust, Inc.,
28 F. Supp. 34, 41 '(N.D. Cal. 1939). See also Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108
F.2d 51, 56 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Frankel, supra
note 19, at 288.
136 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970).
137 272 Wis. 66, 74 N.W.2d 805 (1956).
138 1 L. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 157 n. 95 (2d ed. 1961).
139 382 Ill 538, 48 N.E.2d 386 (1943); Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1252 (1943). The case dealt
with the Securities Act of 1933, but the same rationale applies to the 1940 Act. Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), aff'd 339 U.S. 643
(1950); First Nat'1 Savings Foundation, Inc. v. Samp, 274- Wisc. 118, 80 N.W.2d 249 (1956).
140 Crosby v. Well, 382 Ill. 538, 543, 48 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1943).
141 166 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1948).
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only to approve or permit it. 42 A state commission should not through its power
of approval, exercise a veto and weaken the impact of federal law. State law had
to yield.
It is submitted that state law that imposes an additional duty on a company
is not in conflict with federal law unless unduly burdensome.' As to insurance
laws, it seems that the McCarran-Ferguson Act has removed the last mentioned
limitation.' When federal law leaves certain options to a company and state
law limits or eliminates some of the options, there is no conflict unless the federal
]aw is designed to encourage the exercise of the options. There seems to be no
reason to prevent states from requiring or forbidding actions which the com-
panies are free to do or to abstain from doing. Thus, there is no conflict between
the 1940 Act that requires unseasoned investment companies to have a net worth
of $100,000 and state law that requires a higher minimum net worth.' 5 There is
no conflict between state law that prohibits underwriting activities by accounts,
and the 1940 Act that only restricts these activities." The thrust of the federal
provision is to provide safeguards for investors. Additional safeguards do not
conflict.
When state law frees a company from a prohibition or a requirement of
federal law, a conflict exists. Thus, when state law permits investments in
another investment company beyond the federal maximum, 4  or allows a com-
pany to disenfranchise policyholders that under federal law should have a vote,4 "
state law has to yield.
49
In some areas state laws supplement the 1940 Act. The 1940 Act does not
prescribe a full organizational scheme for investment companies. These questions
are governed by state laws, subject to specific federal provisions.rO Thus, the
1940 Act provision that contractholders have a vote does not conflict with state
insurance laws that give insurance commissioners the power to remove dis-
142 § 11(e) imposed on the "SEC the 'duty' of ascertaining how far holding com-
panies can be 'simplified' ... and vests it with power to accomplish these ends." Id. at 787. If
the prior approval of the state authority to issue the securities is required, then the SEC would
have to dismiss the proceeding under one section and start under another. The court refused
to give to § 11(e) this interpretation. Id.
143 E.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). (An Arizona statute providing that
bankruptcy of an adjudged negligent driver does not release him from liability for the judg-
ment held to conflict with the federal Bankruptcy Act that declares bankrupts are released
from prior debts. The conflict stems from the purposes of statutes because the state act is
aimed at providing leverage for collection of damage.); Powers v. McCullough, 258 Iowa 738,
140 N.W.2d 378, 383 (1966) (State statute which required an employer to report certain
accidents to state authority did not conflict with the monthly reporting of railroad accidents to
the Interstate Commerce Commission under the federal statute because the employer could
comply with both, Congress did not intend to preempt the field, and there was no undue
burden on interstate commerce.); see also G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 8, § 2 (8th ed. 1970).
144 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
145 See p. 1072 infra.
146 See p. 1076 infra.
147 § 12(d) (1); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1) (1970). See p. 1077 infra.
148 Even here there is no real conflict if state law does not require a company to invest
more than the federally permitted percentage.
149 See p. 1081 infra.
150 National banks offer an appropriate contrast. The constitution of the banks is carefully
spelled out in the federal law. State law is therefore sparingly applied. See Rogers v. First Nat.
Bank of St. George, 410 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1969). A statute requiring the setting of the
record date prior to a shareholders' meeting concerning the merger of national banks would
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
qualified management. 5' As a matter of interpretation of the 1940 Act, state law
should apply.
As noted, the relationship between state and federal law with respect to
insurance is specifically governed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The history
of insurance regulation and the events that preceded the Act are a necessary and
fascinating introduction to any discussion of the Act.'52
Insurance regulation began about one hundred and twenty years ago when
the several states started to tax and regulate insurance companies. The insurance
industry resisted state regulation on the constitutional ground that state taxation
unduly burdens interstate commerce. In Paul v. Virginia"'58 the Supreme Court
held that the states could tax and regulate insurance business because the business
was not interstate commerce. For the next seventy-five years, it was assumed on
that ground,54 that insurance was exclusively within state control. During that
period state regulation helped preserve the industry's solvency, eliminated fly-
by-night operations, and thereby strengthened the public image of the industry.","
However, during that period insurance companies became major taxpayers in
many states and acquired influence commensurate with their contributions. This
influence occasionally affected state regulation of objectionable insurance prac-
tices. Some insurance companies used coercion, boycott, and combinations to
maintain monopoly, price fixing and exorbitant premiums. These practices
brought about the intervention of the federal government. For the first time in
the history of insurance regulation the Attorney General of the United States
brought suit against a powerful organization of insurance companies for viola-
tions of federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association58 that federal antitrust laws applied to
the business of insurance, because insurance is interstate commerce for the
purposes of federal jurisdiction.
The case raised an uproar. While the case was still pending there were some
conflict with the terms of a federal statute requiring only that the vote be ratified and
confirmed by affirmative vote of two thirds of the shares and South Carolina statute could not
be the basis of invalidating the vote for merger merely because no record date was kept. See
also Frankel, supra note 19 at 261-63.
151 § 18(i); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1970). See the definition of a company, § 2(a) (8);
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8) (1970) and § 16; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1970).
152 As to the McCarran Act and history of insurance regulation see generally Woodroof,
Annuities Regulation in a Changing Society, 7 CAL. Was. L. REv. 307 (1971); see also Stem,
The McCarran Act-Twenty Years After, 1966 ABA SECTION OF INS., NEG., & COMPENSATION
LAw 302, Mertz, The First Twenty Years-A Case Law Commentary on Insurance Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause, Nat. Ass'n of Independent Insurers (1965); Maloney, Federal
Regulation of Insurance, 1968 INS. L.J. 363.
153 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
154 "The business of insurance is not commerce." Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655
(1895); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 503-04, 510 (1913).
See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 544 n. 18 (1944);
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 432 (1935); Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274,
276-77 (1927); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71, 75 (1922); North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918); Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183
U.S. 553 (1902); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401 (1900); Noble v.
Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367, 370 (1896); Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 118
(1886); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566, 573 (1870); Ducat v.
Chicago, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410, 415 (1870).
155 Bredon, Insurance-the Regulation Phase, 22 CONN. B.J. 149 (1948).
156 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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attempts to oust the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over insurance companies."'
After the decision the attempts were directed at exempting insurance mainly
from federal antitrust laws. Both the states and the insurance companies exerted
pressure. Their supporters argued that the decision created chaos.. because
insurance companies refused to pay taxes on which the states depended for
revenue,5 9 and that federal intervention was unwarranted since the states have
effectively regulated the insurance industry, as proven in the depression era?e°
The opponents of exclusive state regulation of insurance conceded that the states
had effectively preserved the financial condition of insurance companies. This
group did not demand federal regulation of insurance; it argued for concurrent
regulation, especially in the area of antitrust laws."'
B. Interpretation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
The McCarran Act deals specifically with a number of federal statutes and
their application to insurance. As to other federal statutes § 2(b) of the Act
provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of in-
surance: Provided, that ... the Sherman Act, and ... the Clayton Act,
and... the Federal Trade Commission Act... shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law.'
62
1. "UNLESS SUCH ACT specifically relates TO THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE..
It is submitted that the Investment Company Act is not an Act that "specifi-
cally relates to the business of insurance." To be sure, the Act refers to the busi-
157 The South-Eastern Underwriters case prompted insurance companies to argue that the
federal government is seeking control over the regulation of the industry. For 75 years the
Supreme Court upheld the power of states to regulate and tax insurance companies on the
ground that insurance was not commerce. To many this statement meant that the Commerce
Clause did not apply to insurance and hence, that congressional authority was limited. Even
before the decision was made, there were attempts to limit the jurisdiction of Congress, to
reestablish the exclusive power of states to regulate and tax insurance. When these attempts
failed, bills were introduced to exempt insurance from specific federal statutes, especially the
antitrust federal legislation. 90 CONG. REc. 6450 (1944) (remarks of Senator LaFollette).
158 91 CoNG. REc. 1093 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Sumners).
159 The advocates of state regulation aimed at a bill that would go as far -as possible in
overruling the Underwriters case on the grounds that the decision shakes the foundation of
state taxing power. 91 CONG. REc. 1087 (1945) "The insurance commissioners and many
of the insurance companies have been in very great doubt as to how they could operate at
this time with respect to matters of collection of premiums, . . . and many other aspects of
the business. Therefore, it seems very desirable that somewhere in this measure there should
be a statement that the right of the States to regulate and to collect taxes should not be
terminated or should not be repealed by implication." 91 CONG. REac. 482 (1945) (remarks of
Senator Radcliffe).
160 For a blistering attack of federal regulation see 90 CoNG. REc. 6418 (1944) (remarks
of Mr. Allen).
161 Senator Radcliffe pointed to the enormous powers of insurance companies and to the
change of heart of insurance companies, who at the beginning of the century clamoured for
federal regulation and now wanted state regulation. 91 CONG. REc. 782 (1945).
162 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970).
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ness of insurance: it excepts an insurance company from the definition of an in-
vestment company;1"3 it expressly reserves the powers of insurance agencies in
connection with investment companies' holdings of insurance companies' stock; 64
it expressly requires registration 5 of insurance contracts issued by investment
companies, even though insurance contracts are exempt from registration under
the Securities Act of 1933.116 On the basis of these provisions the SEC argued
before the Supreme Court in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Com-
panyP67 that the 1940 Act "specifically relates" to the business of insurance. 68
It does not seem that the Supreme Court accepted this argument. Without re-
ferring to this argument, Justice Douglas for the majority, envisioned possible
impairment by the 1940 Act of state insurance laws." 9 In SEC v. United Benefit
Life Insurance Campany7 ° the Court voiced the same concern.
171
According to the legislative history of the McCarran Act, a federal act
"specifically relates" when it applies by its terms to insurance business even
though it invalidates state insurance law.' 2 The intent of this provision was to
avoid inadvertent federal encroachment on state insurance legislation.' 3 There-
fore, the mere existence of sections that are, by their terms, applicable to in-
163 § 2(a)(17); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (17) (1970) (defining insurance companies); § 3
(c) (3); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (3) '(1970) (excepting insurance companies from the definition
of an investment company).
164 § 12(g); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(g) (1970).
165 § 24(d); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(d) (1970).
166 § 3(a)(8); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1970).
167 Brief for the Petitioner at 60-61, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65
(1959).
168 §§ 3(c)(3) and 2(a)(17) in the 1940 Act "make it clear that a company which is
within the definition of an investment company and which is engaged in the writing of in-
surance but not primarily and predominantly so engaged is subject to regulation under the
Investment Company Act .. " Id. This argument may be strengthened on the ground that
"specific" is not necessarily "express." BLAcK's LEGAL DICTIONARY 1571 (Rev'd 4th ed. 1968)
defines specific as "precisely formulated or restricted; definite; explicit; of an exact or particular
nature."
169 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 68 (1959).
170 387 U.S. 202 (1967). The Court held that an "insurance policy" in the 1940 Act was
"insurance business" in the McCarran Act. Variable annuities, being securities, were not the
business of insurance.
171 Id. at 212. It should be mentioned, however, that the Court remanded upon the request
of the SEC.
172 The first version of the McCarran-Ferguson Bill (S. 340, introduced by Senator Fer-
guson on January 25, 1945, 91 CONG. REc. 478-9) used the expression "so provides." There
is no explanation for the change of language in the final version from "so provides" to "relates
to the business of insurance." It seems that the purpose of the change was only to clarify the
meaning. Senator Ferguson explained these words as follows:
If there is on the books of the United States a legislative act which relates to inter-
state commerce, if the act does not specifically relate to insurance, it would not apply
at the present time .... If Congress should tomorrow pass a law relating to interstate
commerce, and should not specifically apply the law to the business of insurance, it
would not be an implied repeal of this bill, and this bill would not be affected,
because the Congress had not, under subdivision (b), said that the new law specifically
applied to insurance.
Id. at 481. The Act applied to past, as well as future, legislation. 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (1945).
"No existing law and no future law should, by mere implication, be applied to the business of
insurance." (Affirmed by Senator Ferguson on question of Senator O'Mahoney). 91 CONG.
REc. 1487 (1945).
173 Senator Ferguson: "We wanted to make sure that the Congress, in its wisdom, would
act specifically with reference to insurance in enacting the law." 91 CONG. REc. 1487 (1945).
"We are removing ourselves from the field as far as possible. No act of Congress governing
interstate commerce shall apply to insurance unless the act specifically so states." 91 CONG.
REc. 1090 (1945) (statement of Mr. Gwynne of Iowa).
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surance, is not sufficient to satisfy the "specifically related" requirement with
respect to other sections of the Act that impair state insurance laws, but are silent
as to their applicability to the business of insurance.
In 1970 Congress passed extensive amendments to the 1940 Act. 74 Among
the amendments are two provisions specifically concerning separate accounts:
one defining separate accountsy15 and the other excepting from the definition
of an "investment company" separate accounts which hold assets derived solely
from tax qualified plans. 7 1 The question is whether Congress extended the In-
vestment Company Act to nonexcepted separate accounts, either as defined in
the 1970 Amendments or as interpreted by the Commission in Prudential.
7
The second question is whether, by the 1970 Amendments, the 1940 Act
"specifically relates" to the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the
McCarran Act. It is doubtful whether the two sections in the 1970 Amendments
support a positive answer.
No inference can be drawn from the definitional section in the 1970
Amendments Act. This definition is very wide. It covers all accounts used in
insurance business including accounts that are not investment companies even by
the criteria established in the Prudential case.' It is inconceivable that Congress
intended all accounts as defined to be subject to the Act. The legislative history
of this section supports the same conclusion. According to the House and Senate
Reports the purpose of this section was to give a "definitional base" to the ex-
clusion of excepted accounts."' As to § 3(c) (11) excluding certain separate
accounts from the definition of an investment company, it is doubtful whether
this section can be interpreted to mean the reverse, that other, nonqualified
separate accounts are investment companies. At most, the enactment of the sec-
tion can be evidence that Congress was generally aware of the Commission's
assertion of authority over separate accounts, and did not act upon the matter.
In a long line of cases the Supreme Court held that when Congress reenacts
a statute, a long-standing, undisturbed and uncontested interpretation by an ad-
ministrative agency in charge of administering the statute will be given effect. A
somewhat similar rule exists in connection with judicial interpretation. The rule
has been questioned,' but the Supreme Court continues to apply it.' 8' The
rationale of the rule seems to be that congressional silence may be interpreted as
174 Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970).
175 § 2(a)(37); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (37) (1970):
An account established and maintained by an insurance company pursuant to the
laws of any State or territory of the United States, or of 'Canada or any province
thereof, under which income, gains and losses, whether or not realized, from assets
allocated to such account, are, in accordance with the applicable contract, credited
to or charged against such account without regard to other income, gains or losses of
the insurance company.
176 § 3(c) (11) ; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (11) (1970).
177 See Frankel, supra note 19, at 231-34.
178 In re Prudential Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963).
179 HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 1970 ACT, H.R. REP. No.
1388, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970). See also SENATE COmm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
INv. Co. AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1969).
180 Griswold, A Summary of the Regulation Problem, 54 HARv. L. Rlv. 398, 400 (1941).
See also reservations expressed by K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT, § 5.07, at 93 (1959)
and Supp. 1971.
181 See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
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speaking in circumstances which should have prompted Congress to speak out.
One of these circumstances is congressional awareness of the administrative
or judicial interpretation. 8 ' Another is consensus among the affected interested
parties, the administrative agency or the courts."
In the case at hand there was no long-standing administrative or judicial
interpretation 8 4 but the exclusion section' shows that Congress was aware of,
and seriously considered, the Commission's interpretation regarding excluded
separate accounts. 8 On the other hand, with regard to nonexcepted separate
accounts there is no discussion, no request for changes,' 7 no decision to leave or
deal with the problem.
Congressional approval is rarely implied from total inaction.' But it may
be implied from re-enactment as well as other actions.' Courts have expressed
doubts as to the validity of drawing inferences from the unspoken legislative
word. The legislature may refrain from acting for a variety of reasons which
are unconnected with the merits of the case. 9 Most courts consider the rule as
182 The interpretations must be long-standing. It has been held that a short term ad-
ministrative interpretation of a reenacted section does not give it the effect of law. See Ten-
Broek, Interpretative Administrative Action and the Lawmaker's Will, 20 ORE. L. REv. 206,
219 (1941).
183 Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 '(1955); Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U.S.
498, 512 (1959).
184 The Prudential decision was handed down by the Commission in 1963. In re Prudential
Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963), aff'd 326 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964). Congressional hearings on the Mutual Fund Amendments Bill began in 1967. Hearings
on H.R. 9510, H.R. 9511 Before the Sub comm. on Commerce and Finance of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1 and 2 (1967). The Supreme
Court left the door open for further discussion. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S.
202, 212 (1967). The industry refrained, by and large, from registering under the 1940 Act,
and most of the accounts used by the industry were claimed to be excepted from the Act. SEC
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF SECURITIES AND EXCIHANGE CONIIsssoN, H.R.
Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 646, 648 (1971). Of 197 accounts, only 2.4 per
cent of the reporting assets were registered under the Act. See also Frankel, supra note 19, at
385. Consensus cannot be proved in this case.
185 § 3(a)(11); 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-3(a)(11) (1970).
186 (a) Hearings on S.34, and S.296 Before the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 32, 33, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51 (1969). (b) Hearings on H.R. 11995,
H.R. 13754, H.R. 14737 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 139, 179, 465, 499, 500, 501
(1967). (c) H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 18, 54 (1970). (d) S. REP. No. 1351,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 10, 20 (1968). (e) S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 12, 22 (1969).
187 (a) Hearings on H.R. 11995, H.R. 13754, H.R. 14737 Before the Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance of the Committee on Interstate And Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., at 139, 179 (1967). (b) H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 54 (1970).
(c) The industry did not ask for a change beyond an exemption of qualified plans. Hearings
on S.34 and S.296 Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 46,
48, 49, 50, 51, 52 (1969).
188 The Supreme Court in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962) held that such an aware-
ness of an administrative position and of a 1952 court decision, as reported by the Com-
mission, interpreting § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, plus absence of congressional
action pointed to the establishment of a binding interpretation. In that case, however,
Congress had refused in the original legislative session to adopt the interpretation urged in this
case. In addition, it seems that the majority did not accept the new interpretation which the
Commission was urging upon it. In any event, it is submitted that the sweeping statements
should not apply in this case. Inference from inaction was rejected in Jones v. Liberty Glass
Co., 332 U.S. 524 (1947); see also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510 (1959).
189 E.g., Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962). There is a strong dissent
by Chief Judge Lumbard and Judges Friendly and Kaufman. See also Girouard v. United
States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
190 Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966): "The practicalities of the
legislative process furnish many reasons for the lack of success of a measure other than leg-
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a rule of interpretation,'"' even though the courts have characterized congres-
sional action as giving administrative interpretation, "the effect of law,"' 2
"legislative approval,' 93 or "acceptance"'9 4 or "adoption.""' 5  This language
does not mean that the administrative or judicial interpretation becomes law
that could not be changed except by Congress.
9 6
In the writer's opinion the hearings on the Mutual Fund Bill do not close
the door for judicial decision on the matter. As an aid to interpretation they
show, at most, that Congress was aware of the Prudental decision, that it did not
address itself, and was not asked to address itself, to the status of other than
excepted accounts under the 1940 Act,'9' that Congress may have left the further
islative dislike for the principle involved in the legislation." See also Duncan v. Railroad,
Retirement Board, 375 F.2d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1967): "True, long standing administrative
interpretation of a statute, acquiesced in by all interested parties, may form the basis for an
inference that the administrative interpretation is correct. However, courts are properly chary
of equating mere inaction with approval. .. ."
191 The Supreme Court permitted an administrative agency to change its long-standing
regulations that had weathered congressional reenactment, Mass. Trustees v. United States,
377 U.S. 235, 241-42 '(1963); to the same effect, Automobile Club v. Comm'r, 230 F.2d 585,
598-99 (6th Cir. 1956); especially when there was no evidence that Congress addressed itself
to the question, Mass. Trustees v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 241 (1963); and when new
circumstances justified the change, American Trucking v. A.T. & Santa Fe Rly Co., 387 U.S.
397 (1967). The attention of Congress was drawn to the problem, and relief was asked. When
legislation was pending, the industry asked that action be withheld until the agency made a
determination. When the agency acted to grant relief, deviating from twenty-five years of
consistent interpretation, the court said:
We do not regard this as legislative history demonstrating a congressional construction
of the meaning of the statute, nor do we find . . . evidence of an administrative
interpretation of the Act which should tilt the scales against the correctness of the
Commission's conclusions as to its authority.... The advocacy of legislation by an
administrative agency-and even the assertion of the need for it to accomplish a
desired result-is an unsure and unreliable, and not a highly desirable, guide to
statutory construction.
Id. at 417-18. It was also held by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
that when Congress re-enacted a statute without considering a particular point or referring to it,
re-enactment cannot be given controlling weight to an originally "erroneous administrative in-
terpretation." Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1949), and to the same
effect, East Brewton Materials, Inc. v. State, 45 Ala. 584, 233 So.2d 751 (1970). The Supreme
Court has on various occasions restated its power to overrule its own "erroneous" decisions,
notwithstanding re-enactment of the statute on which the decisions rested without a change.
In James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961). The Court overruled its own decisions
of fifteen years' standing that embezzled funds should not be included in the declaration of
income tax of the year in which they were misappropriated. ". . . the fact that Congress has
remained silent or has re-enacted a statute.., or that congressional attempts to amend a rule
announced by this Court have failed, does not necessarily debar us from re-examining and
correcting ... errors." Id.
192 Comm'r v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 682 (1965): "a long standing administrative
interpretation, applying to a substantially re-enacted statute, is deemed to have received con-
gressional approval and has the effect of law." Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306
U.S. 110, 115 (1939).
193 United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 466 (1933); Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Gardner, 278 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
194 NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
195 United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337 (1907).
196 The rule is one of interpretation. "While it [the rule] is useful at times in resolving
statutory ambiguities, it does not mean that the prior construction has become so embedded in
the law that only Congress can effect a change." Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428, 432
(1941).
197 The issue of whether banks were permitted to establish commingled funds, which was
raised, was left to the courts. This does not mean that the fate of nonqualified separate accounts
would have been the same. The position of the insurance and banking industries may have been
different, the considerations regarding the McCarran Act may have been different from those
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development of the law to the Commission and the courts,19 and, perhaps, that
Congress recognizes the principle that separate accounts funding variable an-
nuities are entities that could be regulated by the 1940 Act.
Since Congress did not deliberate on the question of nonexcepted accounts
or on accounts funding variable life insurance, the exception of § 3(c) (11) is
not sufficient to classify the whole 1940 Act as "specifically related" to the busi-
ness of insurance. The questions which the McCarran Act poses are therefore not
foreclosed.
2. "No Act OF CONGRESS SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO INVALIDATE ... ANY LAW
ENACTED BY ANY STATE .. .FOR THE PURPOSE OF REGULATING THE BUSINESS
OF INSURANCE..."
The language of the McCarran Act covers all acts of Congress. Nonetheless
the SEC argued that Congress did not intend to cover all federal statutes which
apply to insurance companies but only those which apply solely on the basis of
the Commerce Clause.'9 9
The purpose of the McCarran Act, the Commission reasoned, was to allay
doubts raised by the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association,"' which resulted in applying to insurance
federal acts based on the Commerce Clause. The Act declares that state regula-
tion of insurance is desirable as a matter of federal policy," 1 prohibits certain
federal statutes from impairing state laws regulating insurance 2 unless they
specifically apply, and enumerates certain federal statutes which are not to apply
if the states preempt the field."°2 The Commission argued that legislative history
shows that Congress intended to preserve, but not to add to, the power of states
to regulate insurance.0 ' In view of this legislative history, the SEC argued that
federal statutes which had regulated insurance before the South-Eastern Under-
writers case are not subject to the limitations of the McCarran Act.
regarding the Glass-Steagal Act. See 4 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2538-49 (Supp.
1969). Frankel, supra note 19, at 236 n. 29.
198 Id.
199 Brief for Petitioner at 22-23, SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
Presumably this argument was rejected because the main thrust of the decision is that the
application of the securities acts to the solicitation of shareholders' votes for a merger of two
insurance companies does not directly impair state insurance law, ergo, the securities acts are
subject to the McCarran Act limitations when the business of insurance is involved.
200 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See Note, A Year of S.E.U.A., 23 CH.-KENT L. Rav. 317, 319
(1945).
201 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1970): "Congress declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regula-
tion of such business by the several States."
202 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970) : "(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance...."
203 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970): "... Provided, that after June 30, 1948, the Act of
July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as
amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the
extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
204 H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945). Frankel, supra note 19, at 210.
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There is language in some decisions to support this contention. In United
States v. Sylvanus °5 the court said that "it was not the intent of the Congress,
by its passage of the McCarran Act, to surrender control of the use of the
mails.. . ." And therefore even though the Mail Fraud Act did not specifically
apply to insurance business, the limitations of the McCarran Act were inopera-
tive. In Lamgdeau v. United States208 the court stated that nothing in the McCar-
ran Act indicates that the United States has given a state authority to extinguish
a tax obligation or debt due the United States, even though the debt was due
from an insolvent insurance company. In Sears Roebuck v. All States Life
Insurance Company9°T the court concluded "that there is nothing in the McCar-
ran Act that limits the right of the owner of a trade or service name to seek
redress in the federal courts merely because the approval of the name of the
infringing insurance company is part of the duties of the state board. The real
purpose of the McCarran Act" said the court, "is too well known to permit us to
extend its prohibitions to this situation ... 208
Nevertheless, this reasoning is not decisive. First, each decision alleged
other grounds, tending to show compliance with the McCarran Act, such as
that the state statute in question did not regulate the business of insurance," 9 or
that the federal statute did not impair state law, or that the facts did not
warrant a judgment.211 Some of these additional reasons are in logical conflict
with the ground that the federal statute is not subject to the constraints of the
McCarran Act. In such a case it is irrelevant whether the federal act impairs the
state statute or otherwise complies with the limitation of the McCarran Act.
This writer has found no case in which a decision was based solely on the ground
that the federal statute was outside the McCarran Act. 12 Second, the purpose
of the McCarran Act was not only to remove doubts as to whether state regula-
tion of insurance is permissible. Legislative history indicates that Congress con-
sidered the wider question of who should have the primary responsibility for
regulating insurance."' There were arguments between the advocates of con-
current federal and state regulation and the advocates of exclusive state regula-
205 United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Zachman v.
Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
206 363 S.W.2d 327, 331-32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
207 246 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 1957). See also Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 68
F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd on other grounds 167 F.2d 834 (1946) cert. denied, 335 U.S.
827 (1947).
208 246 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 1957).
209 United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1951): "The charge is not
that the corporate charter should be ignored or that the administrative officers of Illinois
may not perform their statutory duties and supervise and regulate the company's insurance
business in Illinois, but goes to the use of the mails, over which the Congress has, by the
Constitution, paramount power and authority." Langdeau v. United States, 363 S.W.2d 327,
330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962): "With respect to [state law] .. .we are of the opinion that it
does not regulate the business of insurance. It regulates the claims for wages of employees
of an insurer which is in receivership. It is for their benefit and in their aid alone. It lends
no help to the continuance of the business of insurance by the Company."
210 Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 64, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
211 Sears Roebuck v. All States Life Ins. Co. 246 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 1957).
212 Except, perhaps, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 413 (1954). See also
Id., at 437, 438 (dissenting opinion).
213 H.R. REP. No. 143 79th Cong. 1st Sess. (1945) states: "The purpose of the bill
is twofold: (1) To declare that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States
of the business of insurance is in the public interest ......
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tion. § 2(b) was not subject to a controversy. All factions agreed that the
states ought to continue their conventional regulation. 14 From this it follows, in
my opinion, that all acts of Congress should be construed according to the
dictates of the McCarran Act.
3. "No ACT OF CONGRESS SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO INVALIDATE, IMPAIR, OR
SUPERSEDE ANY LAW ENACTED BY ANY STATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF REGU-
LATING THE business of insurance ... ."
The McCarran Act protects only state laws that regulate insurance business.
The Act speaks of the "business of insurance", not of insurance companies.2 15
In 1959 the SEQ argued before the Supreme Court that a company which is
not an "insurance company" excepted under the 1940 Act does not conduct the
business of insurance under the McCarran Act because the two expressions are
synonymous."' The Supreme Court did not comment and decided on the basis
of another ground."'r
A question under the McCarran Act would arise only when a company
conducts a "business of insurance" as defined in the McCarran Act, but does
not qualify as an "insurance company" excepted from the 1940 Act.21 8 Such a
problem did not arise until 1963, when the Securities and Exchange Commission
held in the Matter of Prudential Insurance Company, that a separate account
funding variable annuities was not an insurance company, nor a part of the
214 Oppenheimer, Insurance and the Antitrust Laws, 1961 INS. L. J. 807, 816-17. "Ob-
viously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future state systems
for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This was done in two ways. One was by
removing obstructions which might be thought to flow its own power, whether dormant or
exercised, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation.
The other was by declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued state regulation and
taxation of this business is in the public interest ... ." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408, 429-30 (1946). See also Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate
Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Retrospect, 56 icQH. L. Ray. 545,
555 (1958); Note, A Year of S.E.U.A., 23 Cni.-KENT L. Rv. 317 (1945) on the history of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
215 "Insurance companies may do many things which are subject to paramount federal
regulation; only when they are engaged in the 'business of insurance' does . .. [the McCarran
Act] apply." SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969). See also Langdeau v.
United States, 363 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). See generally, Note, Insurance
Mergers and the Clayton Act 78 YALE L. J. 1404, 1411-1417 (1969).
216 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
217 Id. at 68. The decision was based on the ground that the definition of an insurance
contract is the same in the securities acts and the McCarran Act.
218 In the case of In re Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.W. Va. 1941) the
company amended its charter to enable it to issue insurance policies. The amendment was
made to qualify the company as an insurance company under the 1940 Act, in order to escape
the more rigorous requirements of the act. However, the question before the court was not
whether the company had succeeded in doing so but whether the company was an insurance
company within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, so as to escape federal jurisdiction under
that statute. After the passage of the McCarran Act the author has found no case in which
such a situation arose; in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Go., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) the
Supreme Court held that "the question common to the exemption provisions of the Securities
Act and the Investment Company Act and to § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is
whether the respondents are issuing contracts of insurance." Id. at 68. The Court did not
answer positively the argument of the SEC that the exemption for insurance companies as
defined in the 1940 Act and the "business of insurance" as mentioned in the McCarran Act
were synonymous. Brief of SEC at 15, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65
(1959).
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activities of an insurance company, but an investment company, and therefore
subject to the Investment Company Act. The decision was affirmed by the Third
Circuit.2 19 However, in a later case the Supreme Court refrained from deciding
the issue. The Court found the question to be a difficult one and remanded upon
the request of the SEC for further deliberation. 220 Proceedings were discontinued
by the parties. The question of whether or not the separate account was an
insurance company remained unanswered by the Supreme Court.2 2'
There is no general definition of the business of insurance. One judicial
test is whether an activity was historically regulated by the states. Traditionally
regulated activities, such as licensing of insurance companies to do business in
the state, fixing of insurance rates, writing of policies, advertising and sale of
policies, calculation of reserves, and the prevention of unfair trade practices by
insurance companies in their dealings with each other and with the policyholders,
were considered to be the business of insurance.222 However, state laws regulating
the organization of companies in general, as companies, are not laws regulating
the business of insurance even if they apply to insurance companies.22
Some provisions of the 1940 Act fall into this category. For example, the
1940 Act prohibits a registered investment company from using a deceptive or
misleading name. 2 4 Many state laws have similar provisionsY In any conflict
between federal and state law, such as when state law's standards are more
relaxed, state law should yield.
The same reasoning applies to the 1940 Act standard beyond which a
219 In re Prudential Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335 (1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
220 SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967), rev'g, 359 F.2d 619
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
221 See Frankel, supra note 19, at 234.
222 Brief for SEC at 18, 19, SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) citing
HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 40, at 680-98. A similar list was cited by the Supreme Court
in F.T.C. v. National Gas. Co. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
223 Wilder, Insurance and the Antitrust Laws, A State Outlook, 1963 INs. L. J. 534,
536.
224 § 34(a),(b),(c); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(a),(b),(c) (1970).
225 ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 49 (Supp. 1969); ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.050 (1966); Aiuz.
Rlv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-218, 10-122 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-2205, 66-4205 (1966);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (1968); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-15 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-287 (Supp. 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 509 '(1970); D.C. CODE
ENCYOL. ANN. § 35-601 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.024 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. §
56-318 (1970); HAwAi REv. STAT. § 431-101 (1968); IDAHrO CODE ANN. § 41-311 (1961);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 619, 649(e) (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-3603 (1965);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 504A.67 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-203 (Supp. 1972);
Iy. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.3-100 (1970); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:982-983 (Supp. 1972);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 408 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 45 (1972);
MAss. GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 175 § 181 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.1454 (1972); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 47.23 (2) (1970); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5309-11 thru 14 (Supp. 1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 375.196 (1968); MONT. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 40-2805 (1961); NEB. R v. STAT.
§ 44-352 (Supp. 1967); NEV. REv. STAT. tit. 57, § 628.030 (1967); N.H. RBv. STAT. ANN. §
294:5 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:18-4 (Supp. 1971) ;N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-18-15 (1953);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 50 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-33 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-08-05
(1970); Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 3907.02 (Page 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 620
(1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 731.430 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 421.1 (Supp. 1971);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-108 (1962); S.D. COR'. LAWS ANN. §§ 58-6-14, 58-6-17 (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-105 (1964); TExAs INS. CODE arts. 2.02, 11.01 (1963); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31-5-15 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 46 '(1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-104(b)
(1964); WAsr. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.05, 190 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 33-3-12 (1966);
Wisa. STAT. ANN. § 201.02(3) '(1957)'; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-55 (1967).
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director, officer, investment adviser and underwriter may not be indemnified.ns
Here, again, some state laws provide for similar restrictions.22 7 Since indemnifica-
tion relates primarily to the duties of management and only remotely to insurance
business, state laws standards should yield if they are more relaxed than the
federal law.
The test based on the nature of the regulated activity was inadequate when
the same activity affected not only policyholders but also other parties, e.g.,
shareholders. In such a situation the Supreme Court established an additional
test.22 The business of insurance, it said, concerns the relationship between the
insurance company and its policyholders, and the protection of policyholders.
A merger between two insurance companies was therefore the business of in-
surance because of state interest in protecting policyholders. On the other hand,
when the purpose of state regulation of insurance companies was to protect
investors, the state was not regulating the business of insurance, even with re-
spect to the merger mentioned above.229 Following this test, the 1940 Act pro-
visions with respect to voting rights and proxy solicitation prevail over state laws
regulating the same subject.2
226 § 17(h),(i); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h),(i) (1970).
227 New York requires the insurance company to notify the Superintendent of Insurance
before any director is indemnified. N.Y. INS. LAw § 62-a (McKinney, 1966). The New York
provision is state law regulating insurance since it provides the Superintendent with the in-
formation necessary to perform these functions. But there is no conflict between the two provi-
sions, since notification cannot be considered unduly burdensome. There is no impairment,
since there is nothing in the 1940 Act that changes the New York law or its effect.
228 SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
229 Id. at 460. See also Langdeau v. United States, 363 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962) (regulation in interest payment on debts of an insolvent insurance company is not
the regulation of the business of insurance, because the main purpose of the state statute was
to protect employees of insurance companies after they had ceased to do business). See also
Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969)
(an insurance policy negotiated and executed in New York provided for arbitration of future
differences. The domiciliary state of one of the parties to the contract did not permit
arbitration of future disputes nor did state laws of both parties permit arbitration of allega-
tions of fraud. Held that Federal Arbitration Act applied. State statutes dealing with the
subject were not statutes regulating the business of insurance, but statutes regulating the
method of handling contract disputes generally).
230 The question of whether variable contractholders have the exclusive right to elect
the management of the separate account is diffcult, and is discussed at pp. 1078-80 infra. Voting
rights are dealt with in § 18(i); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1970). Frankel, supra note 19,
at 297-303. Proxy rules are dealt with in § 20(a); 15 U.S.C. § 80-20(a) (1970). Frankel,
supra note 19, at 303-4.
The right of contractholders to vote and the proxy rules relating to the voting should
apply to variable life insurance policies, as a matter of federal law, because policyholders are
not afforded by state law the protection of the act. The following states have no provisions
regarding proxies: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio and Rhode
Island.
The following state statutes refer proxy problems in mutual companies to their general
corporation law, which permit proxies: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1953); IowA CODE
ANN. § 496 A.32 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.26 (1968); N-v. REv. STAT. fit. 7, §
78.355 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 294.86 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, ch. 76 §
1879 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1 - 32 (1970).
The following state statutes grant the right to vote by proxy to members of mutual
companies: ALAS. STAT. § 21.69.290 (1966); ARiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 20-713 (1956);
ARY. STAT. ANN. § 66-4217 (1966); CAL. INS. CODE § 4017 (Supp. 1971); D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-501 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 628.221 '(1960); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 56-1515 (1971); HAwArI R.v. STAT. § 43-192 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2834
(1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 654 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-502 (1964); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.24-210 (1970); Lx. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 22:127 (1959); ME. Rv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3363 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 94 (1958); Mo.
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It may be argued that the question of whether policyholders or members
of an insurance company ought to have voting rights is the regulation of the
business of insurance, because it affects the balance of power between manage-
ments of insurance companies and their constituents. In answer it can be said
that the business of insurance is involved only if it can be shown that a change
of the balance of decision-making power within the insurance company weakens
the policyholders' position. Even if this were so, impairment of state law by the
federal act would be indirect and inconsequential. In any event, insurance laws
that give voting power to shareholders of insurance companies, for their pro-
tection, must yield to the federal act that grants voting power to policyholders
who are also investors, because the provision as to voting does not concern the
business of insurance. Both federal and state laws deal here with the protection
of different classes of investors. Federal law prevails.
ANN. STAT. § 375.191 (1968); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-4715 (1961); NEB. REv. STAir. §
44-210 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:18-14 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-18-17
*(1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-94 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-14-10 (1970); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 36, § 2113 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 732.470 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 40,§'432
(1954); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-375 (1962); S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 58-5-41 (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1607 (1968); TEx. INS. CODE art. 11.04 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 31-9-15 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.09.150 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 33-5-9
(1966); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 206.02(2) (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-481 '(1967).
The state statutes below have provisions which generally provide for one vote permember unless otherwise stated: ARiz. R-Ev. STAT. ANN. § 20-713 (1956); CAL. INS. CODE§ 4016 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1 (1969) ("Definitions" - Assume
that directors are elected by policyholders); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 702 (1970); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 431-189 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2834 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-
423 (1965) (the section provides for election of directors by policyholders); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-502 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.24-210 (1970); LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:127 (1959); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3363 (1971); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 175 § 94 (1958) (one vote and one additional vote for each $5000 of insurance in excess
of the first $5000. No more than 20 votes by proxy); MCH. STAT. ANN. § 24:15232 (1972);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 66A.07 (1968) (one vote per policy); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.148
(1968); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-210 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B: 18-14 (Supp. 1971); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-18-17 (1962); N.Y. INS. LAw § 198 (McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-94 (1965) (one vote per policy without opportunity for change); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3941.07 (Page 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2113 (1958); ORs. REv. STAT. § 732.470
(1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 432 (1954); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-373 (1962); S.D. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 58-5-41 (1967); Tx. INS. CODE art. 11.04 (1963) (one vote per $500 of
insurance); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-9-15 (1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 48.09.120
(1961); W. VA. CODE § 33-5-9 (1966); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 201.02(3)(d) (Supp. 1972);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-481 (1967).
The states below have statutes which state that every member of a mutual insurance
company shall be entitled to one vote or to a number of votes based upon the insurance in
force, the number of policies held, or the amount of premium paid, as may be provided by
the by-laws. ALASKA STAT. § 21.69.290 (1966); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4217 (1966); COLO.
Rv. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-9 (1964); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-501 (1968); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 628.221 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1515 (1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 654
(1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 258 (1972); Mss. CODE ANN. § 5794 (1957); MONT.
REv. CODE ANN. § 46-4715 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-14-09 (1970); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-1606 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-77 (1970).
New York also provides that mutual companies must either elect the entire board of
directors biennially, or divide the board into not more than three classes, each class to be
elected annually. This tends to ensure continuity of management, but also entrenchment of
management. N.Y. INS. LAws § 198.1 (McKinney 1966); 29 N.Y. JuR. INSURANCE § 187
(1966).
Some states do not require notice of the meeting to be sent to members. Notices may
be published in newspapers or printed on the policies or on premium receipts. MAss. GEN.
LAws ch. 175, § 76 (1958). The language of a notice is approximately this:
The Insured is hereby notified that by virtue of this policy he is a member of the
Insurance Company, and is entitled to vote either in person or
by proxy at any or all meetings of said company. The Annual meetings are held at
its home office on the day of in each year, at o'clock.
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Another test to determine what is the business of insurance is whether the
activities that federal law seeks to regulate are in furtherance of the company's
insurance business. In United States v. Meade23 an insurance agency issued
and sold stock in order to raise funds for investments which the company's
charter permitted. It was held that the sale of the stock was not insurance
business, and was subject to the securities acts. The court did not deal with the
question of whether the sale of stock to finance insurance operations would be
insurance business. In this case the court found that investments in stocks of
other issuers, and in real estate developments, as authorized by the corporate
charter "[were] ... remote from the business of insurance as intended by the
McCarran Act."2"2
By analogy to stock issuance, the investment advisory services that an in-
surance company or its affiliates offer policyholders of variable insurance are not
the business of insurance within the McCarran Act.
People in the insurance industry argue that investment advisory services
are insurance business because in their conventional life insurance business,
insurance companies have been investing the reserves and the policyholders bear
the cost of these services. Moreover, insurance companies' expenditures and
investments have been under state supervision for decades. Hence, a novel
extension of the same activity is the business of insurance within the meaning
of the McGarran Act. The argument seems logical and attractive at first blush,
but not at a second, closer examination. In conventional insurance, investment
activities are performed as part of the insurance operations and on the account
of the insurance company. The policyholder pays a premium which covers part
of the expenses of the company, including investment expenses. But he does
not pay for investment advice. In calculating the amount of premiums, the
insurance company takes into account many other expenses, for example, typing.
In this context typing is the business of insurance. Yet, if an insurance company
engaged in the business of offering typing services for profit, this business will
not be deemed to be the business of insurance under the McCarran Act.
"Investment advice" in conventional policies is given at approximately cost.
Advice in variable life insurance is given at a fee which is a percentage of the
value of the assets. The profits of this arrangement inure to the insurance com-
pany. This fee structure gives rise to possible conflicts of interest and consequent
evils that conventional insurance does not present, and conventional insurance
regulation does not deal with. But federal law does. For example, the 1940
Act prohibits an investment adviser and its subsidiaries from accepting, as agents,
compensation from any source for the purchase or sale of property, to or from
an investment company, except in the course of their business as an under-
writer or broker. 32 Even though the philosophy of this provision is compatible
with state insurance laws, no such provision exists in state laws. Many insurance
laws prohibit officers and directors charged with the investments of the com-
pany from receiving fees or commissions in connection with the acquisition of
231 179 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
232 Id. at 876.
233 § 17(e); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1970).
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property or the sale of property or the grant of a loan by an insurance com-
pany.234 Some states permit payment if the officers act as agents.23  A similar
prohibition does not apply to the insurance company, as such, in its relationship
with its accounts. There is also no parallel in insurance laws to the 1940 Act
234 CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
Version 1.
Prohibited Pecuniary Interest of Officers. (a) Officers or directors or members of a
committee or employee of a domestic issuer, charged with investments, shall not deposit or
invest except in the insurer's name; shall not borrow funds of the insurer; shall not have a
pecuniary interest in a loan, pledge or deposit, security, investment, sale, purchase exchange...
or other similar transactions or property of the insurer. '(b) Said person shall not take or
receive to his own use a fee, brokerage commission or gift or other consideration, for or on
account of any transaction by or on behalf of the insurer. No insurer may guarantee a financial
obligation of its officers, or directors.
Version 2.
Director, officer or employee of the insurer shall not be financially interested in the
business of the insurer nor shall such a person engage in any business or occupation interfering
or inconsistent with the duties of his office or employment.
Version 3.
No director or officer should receive payment for negotiating, procuring or recommend-
ing a loan from the company, selling or aiding in a sale of stock or securities.
Version 4.
(a) Director, employee, officer, etc., may not be interested as principal, co-principal,
agent or beneficiary in any such purchases or loans (misdemeanor). Applies to officer and
director or other person having effective control (10% of the stock). (b) May not receive
commissions with respect to particular risks insured by the insurer unless the commissions are
paid pursuant to a contract filed and approved by the insurance department. But director,
etc., may be an insurance agent. Violation of this section entails loss of certificate of authority.
Version 5.
Insurer may not invest in property or loan in which a director or officer has an interest.
Director of insurance may approve under specified standards.
Version 6.
No unreasonable compensation. No compensation calculated as % of the premiums
collected without the Commissioner's approval.
ALASKA STAT. § 21.69.370 (1966) (version 1); A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-726 (1956) (ver-
sion 1 '(b) no guarantee of director's obligations by the company); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66.4236
(1966) (version 1); CAL. INS. CODE § 1104 (Supp. 1971) (no loans to officers), see als& §§
1105, 1106 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-142 (1969) (version 3); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 4920 (1970) '(version 1) § 4919 (no guarantee of director's obligations by the
company); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-530 (1968) (version 1, version 3); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 628.255 (1972) (version 3); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1533 (1971) (version 3, version 1);
HAWA Rnv. STAT. § 431-148 (1968) (version 2); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2837 (1961)
(version 1); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 736.2(2) (1965) (version 5); IND. ANN. STAT. §
39-3715 (1965) (no loans to officers and directors); IowA CODE ANN. § 508.8 (Supp. 1973)
(version 1, version 3); LA:. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:848 (1959) (version 5); M. Rxv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 3413 (1972) (version 1); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 267 (1972) (no loans
to officers and directors except mortgage loans on residence used for habitation duly approved
by the board. No advance for future services beyond one year. No guarantee of director's and
officer's obligations by the company); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.15.252 (1972) '(version 3,
version 4(a)); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.39 '(1968) (use of funds for private gains is a felony);
MONT. Rav. CODE ANN. § 40-4723 (1961) (version 2); NEV. Rxv. STAT. tit. 57, § 693A.120
(1972) (version 1) (no guarantee of director's financial obligation by the company §
682.A.280 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-18-26 (1962) (no guarantee of loans of directors by
the company; no fees for directors); N.Y. INS. LAw § 78a-78.6, .7 (Mc~inney Supp. 1972)
(no loans to directors, and directors may not seel their office); ORE. REV. STAT. § 732.325
(1971) (version 3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2126 (1958) (prohibited interest of officers
and directors), § 6071 (Supp. 1972) (prohibition of payment of commissions to officers and
directors of life companies); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §_ 507 (Supp. 1971) (version 3, version
4a); S.D. Coip. LAws ANN. §§ 58-5-61, 58-5-62 (1967) (version 1); TENN. CODE ANN. §
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provision that a broker, who is an affiliate of the fund, may only charge the
fund a customary fee.2" '
This provision is irrelevant in conventional insurance, except that it might
affect dividends, but it is imperative for the protection of variable life insurance
policyholders. Expenses of investing and trading in securities directly affect the
investment performance of the account, which in turn affects the investment
arrangement in the policies. Even if there exists a legitimate state interest to
protect policyholders, there is a stronger federal interest to protect investors.
4. "No ACT OF CONGRESS SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO INVALIDATE ... ANY LAW
ENACTED BY ANY STATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF regulating THE BUSINESS OF
INSURANCE, OR WHICH IMPOSES A FEE OR TAX UPON SUCH BUSINESS, . . .
Provided, THAT ... THE SHERMAN ACT, AND ... THE CLAYTON ACT, AND
... THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT, . . . SHALL BE APPLICABLE TO
THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH BUSINESS IS NOT
REGULATED BY STATE LAW."
Two approaches that could be adopted to interpret the main paragraph
of § 2 (b) : the first is based on the notion that state laws provide a compre-
hensive scheme of insurance regulation, and that if any federal statute or part
of it is not compatible with this scheme the entire federal act should be ex-
cluded.237 The second approach is less sweeping. If a provision or a group of
provisions impair state insurance regulation, then this part of the act should be
excluded, but the rest of the act should apply. State regulation is also viewed
narrowly. If specific subject matter is not within the McCarran Act, it cannot
acquire a protected status just because state regulation covers a related area or
provides a comprehensive scheme of regulation.
In the writer's view, the second approach is sounder. There is no reason
for rejecting an entire federal act because part of it does not pass the McCarran
Act test. Just as a section in the federal act that specifically applies to insurance
should not result in the automatic application of the entire federal act to insur-
ance, so existence of provisions that impair state law should not automatically
result in the exclusion of the entire federal act.
The first approach that views state regulation in its entirety is also unaccept-
able. The McCarran Act establishes various relationships between federal and
state laws. The first paragraph of § 2(b) deals with federal acts that are not
specifically mentioned in other parts of the Act. It gives protection from federal
impairment to state laws regulating the business of insurance, but does not
preclude concurrent federal and state regulation. The proviso to this section
56-310 (1968) (version 1); TEx. INS. CODE art. 3.67, 3.68 (1963) (version 3); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31-7-6 (1966) (no guarantee of director's financial obligation by the company); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3469 '(1971) (version 5); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-34 (version 3), 38.1-33
(1970) (no loans to officers); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.07.130 (1961) (version 1);
W. VA. CODE § 33-4-17 (1966) (version 3); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-490 (1967) (version 1).
235 Id.
236 § 17(e) (2); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(2) (1970).
237 This approach was urged on the SEC by the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners. NAIC Brief, supra note 43, at 50. The association cited Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497, 502 (1955); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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deals with three specified federal acts. Only with respect to these acts is concur-
rent regulation precluded and state regulation permitted to preempt the field.
The preemption approach of the proviso was rejected in the United Benefit case
when the Supreme Court applied the Securities Act of 1933 to an old-line in-
surance company that issued hybrid insurance and investment products. This
approach has no basis in the history of the McCarran Act. The main paragraph
of § 2 (b) was not designed to curb federal control of insurance. It was designed
to ensure the continuation of state regulation of insurance. Federal law was to
yield only when it weakened the impact of state law, unless Congress specifically
indicated its intention to the contrary.
SEC v. National Securities, Inc.3 ' dealt with Arizona insurance law that
required the approval of the insurance commissioner for merger of two insurance
companies. The Supreme Court did not conclude that federal securities acts
should yield to state law because state insurance regulation is comprehensive or
because the regulation deals with insurance companies and is contained in in-
surance laws, or because there is a possibility that federal securities acts will
result in declaring a merger approved by the insurance commission as invalid.
Rather, the Court took the approach which this article follows. The Court
examined the nature of state law, found that the very same action of the com-
missioner was both the regulation of insurance and the regulation of issuance of
securities, which is not the regulation of insurance. Then the Court considered
whether and to what extent the proxy rules of the 1934 Act impaired state
regulation. The Court distinguished between direct federal intervention and
indirect intervention through invalidation of the votes that led to the approval
of the merger by the shareholders of the companies. The Court also distin-
guished between approval of the merger by permitting it and a mandatory
requirement by the state agency. Further, the Court distinguished between "the
sphere reserved primarily to the States by the McCarran-Ferguson Act" and a
merger of insurance companies which is not within the primary sphere.
Piecemeal application of federal law is not repugnant to insurance regula-
tion. For example, federal law might apply in states which do not regulate a
specific activity but might be excluded in another state, which does regulate
the activity. This was the result of FTC v. Travelers Health Association,239
which dealt with the proviso to § 2 (b). Under that decision the Federal Trade
Commission Act applied in states that could not constitutionally regulate certain
activities of insurance companies even though the same activities were regulated
in other states thereby excluding the federal act. The insurance industry has
long been subject to such regulation. Just as the federal act must be scrutinized
for its effect on state laws, so should state laws be examined to determine whether
and to what extent any part of them is covered by the McCarran Act.
The literal meaning of "regulate" is "to govern or direct according to
rule . . . to bring under the control of law. . . 2 0 § 2(b) of the McCar-
ran Act uses the term "regulate" in prohibiting federal acts from impairing state
238 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
239 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
240 WEBsTER's THID NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARIY 1913 (1965).
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legislation enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance";
and in the proviso, applying the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts to the business of insurance only "to the extent that such business
is not regulated by state law."
The term "regulate" was litigated mainly in connection with the proviso.
Cases deal with two questions: the first is whether the mere passing of legislation
is "regulation."'" This question is not fully resolved. It seems that in order
to constitute regulation, three conditions must be satisfied: there must be some
legislation; this legislation must, by its own terms, impose a requirement for
some form of conduct; and it must provide for some enforcement. As Senator
McCarran explained in 1948:
Probably also the State law should be prohibitory rather than permissive.
That is, it should prohibit the particular practice except in accordance with
specified procedure and subject to State approval, rather than simply in
terms permitting the practice in question.
Machinery should be provided for regulating the practice, and the law
should designate an authority ... to exercise the State regulatory power.
242
The courts have followed the Senator's criteria. When state legislation is
merely exemptive it is not deemed to be regulation.243  As to the extent of
effectiveness, it has been argued by writers that regulation must include effective
enforcement.2  Such an argument was rejected by the Supreme Court.
245
Whether or not an act regulates must be determined according to its own terms.
The courts will not examine the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement."',
On the other hand, if a state statute is passed merely as a device to preclude
federal regulation under the proviso to § 2(b),"' or when a statute is a dead
letter,24 such a statute will probably not qualify under the McCarran Act.
241 In the context of the main paragraph, the question is whether the mere passing of
state legislation is sufficient to impose on federal statutes the constraints of the McCarran
Act. There is no reason why the answer to these questions should not be the same.
242 McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium Under Public Law 15 Expired
July 1, 34 ABA J 539, 542 (1948). Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.C.
1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966). For a discussion of
this case see Atwell, The McCarran-Ferguson Act-A Deceptive Panacea?, 5 FoRuM 339,
343 (1970). See also Curtis, Antitrust Aspects of Mergers in the Life Insurance Industry-A
Word of Caution, 20 Ass'n of Life Ins. Counsel Proceedings, 483, 484-87 (1968); Note,
Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry 46 MINN. L. REV. 1088,
1093-97 (1962).
243 In re Aviation Ins. Industry, 183 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also 33 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L. J. 33-4 (1967).
244 See Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MicH. L. Rav. 545, 574-76 (1958) (Analysis
of legislative history of the McCarran Act to show that regulation means more than just
enacting legislation). For an earlier argument see Note, State Regulation of the Insurance
Business and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 223, 228-29 (1947).
245 FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
246 See, e.g., Fleming v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971)
(Insurance Commissioner's failure in one case to set aside rates filed by a rating organization,
rates which he did not deem to conform to statutory standards, was not evidence that the
regulatory scheme was not substantially effective, regarding the proviso to § 2(b)).
247 See FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958).
248 Senator McCarran, in another publication, stated that in addition to legislation an
enforcement machinery must exist. McCarran, Insurance as. Commerce-After Four Years,
23 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 299, 311 (1948).
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There is no regulation when state law cannot be legally enforced. Since
the McCarran Act did not grant, and could not grant, the states powers which
they did not have under the Constitution, states cannot regulate insurance
business over which the states have no personal jurisdiction.249 Even if personal
jurisdiction could be constitutionally exercised, it was held that a state regulates
if it has the power to enforce its legislation within its own boundaries. A remedy
against the insurance company which is available in another state, such as the
state of incorporation, is no "regulation."2 '
The second question raised in connection with the § 2(b) proviso is how
specific must state regulation be in order to satisfy the "to the extent regulated"
language in the proviso. The answer is not free from doubt. In California
League of Independent Insurance Producers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Com-
pany,"' the court stated that "a State regulates the business of insurance within
the meaning of 1012(b) when a State statute generally prescribes or permits or
authorizes certain conduct on the part of the insurance companies," without
specifically covering the full substance of federal antitrust laws. Other cases re-
quire more specific coverage of state laws before excluding federal regulation. In
United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Company," '2 the defendants were charged
with stock acquisitions that lessened competition among insurance companies.
The applicable state insurance laws did not regulate such stock acquisitions. The
defendants argued that state regulation of insurance rates which assured the pub-
lic reasonable rates achieved the same purposes as § 7 of the Clayton Act, and was
sufficient "regulation" to oust federal antitrust laws under the proviso of § 2 (b).
The court rejected the argument and held that the provision of state law must
be "precisely comparable" to federal law. "The Federal Government has decided
competition is healthy economics and that intent is not necessarily satisfied be-
249 The constitutional minimum contact requirements have been changing to allow states
to exercise personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957); Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 206 F.2d 518, cert. denied, 346 U.S.
877 (1952). For a case where the minimum contact requirement was not satisfied see State
Board of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451 (1962). The limitation on regulation of out-
of-state insurers was recognized in the legislative history of the McCarran Act. HousE REP.
No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see
Hanson & Obenberger, Mail Order Insurers: A Case Study in the Ability of the States to
Regulate the Insurance Business, 50 MARarUTTz L. REv. 175 (1966); Dean, The Foreign
Unauthorized Insurer: A State Regulatory Gap, 32 INs. COUNSEL J. 432, 438-40 (1965).
See also Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, 1951 N.A.I.C. Proceedings 66-68, adopted in
most states and held constitutional in Florida. Parmaee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn.,
206 F.2d 518, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1952).
250 F.T.C. v. Travelers Health Assn., 362 U.S. 293, 297-99, 302 (1960), on remand, 298
F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962). See also, Annot., 21 L. ED. 2d 962 (1969); Johnson v. Universal
Underwriters, Inc., 283 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1960). Note, supra note 242, at 1088; Note,
Regulation of Insurance Advertising Practices: A Jurisdictional Inquiry 67 YALE L. J. 452
(1958).
251 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959). To the same effect see Ohio AFL-CIO v.
The Ins. Rating Board, 451 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1971); Holy Springs Funeral Home,
Inc. v. United Funeral Service, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 128, 135 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Transnational
Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 26 (D. Ore. 1966); see also, Professional and Busi-
ness Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life 'Co., 163 F. Supp. 274, 278-80 (D. Mont. 1958)
(state statute prohibiting monopolies in general, but not referring to insurance was sufficient
to exclude federal antitrust laws). See Atwell, The McCarran-Ferguson Act-A Deceptive
Panacea? 5 FORUM 339, 341 (1970).
252 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965). See also Atlantic & Pacific Ins. Co. v. Combined
Ins. Co., 312 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1962).
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cause one of its ends is achieved by another means." 5 3 On the same ground
the court held that it was irrelevant that state commissioners had power to
censure insurance companies, including foreign companies. 54 Thus, state regu-
lation of one factor in the federal regulatory scheme did not preclude the applica-
tion of the federal statute.
The 1940 Act provides that purchasers of redeemable shares of investment
companies may not be charged excessive fees,25 and imposes on the self-regu-
lating broker-dealers association and the SEC the primary responsibility of de-
fining standards and enforcing the Act. 56 The Act also restricts the sales com-
mission and front-end load on periodic payment plan certificates.257
Had state insurance laws regulated variable life insurance rates, the McCar-
ran Act would have applied because rate regulation is the business of insur-
ance,255 and variable life insurance policies contain a true life insurance arrange-
mentY.2 9 Life insurance rates or premiums depend on five factors: mortality
rate, method of computing reserves, nonforfeiture values, net investment earn-
ings, and expenses of executive, clerical, professional and sales services, 6 ' of
which the last is the largest single expense261
Since the main concern of state regulation is that insurance companies
will charge sufficient amounts as premiums that go into reserves, "62 mortality
tables26 and reserve computation are established by law and apply equally to
253 242 F. Supp. at 71.
254 Id.
255 § 22(b)'(1); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (b) (1) (1970).
256 Id. The section was amended in 1970. It authorizes a securities association like the
National Association of Securities Dealers to adopt rules regulating the distribution of redeem-
able securities "in order that the price at which such security is offered or sold to the public
shall not include an excessive sales load, but shall allow for reasonable compensation. . .
Within 18 months of the enactment of the amendments or after the association will have
adopted rules the Comission is authorized also to adopt similar rules. § 22(b) (2) ; 15 U.S.C. §
80a-22(b) (2) (1970), or to alter the rules of the association, § 22(b) (3); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
22(b)(3) (1970). Until 1970 the only Rule was § 26 of the N.A.S.D.'s Rules of Fair Prac-
tices. The Commission has not interfered with § 26 of the N.A.S.D.'s Rules of Fair Practices
except by enacting Rule 22c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1971). See 4 L. Loss, S.ECUxrEs
REGULATION 2429 (Supp. 1969).
257 § 27; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1970).
258 "The rate of commission paid to agents is a vital factor in the ratemaking structure."
California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857,
860 (N.D. Cal. 1959). And rate making (in automobile insurance) is insurance business. See
SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
259 It is interesting to examine the different treatment of life insurance rates and other
rate regulation in the industry. Presently state laws regulate commissions on sales of fire and
casualty insurance by requiring state approval of rates. Before the Civil War these companies
competed unchecked. Stelzer, The Insurance Industry and the Antitrust Laws: A Decade of
Experience, 1955 INs. L.J. 137, 141-2 (hereinafter cited as Stelzer). There developed a
pattern of fraudulent policy designs, misleading descriptions of the policies, and more in-
solvencies. This state of affairs led to the appointment of the Armstrong Commission in New
York. The hearings before the Commission prompted many states to abolish their anticom-
petition laws regarding fire and casualty insurance, and permit cooperative rate making. Life
insurance too suffered from unbridled competition in the 1890's. But it developed its protective
mechanisms without rate regulation. Id. See also HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 40, at 743.
(on regulation of rates).
260 Stelzer, supra note 259, at 141-42. See also Butler, Actiuities of Agents Under the
McCarran Act, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 568, 572 (1950). See HUEBNER & BLACK,
supra note 40, at 379. J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE, ch. 6 (9th ed. 1962).
261 Stelzer, supra note 259, at 149.
262 Kulp, The Rate-Making Process in Property and Casualty Insxurance-Goals, Techniques,
and Limits, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 493 (1950).
263 Stelzer, supra note 259, at 143.
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all life insurance companies.'" As to the investment item, all states set a mini-
mum standard with respect to the type of investments that insurance companies
may make. As to the commissions item, three states, one of which is New York,
limit the amount that insurance companies may pay for marketing their
policies." 5 The purpose of these laws was to end the practice of the 1920's
when insurance companies paid extravagant commissions and bonuses which
led to their demise. 66 The limitations on sales commissions in state laws are
far less stringent than those of the 1940 Act." 7 It is not the paramount con-
cem of state laws to protect purchasers from paying excessive commissions. 6 '
There is no such prohibition in any state law. It has been argued that free
competition is an effective substitute to commissions control.269 Yet state laws
do not seem to have competition high on the list of their priorities. Private
"understandings" with respect to sales commissions that existed before the
South-Eastern Underwriters decision may still exist.27  Furthermore, the areas
of competition between insurance companies are blurred because the companies
are selling three different types of life insurance.271 Perhaps the strongest reason
for questioning the efficacy of competition on sales commissions is that sales
commissions in life insurance are fairly stable and arguably high.
Existing state insurance legislation is not "regulation" within the McCarran
Act. As to states that neither require, prohibit, authorize nor explicitly permit
specific rates on life insurance policies, it could be argued that they nonetheless
regulate this subject because the states have a legitimate interest in protecting
insurance companies from competition of the investment industry. Since the
successful marketing of insurance and mutual fund shares depends on incentives
to salesmen, the freedom given by insurance laws regarding sales commissions
ensures to insurance companies a competitive advantage. This freedom is inten-
tional; the silence of state laws is a "speaking silence." To this argument the
264 J. MAOEE, GENERAL INSURANCE 116 (6th ed. 1961).
265 N.Y. INS. LAws § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
266 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Durkin, 301 N.Y. 376, 93 N.E. 2d 897, 899, 903-04
(1950). The purpose of the section "was to put an end to excessive and ex post facto re-
wards.... ." Id. at 899. It has been suggested that all states should regulate commissions so
as to prevent encroachment on payments due to cover losses and curb discrimination. Orfield,
Improving State Regulation of Insurance, 32 MINN. L. Rv. 219, 247 (1948).
267 In the Hearings it transpired that usually all first year's premiums are used to pay
marketing expenses of which approximately 65 per cent are paid to the salesmen and under-
writers. SEC Hearings, supra note 5, at SEC Exhibit K.
268 As to the history of rate regulation in the fire insurance industry, see Kimball & Boyce,
supra note 244, at 545, 567. See also Note, Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws-A Problem
in Synthesis, 61 HARv. L. REv. 246, 271 (1948) in which the authors prophetically state that
the rating system is not designed to tend to keep down commissions. See also Donovan,
Regulation of Insurance Under the McCarran Act, 15 LAW & CONTEuP. PRoB. 473, 485
(1950).
269 HUEBNER & BLACK, supra note 40, at 743.
270 Stelzer, supra note 259, at 150, states that these combinations may still exist but are
less forceful.
271 The areas of competition are blurred by the three predominant types of life insurance
selling: the stock companies that use low-premium plans, with profits going to the stock-
holders; mutual companies that sell at higher premiums, but quote estimated dividends which
the policyholders may expect to receive; mutual companies that sell at low premiums as in
stock companies. MAGEE, supra note 264, at 143.
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answer is that the McCarran Act protects laws "enacted by any State." Silence
is therefore not speaking. 72
It may also be argued that state agencies' policy is to permit insurance
companies to charge as much commissions as the market will bear so long as
their financial solidity is not threatened. Two insurance commissioners testified
at the SEC Hearings that they would be alarmed at lowering the ceiling on
marketing expenses below the New York maximum, and that they would favor
eliminating the New York limitation altogether."' To this argument the answer
is that policies of state commissioners are not protected by the McCarran Act
unless they are expressed or authorized by the state legislature.
It may also be argued that since state laws regulate the issuance of variable
life insurance they implicitly regulate the sales commissions by permitting com-
panies to charge what the market will bear. To this argument the answer is
that regulation, even for the purpose of the first paragraph of § 2(b) of the
McCarran Act, must be express. Otherwise any mention by state law of in-
surance business limits the application of federal law.
As to New York,2 14 Illinois,27 and Wisconsin 211 statutes that limit sales
expenses, legislation with a view to protecting the financial integrity of insurance
companies is regulation of the business of insurance. Federal law limiting the
commissions that purchasers may pay to salesmen, in order to protect investors,
must therefore pass the impairment test. It is difficult to see how the 1940 Act
impairs these three statutes. The less a company spends, the fuller are its coffers.
Further, these statutes are not designed to encourage the sale of insurance poli-
cies. If these three statutes were interpreted as giving license to insurance com-
panies to pay sales commissions up to the limits stated, the statutes in this sense
would not qualify as "regulation" under the McCarran Act. § 2(b) was
not passed to immunize insurance companies from additional regulation."7
Congress did not intend to protect state laws that simply permit insurance com-
panies to do as they please. The 1940 Act regarding commissions should apply
unless it can be shown that the application would detrimentally affect the finan-
cial integrity, stability and development of insurance companies. These allega-
tions require substantial proof which has not been produced to date. Even if
this were shown, state laws would prevail only in the three states where these
statutes govern.'7
272 Emphasis added. See 33 ABA ANTITRUST L. J. 33, 34 (1967). See also In re Aviation
Ins. Indus., 183 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
273 SEC Hearings, supra note 5.
274 N.Y. INs. LAw § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
275 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 736.2 (1965). First-year sales expenses can be as high as
100 per cent of the premium. SEC Hearings, supra note 5, at SEC Exhibit K.
276 Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 206.29 (Supp. 1972). These limitations "are so liberal that it is
doubtful if it ever has had any effect." SEC Hearings, supra note 5, at 333.
277 Royal Standard Ins. Co. v. McNamara, 344 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1965). The McCarran
Act did not create any statutory right for insurance companies. Therefore, they could not
challenge the power of the Secretary of Defense to issue directives for uniform requirements
as to automobile liability for personnel on military reservations. In re Aviation Ins. Industry,
183 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (where 45 states did not regulate aviation rates, federal
antitrust laws apply. Id. at 379).
278 E.g., F.T.C. v. Travelers Health Ass'n., 362 U.S. 293 (1960) (states cannot regulate
insurance business extraterritorially); F.T.C. v. Nat. Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958); United
States v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. II. 1965).
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Another area which state insurance laws do not regulate is that relating
to fees paid to insurance companies for investment advice. The 1940 Act im-
poses a fiduciary duty on investment advisers with respect to these fees. The
duty can perhaps be translated into a prohibition on unreasonable fees." 9 The
Act also limits the expenses charged by trustees of unit investment trusts.
28 0
There are no parallel provisions in state laws,"' except to the effect that the
assets in separate accounts are owned by the insurance company, and that the
company shall not be nor hold itself to be a trustee with respect to these assets.2"2
Investment advice in connection with variable life insurance is not the
business of insurance. s3 Even if it were, state regulation quoted above does not
relate to investment advisory services, but to the assets in the account. Most
state judicial decisions hold that, subject to statutory and contractual provisions,
the relationship between the policyholders and the insurance company is that of
creditor and debtor, and that an insurance company is not a trustee or fiduciary
of the policyholder.' The holdings deal with the status of the assets of the
insurance company, when policyholders brought suits for accounting.8 ' They
should not govern services rendered by the insurance company which create a
fiduciary relationship. Therefore, it would seem that the provisions of the 1940
Act regulating investment advisory fees should apply.
5. "NO ACT OF CONGRESS SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO invalidate, impair and
supersede."
Most of the 1940 Act covers subjects specifically regulated by state laws.
The federal act would apply unless it invalidated, impaired or superseded state
law. Literally, to "impair" means to weaken, to make worse, to lessen power,
diminish, or otherwise affect in an injurious manner;8 6 "invalid" means having
no binding force or legal effect, lacking in authority or obligation," 7 made weak
or useless; "to supersede" means to make void, and to take the place of." s The
meaning of these terms in the McCarran Act has seldom been litigated.
It is submitted that if the application of federal law does not weaken the
impact of state law and is compatible with state law policy, and if federal law
limits the freedom of action of insurance companies but not the freedom of state
agencies to protect policyholders, then under the main paragraph of § 2(b),
federal law should apply concurrently with state law. The rules governing con-
279 See Frankel, supra note 19, at 364-70.
280 § 26(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(2) (1970).
281 Some state laws permit insurance companies to engage in the business of investment
advice, but say no more. Wee, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw § 46-a (McKinney Supp. 1971).
282 MODEL VARIABLE CONTRACT LAW Sec. 1(c). See also Frankel, supra note 19, at 242,
330.
283 See p. 1056 supra.
284 See Frankel, supra note 19, at 327-30. Note that the 1940 Act does not require that
ownership of assets vests in the account or contractholders.
285 Id. at 328.
286 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 885 '(4th Ed. 1957); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY 1131 (1961).
287 See WEBsTER's THIRD Naw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1188 (1961).
288 Id. at 2295.
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flict between state and federal laws could be used to test whether federal law
impairs, invalidates or supersedes state insurance laws. It should be borne in
mind, however, that the McCarran Act protection of state laws is limited to
regulation and taxation of insurance business as discussed before.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life Insur-
ance Company"9 Mr. Justice Douglas stated for the majority that the 1940
Act does "at least to a degree 'supersede' state insurance regulation, since the
Federal Acts prescribe their own peculiar requirements." 90 The Justice cited
§§ 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 21 of the 1940 Act as examples of such super-
session. However, the statement did not go beyond this remark and was clearly
dictum.
Ten years later the Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion v. National Securities, Inc.'91 examined and determined the scope of super-
session under the McCarran Act in connection with the application of the 1934
Act to insurance. In that case a state insurance agency approved a merger
between two insurance companies, but the petitioner argued that the consent
of the shareholders was obtained in violation of the SEC proxy rules. The Court
held that the state authority's approval was regulation of insurance business
within the McCarran Act. Nevertheless, the Court preserved the federal remedy.
Limiting the decision to the facts of the case, the Court held that the attack on
the merger and federal impairment of state law were indirect.
First, the Court reasoned, federal remedy regarding an act regulated by
state insurance laws does not ipso facto invalidate state law. "2" Second, the com-
plaint was directed not at the approval by the state insurance agency but at the
manner in which shareholders' approval of the merger was obtained. Third, the
protection of state law was preserved. The merger remained subject to the state
commissioner's approval. Fourth, the state commissioner did not order the
merger, but rather permitted it. An additional requirement that might result
in prohibiting what he had authorized is not an impairment of his regulatory
powers.29' "The paramount federal interest in protecting shareholders is in this
situation perfectly compatible with the paramount state interest in protecting
policyholders."' 4
Guided by these principles, some of the 1940 Act's provisions do not impair,
invalidate or supersede state insurance laws. For example, the 1940 Act requires
initial disclosure of information concerning the investment company'95 and its
289 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
290 Id. at 67 n. 2.
291 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
292 Id. at 463.
293 In their brief the respondents argued that state law would be invalidated if a merger
authorized by the commissioner of insurance were set aside: "Let us leave the matter with a
rhetorical question for the SEC: How would it be possible more completely to impair or
supersede the Director's power than to set aside a merger he allowed? If the SEC did wish
to impair or supersede A.R.S. § 20-731, what else could it do?" Respondents' brief at 33, 34,
SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The Supreme Court laconically answered
that any supersession or invalidation would be "indirect." Id. at 463.
294 393 U.S. at 463.
295 §§ 7, 8; 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7, 8 (1970).
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operations,29 and periodic reporting to the Commission and to the policy-
holders.29' Insurance laws also require extensive reporting to insurance agencies
298
and, to a lesser extent, to the policyholders. 9
Additional federal disclosure requirements do not impair state law. In
SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company 00 the Supreme Court held that
the Securities Act of 1933 applied to variable annuities issued by a life insurance
company because these contracts were securities. Implicit in the decision is
the conclusion that the additional reporting requirements of the 1933 Act do
not impair state insurance laws. With respect to the application of the 1940
Act, the Court did not reach this, or any conclusion, but remanded to the lower
court to examine to what extent the Investment Company Act might impair
state insurance laws regulating the business of insurance.3"' The Court em-
phasized that the Act's requirements went much further than "mere disclosure."
A further inquiry into possible impairment was therefore necessary.
The 1940 Act also imposes the 1933 Act registration provisions with
respect to the sale of mutual fund shares." 2 State insurance laws are inadequate
to provide investors with information necessary to make an intelligent evaluation
of policies. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion regarding variable
296 Form N-IR, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30a-1 (1972).
297 § 30; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 '(1970).
298 ALA. CODE tit. 28, § I (Supp. 1969); ALAScK STAT. § 21.09.200 (1966); Apm. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 20-223 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2220 (1966); CAL. INS. CODE § 900
(Supp. 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-13, 72-1-34 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
38-24 (1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 526 (1971); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-103
(1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.0223 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-315 (1971); HAwAI RZv.
STAT. § 431-106 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-355 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 743,
748, 751 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5021 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. §
508.11 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-225 (Supp. 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.3-240
(1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1451 (1959); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 423 (1971);
MD,. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 58 '(1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 25 (1958);
MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 24:1438 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.13 (1968); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 5726 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.891 (1968); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-2820
'(1961); NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 44-332 (1968); NEV. REv. STAT. tit. 57, § 680A.270 (1972);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402:37 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:19-1 (Supp. 1971); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-5-18 (1962); N.Y. INS. LAW § 217 (McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
58-21 (1965); N.D. CENT. CoDn § 26-07-05 (1970); OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 3907.19 (Page
1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 311 (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 731.574 '(1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 443 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-12-1 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 37-293 (Supp. 1971); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 58-6-75 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-
301 (1968); Tsx. INS. CODE art. 1.11 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-5-21 (1966); VT.
STAT. ANN. fit. 8, §§ 3561, 3562 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-159 (1970); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 48.05-250 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 33-4-14 (1966); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 601.
42(1) (a) (1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-72, 26.1-73 (1967).
299 The MODEL VARIABLE CONTRACT REGULATION supra note 49 provides at Art VII § 1:
Any company issuing variable contracts shall mail to the contract holder at least once
in each contract year after the first . . . , a statement or statements reporting the
investments held in the separate account .... 2. Any company issuing individual vari-
able contracts shall mail to the contract holder at least once in each contract year after
the first..., a statement reporting as of a date not more than four months previous
to the date of mailing: (a) In the case of an annuity contract under which payments
have not yet commenced, (i) the number of accumulation units credited to such con-
tract and the dollar value of a unit, or (ii) the value of the contract holder's account,
and (b) in the case of life insurance policy, the dollar amount of the death benefit.
300 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
301 Id. at 212.
302 § 24; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 '(1970).
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annuities."' The same reasoning applies, with greater strength, to variable
life insurance."
Advertising is another area where federal regulation does not impair state
laws and where investor protection is needed. Under the Investment Company
Act, advertising material must be filed with the Commission within ten days
of use."'5 The Commission has set guidelines, which the National Association of
Securities Dealers administers, to eliminate misleading advertising peculiar to
the mutual fund industry such as projection of future earnings from past per-
formance °6
Insurance statutes regulate advertising by prohibiting misleading state-
ments. 0 7 Only five states require filing of advertising material or have similar
requirements,"' Some states prohibit projections of future eamings. s°  Twenty
303 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
304 Many insurance laws require that the variable contract describe the formula used to
measure the variable element in the payments. See Appendix A, Example 1, infra, for a sample
policy presumably in confonnity with this requirement.
The disclosure in Example 1 of the Appendix does not comply with federal standards. It is
true that prospectuses concerning variable annuity contracts are also not easy to understand. It
is very difficult to clearly translate complicated mathematical formulas into words. Prospectuses
on variable annuities contain helpful examples, and their style and contents are improving. As
for variable life policies, only actuaries who are acquainted with the formulas can understand
them and perhaps compare the various policies. There must be a better way.
305 § 24(b); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b) (1970).
306 22 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1957).
307 No filing required unless noted. UTP=Unfair Trade Practices. ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 18
(1958); ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.040 (1966) (UTP); ARiz. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 20-443 (Supp.
1971) (UTP); ARK. STA.T. ANN. §§ 66-3004, 66-3005 (1966) (UTP); CAL. INS. CODE §
790.03 (b) (Supp. 1971); COLO. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-4(3) (1963) (UTP); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-57 (Supp. 1973) (filing required); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304
(1971) (UTP); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-410 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.953
(1972) (UTP); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-704 (1) (2) (1971) (UTP); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 431-
643 (1)(2) (1968) (UTP); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 41-1303, 41-1304 '(1961) (UTP); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 760 (1965); § 1030 (Supp. 1972) '(UTP); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 39-5019,
39-5020 (1965); § 39-5304 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 511.22, (1949); § 507B.4 (2)
(Supp. 1972) (UTP); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(2) (Supp. 1972) (UTP); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 304.12-020, 304.12-050 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1214(2) (1959);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2153 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 218 (1972);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 191 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:12007, 24:12055
(1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.08 subd. 2 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5634 (1957);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.936(4) (Supp. 1973) (UTP); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§
40-3503, 40-3504 (1961) (UTP); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 57, § 686A.040 (1972) (UTP);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4 III, 580:9 (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:117-1
(1963), § 17B:30-3 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-9-12(A)'(2) (1962) (UTP); N.Y.
INS. LAW § 97,126 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124 (1965); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26-30-04(2) (1970) '(UTP); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.21 (Page 1971)
(UTP); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1204(2) (1958) (UTP); ORE. REV. STAT. § 743.021
(1971) (filing required); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1152(b) (Purdon's Supp. 1971); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-29-4(2) (1968); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-144 (1962); § 37-1205
(Supp. 1971); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 58-33-5 (1967) (UTP); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-
1204 (2) (1968); Tax. INS. CODE art. 21.20 (1963); UTAH CODm ANN. § 31-27-7 '(1966);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(2) (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-52'(2) (1970); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.30.040, 48.30.070 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1966); Wisc.
STAT. ANN. §§ 201.45(1), 207.04 (2) (Supp. 1972); W'zo. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1-245, 26.1-246
(1967).
308 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-57 (Supp. 1973); ORE. RV. STAT. § 743-021 (1971);
WisC. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.45 (1), 207.04(2) (Supp. 1972). Authority of Commissioner required
in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1150(6) (Purdon's Supp. 1971). Inspection upon request, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 191 (1958).
309 MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 218 (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 191
(1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-144 (1962).
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states include advertising regulation in their Unfair Trade Practices Acts 1°
Concurrent regulation of advertising does not impair state law. The dif-
ference between the main paragraph of § 2 (b) and the proviso cannot be more
dearly demonstrated than in this instance. For the purpose of the proviso, it
was held that state law regulates advertising so as to preempt the field and
exclude the application of the Federal Trade Commission Act. But state law is
not impaired so as to exclude, under the main paragraph, concurrent regulation
of advertisement by the 1940 Act.
State and federal laws are concerned with the integrity of those who deal
in other people's money. The 1940 Act disqualifies persons convicted of securi-
ties frauds from serving as officers, directors, and employees of investment com-
panies."' 1 State insurance laws do not have a similar self-executory standard,
but grant wide discretionary powers to state insurance authorities to achieve a
310 See note 307 supra.
311 § 9; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(1970).
Insurance commissioners are required to investigate proposed officers and directors of new
insurance companies before granting a certificate of authority. They may not grant the
certificate unless they found that the general character and experience of the incorporators,
directors and officers are such to assure reasonable promise of a successful operation; that they
are persons of known good character and that there is no reason to believe that they are affiliated
with persons known to have been involved in improper manipulation of assets, accounts or re-
insurance. ALAsx C STAT. § 21.09.100 (1966); CAL. INS. CODE § 717 (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 73, § 767.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.3-080 (1970);
MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 175, § 49 (1958); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 24:1250 '(Supp. 1972);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 375.163 (1968); MONT. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2810 (1961); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 388 (Purdon's Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-203(6) (1968); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit 8, § 3305 (1971); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 201.03 (1957). A slightly different version
provides that no certificate of authority will be granted if the managing officers are known to be
of bad character, incompetent, untrustworthy so as to make the operation of the company
hazardous to the issuer, policyholders and the public. FIA. STAT. ANN. § 624.404 (1972);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-308 (1961); Mr. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 407 (1971); MIs. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 51'(1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.051.5 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17B:18-42 '(Supp. 1971); ORE. REv. STAT. § 731.386 (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-106.1
(Supp. 1971); S.D. ComP. LAws ANN. § 58-6-8 (1967); TMx. INS. CODE art. 1.14 (1963);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-5-3.5 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-53 (1967). In California the
commissioner may refuse to renew a certificate of authority if a holder of 10 per cent of the
stock has been convicted of a mail fraud, securities or insurance statute violation. CAL. INS.
CODE § 704.5 (Supp. 1971). The commissioner may also decline to renew a certificate of
authority if a director or officer has committed a felony, one of the elements of which is a
fraudulent act, in a transaction of money or property. Id. § 704.5. In Illinois the director of
an insurance company who was found after a hearing to be incompetent, untrustworthy or of
known bad character, and if the company does not comply within 30 days the certificate of
authority will be suspended. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.4 '(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). New
York has a similar provision. N.Y. INs. LAws § 511(n) (McKinney 1966). See atso id. §§
133-139 requiring certification as trustworthy of officers and employees negotiating or solicit-
ing applications and orders of life insurance from the public. Washington disqualifies a
bankrupt and a person guilty of misconduct from being a director in an insurance company.
WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. §§ 48.09.160; 48.30.120, 48.30.130 (1961). In addition, insurance
laws that permit the establishment of an account usually require the insurance agency to
examine the adequacy of management of the company that proposes to offer and sell variable
contracts. The language of this provision is similar to that of the MODEL VARIABLE CONTRACT
LAw § 3:
No company shall deliver or issue for delivery within this state variable contracts
unless it is licensed or organized to do a life insurance or annuity business in this
state, and the Commissioner is satisfied that its condition or method of operation in
connection with the issuance of such contracts will not render its operation hazard-
ous to the public, or its policyholders in this state. In this connection, the Commis-
sioner shall consider among other things:
(a) The history and financial condition of the company;




similar goal."'2 It may be that as a matter of interpretation of the 1940 Act,
these provisions are sufficient protection to investors so as to preclude the applica-
tion of the Act to insurance companies. On the other hand, the 1940 Act does
not impair insurance laws. It adds protection and furthers the same policies
manifested in state laws. State insurance agencies are never given power to rein-
state or choose management. Their power is either to remove or disapprove
proposed management. This power is left untouched by the 1940 Act.
Another area which should be regulated concurrently is the valuation of
assets in the account for the purpose of calculating the investment performance.
State insurance statutes concerning valuation of reserves funding the company's
conventional insurance liabilities use conservative methods of valuation that
might permit even valuation below market." This is appropriate when in-
surance benefits are not linked to asset values. As to separate accounts different
(c) The law and regulation under which the company is authorized in the
state of domicile to issue variable contracts.
If the company is a subsidiary of an admitted life insurance company, or affiliated
with such company through common management or ownership, it may be deemed
by the Commissioner to have met the provisions of this section if either it or the
parent or the affiliated company meets the requirements hereof.
312 QUALIFICATIONS OF DIECTORS.
Version 1.
Director shall not approve company's organization or issue certificate of authority until
he found: (a) that the company has submitted a sound plan of operation and (b) the general
character and experience of the incorporators, directors, and proposed officers are such as to
assure reasonable promise of a successful operation; . . . persons of known good character
and no good reason to believe that they are affiliated to persons known to have been involved
in improper manipulation of assets, accounts or reinsurance.
Version 2.
The Director of insurance may order removal of a new director of an insurance com-
pany who was found after hearing to be incompetent or untrustworthy, or of known bad
character. If the company does not obey within 30 days-suspension of authority will result.
Version 3.
If the commissioner has reason to believe that an officer or director is untrustworthy
or has abused his trust, or his continuation as a director is hazardous or injurious to the
insurer, policyholders or public, the commissioner must hold a hearing and if he so finds,
may order removal of a director or officer.
Version 4.
No grant of certificate of authority if managing officers know to be of bad character,
incompetent, untrustworthy as to make operation hazardous to the insurer, policyholders and
the public.
Qualification of Directors: ALASKA STAT. § 21.09.100 (1966) (Version 1); CAL.
INS. CODE § 717 (Supp. 1971) (Version 1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.404(3) (1972) (Version
4); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-308 (1961) (Version 4); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.4 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1972) (Versions 1 & 2); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.3-080 (1971) (Version 1);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 407 (1971) (Version 4); Mr. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 51
(1972) (Version 4); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 49 (1958) (Version 1); MICE.
STAT. ANN. § 24:1250 (1972) (Versions 1 & 3); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.051 Subd. 5
(Supp. 1973) (Version 4); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.163 (1968) (Version 1); MONT. RV.
CODE ANN. § 40-2810 (1961) '(Version 1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B: 18-42 (Supp. 1971) (Ver-
sion 4) ; N.Y. INS. LAw § 51 In (McKinney 1966) (Commissioner's power to require removal of
an officer); ORE. REv. STAT. § 731.386 (1971) (Version 4); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 388
(Purdon's Supp. 1971) (Version 1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-106.1 (Supp. 1971) (Version 4);
S.D. ComP. LAws ANN. § 58-6-8 (1967) (Version 4); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-203 (1968)
(Version 1); TEx. INS. CODE art. 1.14 (1963) (Version 4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-5-3.5
(1966) (Version 4); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 3305 (1971) (Version 1); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 48.09.160, 48.30.120, 48.30.130 (1961) (Disqualified if bankrupt-48.09.160, mis-
conduct-48.30.120, Presumption of knowledge-48.30.130); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 201.03(5)
(1957) (Version 1); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-53 (1967) (Version 4).
313 Some laws provide for valuation according to the methods established by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1512 (Supp.
1972); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 431-272 (1968). Others provide for the market value, and if
1070 [June, 1973]
[Vol. 48:1017] REGULATION OF VARIABLE LIFE INSURANCE
considerations apply. If valuations are not realistic, policyholders will not receive
their due. At present, formulas used to determine investment performance vary
with companies issuing the policies.31 4 The investment factor is affected by the
valuation of the assets in the account at the time of computation. Valuation is
at market, or, if there is no market value, according to the terms of the policy.3"
In the three sample variable life policies produced by the insurance industry at
the SEC Hearings, one policy provides for fair value according to accepted
practices and applicable laws and regulation, whatever these might be."'6 An-
other policy does not mention valuation at all.317 The third policy provides for
"fair market value as determined in accordance with a method of valuation
established in good faith by the company." ' 8 Two companies will value each
unascertainable, the book value, or the net worth at which the issuing company is audited,
or the acquisition cost adjusted in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
or any other method which the insurance commissioner will at his discretion permit. See, e.g.,
CAL. INs. CODE §§ 1250, 1251 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-614 (Supp. 1971); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 60.A.12 (1968); ALASKA STAT. § 21.18.130 (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 736.6(2) (1965).
314 See APPENDIX A.
315 Version 1. Market value or as determined in the variable contract.
Version 2. Market value or as determined by Commissioner according to method of NAIC
(insurance reserve valuation).
Version 3. Valuation of insurance reserves. Permitted to value at cost.
ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 4(5)(1)(d) (Supp. 1969) (Version 1); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.-
370(e) (Supp. 1972) (Version 1); Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-515 (Supp. 1972) (Version
1); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3523(d) (Supp. 1971) (Version 1); CAL. INS. CODE § 10506(e)
(1972) (general security valuation); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-45(e) '(Supp. 1971)
(Version 1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1542 (1958) (general security valuation);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2933(a) (4) (1971) (Version 1); D.C. INS. REGS. No. 7 (1971);
FLA. INS. REGS. V, § 625.151 (1960) (general security valuation); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1038(d),
§ 56-1040(h) (1971) (Version 1); HAwArr REv. STAT. § 431-563(a)(3) (Supp. 1972) (Ver-
sion 1); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1936(4) (Supp. 1971) (Version 1); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73 §
857.21(d) (Supp. 1972) '(Version 1); IND. INS. REo. § VI (1971) (Version 1); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-436(d) (Supp. 1972) (Version 1); Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-390(3) (1971)
(Version 1); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1500(G) (Supp. 1972) (Uniform non-discriminatory
standards); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2537(4) (1971) (Version 1); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, § 96A(j) (1972) (Version 1); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 132G (Supp. 1971)
(Version 1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.14(7) (Supp. 1973) (Version 1); Miss. CODE ANN. §
5649-34 (Supp. 1971) (Version 1); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.309(5) (Supp. 1973) (Version 1);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-3014 (1961) (Version 2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-310.02 (1968)
(Valued at cost. Applicable to all assets.) NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 443(1)'(d) (1968) (Market
value, appraised value, prices determined by the Commissioner representing fair market value.) ;
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 408:32 '(1968) (current market value); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:28-
10 (Supp. 1971) (market value); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-4-6.1(4) (Supp. 1971) (Version 1);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 227.1(f) (McKinney Supp. 1971) (Version 1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
79.2(i) (Supp. 1971) (Version 1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-11.1-01(4) (Supp. 1971) (Version
1); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3907.15(B) (Page 1971) (Version 1); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 6061 (g) (Supp. 1972) (Version 1); Oa. REv. STAT. § 733.160(b) (1971) (Method
of computation approved by the Commissioner. Applies to all insurance assets with regard to
securities.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 506.2(h) '(Supp. 1971) (Version 1); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 27-32-4 (1969) (Version 1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-333(c) (Supp. 1971) (Version 1);
S.D. ComP. LAvs ANN. § 58-28-21 (Supp. 1972) (Version 1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-315
(1968) (Version 1); TEx. INS. CODE art. 3.72, § 9 (Supp. 1972) (Version 1); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31-13-32(4) (Supp. 1971) '(Version 1) ; VT. STAT. ANN. § 3855(a) (4) (Supp. 1972)
(Version 1); V. CODE ANN. § 38.1-167 (1970) (general security valuation); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 48.18A.020(3) (Supp. 1972) (Version 1); W. VA. INS. REos. 56 L-2 (VII)
(1966) (market value) § 33-7-11 '(1966); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 206.385(4) (Supp. 1972)
(Version 1); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-367(d) (1967) (Version 1).
316 Policy of the Equitable Variable Life Ins. Co. See APPENDX A, Example 1 at 5.
317 Policy of AETNA Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. See APPENDIX A, Example 3.
318 Policy of New York Life Ins. Co. See APPENDIX A, Example 2 at 7.
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day;... another, each month.120 The same portfolios may therefore show different
assets values and different investment performances, and these in turn affect both
the death benefits and cash surrender value. The policies vary with investment
performance formula, with dates of valuation, and with methods of valuation.
Flexible valuation and calculating methods and the ease with which the
investment factor may be manipulated are an invitation to undesirable practices.
State laws do not provide adequate protection against potential abuse. The
1940 Act does. Open-end investment companies must price their securities for
sale and redemption purposes on the basis of the current net asset value at the
time of computation.3 2" ' If no market value exists, valuation must be made by
the board of directors in good faith. 22 The Commission prescribes methods of
valuation from time to time,"13 and whenever problems arise. 24 Insurance com-
panies may comply with both laws. Concurrent regulation is therefore possible
in this area without impairment of state law.
Some of the provisions of the 1940 Act may impair state regulation. Such
a provision is the 1940 Act requirement of a minimum net worth of $100,000
before variable contracts can be offered by an account to the public.
3 2 5
Minimum capital and surplus and maintenance of reserves are the corner-
stone of state insurance regulation. State laws require as a condition to start-
ing an insurance business, minimum capital and surplus which, with few
exceptions,"28 exceed $100,000.' This capital and surplus must be maintained
throughout the lifetime of the company. These requirements apply in many
319 Policies of New York Life Ins. Co. and Equitable Variable Life Ins. Co., supra notes
316, 318.
320 Policy of AETNA Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., General Definition 3 at 3.
321 § 22(c); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(c) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1972).
322 § 2(a)(39); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41) (1970).
323 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5847, Ace. Series Release No. 113 (Oct.
21, 1969).
324 Id. Problems arising from investments in letter stock.
325 In order to ensure that promoters of investment companies be financially responsible
persons who have a stake in the enterprise. § 14(a); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(a) (1970). Hear-
ings on H.R. 10065 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Inter. & For. Commerce,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 117 (1940) (statement of David Shenker).
326 States having provisions requiring less than $100,000: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-711
(1956) (domestic mutual insurer, $20,000 minimum surplus plus qualifications, or $50,000
deposit in lieu of qualifications); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4210 "(1966) (domestic mutual
insurer, $50,000 minimum surplus plus qualifications, or $100,000 deposit in lieu of qualifica-
tions); D. C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-202 (1968) (corporation, joint stock company, or
association, must have assets or capital stock fully paid up in cash, or both together, or not less
than $25,000 as capital or guarantee fund); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2820 (1961) '(domestic
mutual insurer, $50,000 minimum surplus plus qualifications, or $100,000 deposit in lieu of
qualifications); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.24-100 (1971) (domestic mutual insurer, $50,000
minimum surplus plus qualifications, or $150,000 deposit in lieu of qualifications); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 5660 (5) '(Supp. 1971) (life insurance on the industrial plan needs capital of not
less than $50,000 and a surplus of $25,000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-9-8 (1966) (domestic
mutual insurer, $5,000 minimum surplus plus qualifications, or $50,000 deposit as guaranty
fund in lieu of qualifications); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 48.09.081 (1961), (domestic mutual
insurer, $25,000 minimum surplus plus qualifications, or $50,000 deposit in lieu of qualifica-
tions).
All the states that require $100,000 or more: ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 1 (Supp. 1969); ALASKA
STAT. § 21.09.070 (1966); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-210 (Supp. 1972); ARx. STAT. ANN.
§ 66-2207 (Supp. 1971); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 700.02, 700.03, 700.05, 4013, 10510 (Supp.
1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-36(b) (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-130a
(1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 511 (1971); D.C. CODE ENCYcLO. ANN. § 35-508 (1968);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.407, 624.408 (1972); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-306, 56-307, 56-1510
(1971); HAwAii REv. STAT. §§ 431-87, 431-88 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-313 (Supp.
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instances also to foreign companies doing business in the state. Enforcement of
these provisions is rigorous. In most states insurance companies must obtain a
certificate of authority before starting business, 2 ' and must file with the insurance
agency an annual report329 and may be examined, not less frequently than once
every specified period (usually three years) .33 Some insurance laws require com-
1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 625 (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-3615
(Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 508.05 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-401, 40-402
(Supp. 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.3-120 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:71,
22:121 (Supp. 1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 410 (1972); MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, §§ 47(3), 48(3) (a), 49(1) (1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47, 48, 93E, 151,
153 (1958); McH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.1408, 24.1410 (1972); MXNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60A.07,
60A.10(2) (Supp. 1973); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 5660(4), 5670.1(5) (Supp. 1972); Mo.
ANN. STAT.§ 376.280 (1968); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2807, 40-4708 (1961); NEB.
Rnv. STAT. §§ 44-214, 44-219 (1968); NEv. Rzv. STAT. tit. 57, §§ 628.160, 628.170 (1972);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 401:4, 405:2, 411:3 (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17B:18-35,
17B:18-36 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-18-24 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. INS. LAW § 191,
(McKinney Supp. 1972); §§ 196(a), 42.5 (McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-77 (Supp.
1971)- N.D CENT. CODE §§ 26-08-04, 26-09-1, 26-11-02, 26-14-23 (1970); OHrO REv. CODE
ANN. d§ 3907.05, 3941.06 (Page 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 610, 2111 (Supp. 1971);
§ 611 (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 731.554(1), 731.554(4), 731.558 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, §§ 386(a), 386(d), 621.3, 624.1 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-2-5
(1969); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-181, 37-182 (Supp. 1971); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 58-5-21,
58-5-22, 58-6-23 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-214, 56-1602 (1968); Txx INs. CODE art.
3.02(5), 3.22 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-11-1 (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§
3304, 3309 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-73, 38.1-90, 38.1-91 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.05.340 (Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE § 33-3-5a (Supp. 1971) ;'Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§
201.03, 201.11(1) (Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-59 (1967) § 26.1-671 '(Supp.
1971).
327 Id.
328 ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 49 (Supp. 1969); ALASKA STAT. § 29.09.130 (1966) (renewable);
AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-215, 20-216 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2212 (1966); CAL.
INS. CODE § 700 (1955); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-17 (1963) (renewable annually);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-20 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 515-518 (1971);
D.C. CODE ENCYCLO. ANN. § 35-404 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.401, 624.416 (1972)
(continued each year on payment of license tax); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-303, 56-315 (1971)
(renewal must be filed); HAWAI Rv. STAT. §§ 431-82, 431-94 (1968) (renewable); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 41-305, 41-324 (1961) (continues); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 636 (1965);
§ 663 (Supp. 1972); INn. ANN. STAT. § 39-3324 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 508.13
(1949) (expires annually); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-215 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
304.3-160 (1971); LA. RIv. STAT. ANN. § 22:35 (1959); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §
404 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 52-54 (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175,
§ 32 (1958); McIH. STAT. ANN. § 24.1432 (1972) (remains in force); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60A.051 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5627 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.236 (1968);
MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 40-2812 (1961); NEB. Rlv. STAT. 44-303 (1968); NEV. REv. STAT.
tit. 57, §§ 680A.160 680.180 (1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 402:10 (1968); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:18-42 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-9-1 (1962); N.Y. INS. LAW § 40
(McKinney 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-71 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-01-06 (1970);
OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 3905.09 (Page 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 606 (1958);
ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 731.402 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 405 (Purdon's Supp. 1971);
Il. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-4-21 (1969); S. C. CODE ANN. § 37-102 (1962) (renewable);
S.D. ComsP. LAWS ANN. § 58-6-1, 58-6-2 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-202 (1968); Tax.
INS. CODE art. 114 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-5-2 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §
3368 (1971), VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-85 (1970); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 48.05.030 (1961);
W. VA. CODE § 33-3-1 (1966); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 201.045 (1) (Supp. 1972); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 26.1-50 (1967).
329 See note 298 supra.
330 ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 50 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 21.06.120 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 72-1-10 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-7 (1969) (5 years); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 322 '(1971) (5 years); D.C. CODE ENCYCLO. ANN. §§ 35-202 (year), 35-418 (3
years) (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.318 (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-208 (1971); HAWIIw
Rlv. STAT. § 431-54 (1968) '(3 years); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-219 (1961) (3 years); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 744 (Supp. 1972); IND. ANN. STAT, §§ 39-3312, 13 (1965) (3 years);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 507.2 (1949) (3 years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-222 (1964) (3 years);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.2-210 (1971) (4 years); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:1302 (Supp.
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panies to qualify specially for the sale of variable contracts."'1 The financial
conditions of these companies are again examined. Insurance companies must
reserve assets to cover future liabilities. This is an additional protection, com-
parable to the 1940 Act provisions regarding face amount certificate companies. 32
State laws require that reserves on variable contracts be placed and maintained
in separate accounts3 3 on which variable contractholders might have priority
over other creditors of the insurance company. All the assets of the sponsoring
insurance company are also subject to the claims of variable contractholders.
Since the Investment Company Act provides a minimum standard, it does not
exclude the application of more stringent state laws that further the policies of
the Act.
34
It is submitted that as a matter of interpretation of the 1940 Act an account
should be deemed to comply with the federal Act even if it contains less than
$100,000 so long as the insurance company maintains a net worth of that
amount. It is unlikely that reserves will go below $100,000, especially if the
values of the insurance company's guarantee of fixed death benefits are taken
into account. Yet in such circumstances, or, more importantly, in the few states
that permit the establishment of an insurance company with less than $100,000
in paid-in capital or surplus, the question of federal impairment must be squarely
faced.
There are serious arguments for the position that the federal Act must yield.
The assets in separate accounts constitute reserves33 the determination of which
is the business of insurance. Reserves and premiums change according to the
age and health of policyholders and the mortality experience of the group.
1972) (3 years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 221 (1971) (5 years); MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, § 30 (1972) (4 years); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 4 (1958) (3 years); MIcr.
STAT. ANN. § 24.1222 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.031 (Supp. 1973) (within 6 months
after first certification and after 3rd successive year-at least every 3 years) ; Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 5628 (Supp. 1972) (3 years); §§ 5659.5, 5659.7 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 374.190,
375.164.2 (1968); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-2713 (1961) (3 years); NEB. REv. STAT. §
44-107 (1968) (3 years); NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 57, § 679B.230 (1972) (3 years); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 400:16 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:21-3 (Supp. 1971) (5 years); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-5-13 (1962); N.Y. INS. LAW § 28 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (5 years);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-16 (1965) (3 years); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-01-07 (1970) (at least bi-
ennially); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.07 (Page Supp. 1972) (3 years); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 36, §§ 306, 309 (1958) (3 years); ORE. REV. STAT. § 731.300 (1971) (3 years);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 51 (1 year first 5 years then every 4 years) 52 '(for holding cos.),
405 (new stock before cert.) (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§27-1-9 (for purpose of
ascertaining the value or condition of any stock before deposit), 27-13-1 (1969); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-281 (1967) (3 years); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 58-3-1, 58-3-2 (1967) (3 years);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-113 (cert.), 56-120 (3 years), 56-121 (when requested), 56-122
(foreign) (1968); Tax. INS. CODE art. 1.15 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-3-1 (1966)
(3 years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 3563, 3564 (Supp. 1972) (3 years); VA. CODE ANN. §
38.1-174 (1970) (3 years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.03.010 (1961) (5 years); W. VA.
CODE § 33-2-9 (Supp. 1971) (3 years); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 200.03 (Supp. 1972); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 26.1-32 (1967) (3 years).
331 See MODEL VARIABLE CONTRACTS REG. supra note 49, at Art III.
332 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 28; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-28 (1970).
333 Frankel, supra note 19, at 318 n.452.
334 This conclusion is contrary to Investors Diversified Services u. Diggles, discussed supra
at note 137.
335 See Frankel, supra note 19, at 237-46. For a distinction between insurance and invest-
ment, see id. at 196-99.
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A fixed minimum inherently conflicts with the changing standards and
upsets the insurance scheme. 36 On the other hand, following the National
Securities, Inc. decision3 . one might argue for federal regulation, even though
impairment or supersession may be direct, since state regulation sets only a mini-
mum standard which is not impaired by a higher minimum requirement.3 8
Safe custody of assets is another area of potential conflict. The 1940 Act
provides for safe custody of company's securities 39 and bonding of officers hav-
ing access to the assets." The trustee of a unit investment trust must be quali-
fied." The proceeds of the sale of periodic payment plan certificates must be
deposited with a qualified trustee under essentially the same conditions. 42
Insurance statutes do not have similar provisions," but they do regulate
the safekeeping of assets. State agencies exercise strict control over insurance
companies by virtue of their statutory authority. As a matter of federal law,
the 1940 Act provisions should not apply because it is doubtful whether added
protection to investors is needed. If such protection is needed, the 1940 Act
might impair state regulation. 4 By requiring assets to be kept with qualified
banks, the federal Act impairs state laws that require the assets of insurance
companies to be in their vaults, or limits the discretion of state authorities.
Investments is another problem area in which concurrent state and federal
law may conflict. The 1940 Act restricts or prohibits certain investment com-
panies from engaging in some undesirable financial activities. State insurance
laws provide a comprehensive regulatory scheme for investments of insurance
companies' reserves for the main purpose of preserving and ensuring the financial
integrity of the companies.
With respect to separate accounts, state laws regulating investments vary.
Twenty-two states free investments in separate accounts from all the traditional
336 Federal impairment of state law is greater in variable life insurance than in variable
annuities accounts because the latter are, in effect, mutual funds during the pay-in period. Net
premiums equal assets. Frankel, supra note 19, at 197. In variable life insurance, the assets in
the account are the reserves from its inception.
337 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
338 Unless the purpose of state law is to encourage a particular form of insurance organ-
zation by permitting a lower minimum capital, it is difficult to see the logic of limiting the
application of a more stringent federal law when the policy of both laws is compatible.
339 § 17(f); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-1 (1972); 17 C.F.R. §
270.17f-2 (1972). See Frankel, supra note 19, at 318-20.
340 § 17 (g); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(g) (1970). Frankel, supra note 19, at 321.
341 § 26(a); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a) (1970).
342 § 27(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(c) (2) (1970).
343 Some states provide for bonding of officers, e.g., ALASKCA STAT. § 21.69.360 (1966);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 628.241 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 204.6 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 39-3714 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-207 (1964); Mrie. STAT. ANN. § 24:15246 (1972);
MrnN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.07 sub. 11 (1968); MONT. R v. CODE ANN. § 40-4722 (1961).
344 The Commission exempted accounts from its Rules 17f-1 and 17f-2 to enable state
insurance agencies to examine the assets of the account. Exemption was also granted from the
requirement for a trust indenture, which requirement conflicts squarely with state law. Frankel,
supra note 19, at 319-21. On the other hand, there is no conflict of purpose between federal and
state laws. Experience of concurrent regulation of separate accounts funding variable annuities
has been good. With respect to safety of assets, separate accounts funding variable annuities
are not different from accounts funding variable life insurance.
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restrictions." The rest of the states have a variety of limitations which defy
generalization. 4
A comparison of the 1940 Act with state laws is difficult because they vary in
substance and in purpose. The following rules are proposed in order to deter-
mine the applicability of federal law according to whether or not state laws
adequately protect investors, and according to whether the 1940 Act impairs
state law.
When state law prohibits an investment that federal law either does not
prohibit or restricts only conditionally, the 1940 Act should be interpreted as
preserving state law.3 7 The 1940 Act restricts registered diversified investment
companies in their underwriting activities, to limit their risk. 48 The Act limits
investments in broker-dealer firms and in insurance companies " I in order to
protect investment companies from financing, without controlling, underwriting
and insurance businesses, and in the case of insurance companies to prevent their
control by investment companies because they may have conflicting purposes.
State insurance laws that altogether prohibit underwriting activities by
345 ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 4(5) (b) (Supp. 1969); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.370 (Supp. 1972);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-15(c) (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 38-33(a) (Supp.
1973) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2933 (1970); HAWAiI REV. STAT. § 431-563(a)(2) (Supp.
1972); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-734M(1) (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 857.21
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-436(b) (Supp. 1972); Kyv. Rv. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.7-240 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 1128 (1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
24.1925 (1972); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.13 sub. 3 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-4-6.1
(2) (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-11.1-01.2(a) (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 27-32-2 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-313 (1968); Tm. INS. CODE art. 3.39 § (a) (Supp.
1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-13-31(2) (Supp. 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. § 3855(a)'(2) (A)
(Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 206.385(2) (Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1-367,
26.1-136 (1967); See also MODEL VAMABLE CONTRACT LAW § 1(b):
Except as may be provided with respect to reserves for guaranteed benefit and funds
referred to in Section 1(c), (i) amounts allocated to any separate account and
accumulations thereof may be invested and reinvested without regard to any re-
quirements or limitations prescribed by the laws of this state governing the invest-
ments of life insurance companies and (ii) the investments in such separate account or
accounts shall not be taken into account in applying the investment limitations other-
wise applicable to the investments of the company.
The exception in 1 (c) relates to fixed dollar amounts which the insurance company undertakes
to pay, but seems not to include death benefits guaranteed in a variable life insurancy policy.
346 See for example: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2633 (1966) (variable annuities only); GA.
CODE ANN. § 56-1040c (1970) (variable annuities only); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5649-32 (Supp.
1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3907.15 (Page 1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18A.020
(2) (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 508.32 (1949) Regs. 3.4(508)3.4(1); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42-3105 (1961). See also, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-536.01(A) (Supp. 1972) ;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 362 '(1972); CAL. INS. CODE § 10506(A) (Supp. 1971); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.804 (1972) (variable annuities only); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4202 (1965);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1500(c) (Supp. 1972) (variable annuities only); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-79.2 (Supp. 1971) (variable annuities only); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 6061 (Supp.
1972) (variable annuities only); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN., §§ 35-541, 535 (1968); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 376.309(4) (Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 132 H (Supp. 1971); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-310:06 (1967); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 408:32 (1968); NEV. REv. STAT. tit. 57,
§ 688A.390 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:28-9 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
506.2(c) (Supp. 1971) (variable annuities only ); S.D. Coip. LAWS ANN. § 58-28-15 (Supp.
1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-183.1 (1970); W. VA. INS. REGS. 56L-2 (1966) (variable an-
nuities only ); ORE. REV. STAT. § 733.180-4 (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-333 (Supp. 1971)
(variable annuities only).
347 See pp. 1041-43 supra.
348 § 12(c); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(c)(1970).
349 §§ 12(d) (2), 12(d) (3), 12(g); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(d) (2), 12(d) (3), 12(g) (1970).
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separate accounts,3 50 or that limit investments in any one company,3m  apply as
a matter of interpretation of the federal Act."5 ' The purpose of these laws-to
limit investment risk-is compatible with the policies of the 1940 Act. Invest-
ment companies can comply with both laws, even though their options are
limited by state laws.
Federal law should continue to apply in the area of investments even when
state laws contain very similar provisions. More often than not the two regulatory
systems have different purposes, which might result in different enforcement and
leave investors unprotected. For example, federal law limits investments of
one investment company in another. 3 Many state laws limit, generally, invest-
ment of assets of separate accounts in one company.354 The purpose of the 1940
Act was to prevent duplicate charging of investment advisory fees, and to pre-
vent minority control through pyramiding. 5' The purpose of insurance laws
is to minimize investment risk through diversification. 56 Therefore, both laws
should apply.
Federal law impairs state law if it requires, or otherwise counteracts by
express permission what state law prohibits, but not necessarily the converse.
State laws prohibiting underwriting activities and limiting investments are im-
paired by a more permissive 1940 Act provision because it nullifies state law
protection of policyholders.
When federal law restricts an activity which state law expressly permits,
state law is not protected because it does not qualify as "regulation" under the
McCarran Act. State laws that expressly release insurance companies in their
operation of accounts from investment restrictions that apply to conventional
insurance are not regulating insurance. Federal law should apply also because
the need for investor-protection in these states is great. All safety restrictions on
investments have been lifted and policyholders bear the risk.
Similar rules should apply to the 1940 Act's regulation of transactions that
might result in conflict of interest between an investment company and its
external managers. Twenty states prohibit some transactions along the lines of
the 1940 Act. But not fully so." State insurance laws also prohibit directors
350 D.C. CODE ENCYOL. ANN. § 35-541, 535 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.804, 625.325
(Supp. 1972); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 42-3101 (1961); N.Y. INS. LAws § 78.2 (Mc-
Kinney 1966); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 58-28-15 (1967).
351 For example, D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 35-541 '(1968).
352 See pp. 1041-43 supra.
353 § 12(d)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(1970).
354 See statutes cited note 346 supra.
355 SEC REPT. ON THE STUDY OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES,
Pt. III, H.R. Doc. 279, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. cc. 1-6 (1960). Note, The Mutual Fund Industry:
A Legal Survzey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 732, 787-88 (1969); See also In re Equity Corp. &
Development Corp., 40 S.E.C. 124 (1960).
356 There is no limitation on one account owning all the shares of several investment
companies in New York, even though the law limits investment in other companies to not
more than 5 per cent of their voting power, and to 10 per cent of the insurance company's
assets. N.Y. INS. LAw § 46-a (McKinney Supp. 1971).
357 THE MODEL VARIABLE CONTRACT LAW sec. 1(f) provides:
(f) No sale, exchange or other transfer of assets may be made by a company between
any of its separate accounts or between any other investments account and one or
more of its separate accounts unless in case of a transfer into a separate account,
such transfer is made solely to establish the account or to support the operation of the
contracts with respect to the separate account to which the transfer is made and unless
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and officers of insurance companies from being financially interested in the trans-
actions of the insurance company."' The two regulatory systems are compatible.
Inasmuch as the 1940 Act limits transactions for the protection of investors, but
does not permit transactions that are disallowed by state law, the 1940 Act does
not impair state law.
Perhaps the most difficult application of the McCarran Act concerns the
question of control over investment activities in the account. Even though the
predominant business of separate accounts is investment, the results of this
such transfer, whether into or from a separate account, is made (i) by a transfer of
cash, or (ii) by a transfer of securities having a readily determinable market value,
provided that such transfer of securities is approved by the Commissioner. The Com-
missioner may approve other transfers among such accounts if, in his opinion, such
tranfers would not be inequitable.
It would seem that the term "transfer" does not include sale or exchange, and means
transfer without value. Such transfer occurs when the company pays into the account sums in
order to establish the account, and when the company receives from the account profits from the
insurance business, the differences between mortality tables and mortality experience. Thus,
there is no prohibition on borrowing and on joint venture between the insurance company and
accounts or between accounts inter se.
Sixteen states follow the pattern of the Model Law: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-536.01
(Supp. 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2933(a) (1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1040(f)
(1971); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 431-563(a)(5) (Supp. 1972); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1936(6)
(Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 857.21(f) (Supp. 1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
24-A, § 2537.8 (1971); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 24.1925(4) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 61A.14 subd. 8 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:28-9(c) (Supp. 1971) (slightly dif-
ferent version); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-79.2(n) (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-11.1-
01(6) (Supp. 1971); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3907.15 (Page 1971); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 58-28-20 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3855(6) (Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.18A.020(5) (Supp. 1972). Massachusetts prohibits transfer of investments by sale,
exchange, or substitution between investment accounts and general account except by permis-
sion of the Insurance Commissioner. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 132G (Supp. 1971).
The same pattern is followed in New York, N.Y. INS. LAws § 22 7 .1(g) (McKinney Supp.
1972); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-4-6.1(6) (Supp. 1971); South Carolina, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 37-333(d) (Supp. 1971); and Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.309.4 (Supp.
1973) ("no investment in the separate account or in the general investment account . . . shall
be transferred by sale, exchange, substitution or otherwise from one account to another.")
New York also prohibits the investment of assets in affiliates and subsidiaries of the insurance
company. N.Y. INS. LAW § 227.1(b) (6) (McKinney Supp. 1972). It is not clear whether the
result of this provision is what it seems under § 46-a of the N.Y. INS. LAW. The definition of
a subsidiary and an affiliate is based solely on 51 per cent stock ownership. New York therefore
does not prohibit investments in corporations in which the insurance company own 49 per cent.
The definition of an affiliated person in the 1940 Act is much wider. See § 2(a) (3) ; 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2'(a) (3) (1970). New Hampshire requires that "investments and liabilities of the vari-
able annuity account shall at all times be clearly identifiable and distinguishable from the other
investments and liabilities of the corporation. No investments of the variable annuity account
shall be pledged or transferred as a collateral for a loan." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 408:31
(1968). Texas provides that "no investment shall be transferred between separate accounts or
between separate and other accounts, unless the state Board of Insurance shall authorize such
transfer in circumstances where such transfer would not be inequitable." TEx. INs. CODE
art. 3.39 III(f) (2) (Supp. 1972). Mississippi prohibits investments in "securities of the in-
surance company or any other company in which the insurance company, its officers, or any
member of the board of directors hold more than 13/2 of one per cent ... of the securities of
the company or together own more than 5 per cent . . . of the securities of the company."
Miss. CODE ANN. § 5649-39 (Supp. 1971). West Virginia prohibits "investments which
create a conflict of interest between officers and directors of the insurance company and the
corporation whose stock is purchased." W. VA. REG. 56L-2 § VI.6 (1966). Wisconsin gives the
state insurance authority the power to regulate transfers between separate accounts. Wisc.
STAT. ANN. § 206.385(7) (Supp. 1972); N.Y. INS. LAW § 227.1(f) (McKinney Supp. 1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-79.2(m) (Supp. 1971); and Oar. REv. STAT. § 733.180 (3) (1971)
prohibit unfair discrimination among accounts.
358 See note 234 supra.
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investment affect the insurance business of the company since it "guarantees"
a minimum of death benefits under the policies.
It can be argued that the guarantee of death benefits is not insurance be-
cause a guarantee of a security (and the variable insurance policy is a security),
is itself a security in federal law. 59 In general, the word guarantee may mean
either a warranty6 ° or a contingent obligation,3 ' depending on the context. In
the Securities Act of 1933 the term "guarantee" means a contingent obligation
only. 2 The definition of a guarantee in the 1933 Act presupposes the existence
of another security issued by another issuer, and the legislative history indicates
that the duties of the issuer of the guarantee under the 1933 Act are limited
to the guarantee and do not extend to the other security26 In variable insur-
ance, the company is the primary obligor; its undertaking is not conditioned
on someone's default. The investment performance affects the insurance obliga-
tions of the insurance company to pay a "guaranteed" amount of death benefits
just as the investment performance of the general or other accounts affects con-
ventional insurance obligations. Therefore, the question of who controls invest-
ments in the account involves the business of insurance. State law regulating
control of these investments is within the McCarran Act.
The 1940 Act limits the discretion of investment advisers to determine
investment policies by requiring a detailed statement of these policies in the
registration statement of the company, and prohibiting changes in certain
investment policies without majority shareholder approval. 64 In addition, the
Act regulates the form and part of the substance of advisory and underwriting
contracts. Advisory contracts must specify fees and prohibit their transfer by
the adviser. The contracts must be terminable on sixty days' notice without
penalty, and must be discontinued unless approved annually by the unaffiliated
directors."' The board of the account is elected exclusively by the contract-
holders 6' and at least 40 per cent of the directors must be unaffiliated with the
insurance company or its affiliates. 6 '
State insurance laws usually provide that the board of directors of the
insurance company will make investment decisions.368 Some states prohibit in-
surance companies from entering into management contracts, and some permit
359 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 2(a) (35); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (36) '(1970).
"Security" means any "note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, . . . guarantee of, . . . any
of the foregoing."
360 Roberts v. Reynolds, 212 Cal. App. 2d 818, 28 Cal. Rptr. 261, 266 (1963); Northern
Imp. Co. v. Pembina Broadcasting Co., 153 N.W.2d 97, 103 (N.D. 1967); Morgan Supply Co.
v. Yarbrough, 87 Ga. 521, 74 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1953); Parker Pen Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 509,
511 (7th Cir. 1946).
361 McCallum v. Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160, 349 P.2d 986, 987, 989
(1960).
362 Cf, Methodist Hospital v. Saylor, 15 Cal. App. 3d 862, 93 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1971).
363 1 L. Loss, SECURIrEs REGULATION 455, 466 (2d ed. 1961).
364 §§ 8(b), 13; 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8(b), 13 (1970). In addition, the basic security of a
unit investment trust cannot be changed without the Commission's permission § 26(b); 15
U.S.C. § 80a-26(b) (1970). The harm which variable policyholders might suffer from change
of investments is just as great as that of shareholders of mutual funds. No comparable pro-
tection is afforded by insurance statutes so long as the underlying security is easily valued.
365 § 15; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).
366 § 16; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1970).
367 § 10(a); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1970).
368 E.g., N.Y. INs. LAws § 78(1) (McKinney 1966).
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them only subject to approval by state insurance agencies (if the fees and length
of the contract are reasonable) or subject to their approval of the fee. 69 These
provisions do not apply to a management arrangement between the insurance
company and the separate account or the aggregate of contractholders (policy-
holders).
There are no state laws along the lines of the federal Act and no indication
that state law considers the insurance company's role different from its role in
conventional insurance. Yet the company's role has changed drastically. In-
stead of investing at its own risk and calculating its investment advisory ser-
vices at cost, the policyholders bear part of the investment risk, and are charged
fees calculated as a percentage of the assets. This charge places the insurance
company in potential conflict of interest with the policyholder. In addition,
a guarantee of a minimum fixed death benefit may affect investment decisions,
and not necessarily in accord with contractholders' interest. Therefore, as a
matter of interpretation of the 1940 Act, control of contractholders over invest-
ment policies should be preserved.
In practice contractholders elect a slate proposed by the insurance company
and the unaffiliated directors are nonetheless friendly directors. The declared
investment policies leave the investment adviser a great measure of freedom in
his choice of investments. The board of directors in fact supervises investment
directors only superficially. The insurance company will lose this freedom in
the unlikely event of contractholders' revolt, if contractholders refuse to ratify
the investment advisory contract or when the insurance company is disqualified
from acting as an investment adviser. However, the Act's provisions granting
contractholders a measure of control over investment policies raise serious ques-
tions of impairment of state laws regulating the business of insurance. If the in-
surance company needs full control and freedom over investment decisions in
order to guarantee minimum fixed death benefits, then impairment by the
federal Act is substantial.
The variable life policy poses for the company competing investment goals.
The guarantee of minimum death benefits dictates a conservative investment
policy with the resultant low income. The advisory fees are an incentive to
increase sales. The way to increase sales is to show appreciation of capital,
income, or both. The 1940 Act will impair state laws if it is shown that these
competing goals cannot be achieved within the constraints of an investment
policy under the Act, and that a prescribed investment policy impairs the ability
of the company to honor its insurance obligations. The onus is on the insurance
industry and state authorities.
369 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.69.380 (1966); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-727 (1956);
CAL. INS. CODE § 4030 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4921 (1970); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 628.251 (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1532 (1971); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 41-2838,
2835 (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.4 (Supp. 1972); ME. Rev. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24-A § 3411 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 268A (1972); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §
60A.076 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5657.3 (Supp. 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.164
(1968); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 40-4724 (1961); NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 57, § 693A.110
(1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2127 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 732.220 (1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 290, 291 (Supp. 1971); S.D. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 58-5-85, 87 (1967);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-7-7 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-29.1 (1970); W.VA. CODE §
33-5-21 (1966); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-491 (1967).
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A direct impairment of state insurance agencies' powers may occur in
connection with changes in the investment policy that may not be made without
the approval of shareholders. If the shareholders refuse to approve, or if the
SEC refuses to grant an exemption, what is the effect of state insurance commis-
sioners' permission to change investment policies in order to protect policy-
holders?
The SEC's and state authorities' considerations may be different because
insurance authorities will be concerned with the guarantee, and the SEC will
be concerned with investment. It seems that under the present law, the statutory
power of insurance authorities to change investments to protect policyholders
from insolvency of the insurance company cannot be impaired by the SEC or
the policyholders, provided that the reason for the change is to prevent in-
solvency. If the reason is only to prevent losses to the insurance companies, the
change may be attacked on the ground that it is not regulating the business
of insurance but protecting it from competition. Admittedly, the line is hard
to draw.
A similar analysis can be made with regard to the provisions of the 1940
Act that permit policyholders to terminate the advisory and underwriting con-
tracts.370 Again, this power is very rarely used. Nonetheless, the provisions
permit a complete abrogation of the power of the board of directors of the
insurance company. It is difficult to see how an insurance company can guar-
antee investment performance over which it has no control. 71 Theoretically, an
independent investment adviser would then speculate, safe in the knowledge
that the insurance company will always pay the minimum face amount of
death benefits. The power to terminate investment advisory contracts therefore
impairs state laws vesting investment decision in the board of the insurance
company. But if the power is not granted, policyholders will be left with in-
sufficient protection. Their only remedy is to lapse the policy. The remedy is
inadequate. The lapse of a policy might entail loss of prepaid commissions. It
might result in the complete loss of insurance, if the policyholder has become
uninsurable, or it might result in higher premiums simply because the insured
grew older. The solution to this dilemma must come by legislation.
Policyholders' right to elect the account managers 72 also rarely affects the
power of the investment adviser over the account's activities, but this right raises
difficult theoretical problems. Policyholders and the insurance company should
share the management of an account because both have a stake in the investment
performance. Under the 1940 Act, only policyholders can vote for directors,
but at the same time 60 per cent of the board's members may be affiliated with
the company. Besides, the insurance company retains responsibility for the
day to day investments through the advisory contract. The policyholders' exclu-
sive right to elect the management of the account may impair state law if they
acquire effective control of the account's management. The question is whether
the right balance in making investment decisions is thus achieved.
370 § 15; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).
371 On the impact of termination on the insurance promises, see Frankel, supra note 19,
at 355-59.
372 See In re Prudential Ins. Co., 41 S.E.C. 335, 350, 352 (1963).
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There is no need to cover here all the provisions of the 1940 Act. They
fall under one or more of the categories that have been examined. The inescap-
able conclusion is that hybrid insurance and securities products require special
regulation.
V. Conclusion
There are basic differences in techniques and philosophies between state
insurance regulation and federal securities regulation. Insurance regulation is
paternalistic and secretive. State agencies determine what is good for the con-
sumer and the public and enforcement of the law rests primarily with them.
The consumer is not given incentives to represent, and is sometimes prohibited
from representing, his fellow consumers as a class.
The main purpose of insurance regulation is to insure integrity of the
financial condition of insurance companies. Most other considerations, such
as equity as between the company and the policyholders and among policy-
holders inter se, are subservient to this purpose. 73 This purpose is most effec-
tively achieved by direct state supervision of insurance operations without policy-
holders' intervention.
One of the unique characteristics of insurance is that it does one thing
for the individual policyholder and another for the insurance company. For
the policyholder insurance transfers risk of loss for a minimal fixed amount,
For the insurance company insurance is a business of assuming risk through
pooling and distribution, a special technique that individuals cannot perform
for themselves unless they can become self-insurers. Insurers consider these
techniques to be their property. The policyholders expect from the insurance
company results rather than service. They have no interest in, and no control over,
the manner in which the results are reached. Further, insurance techniques
are complicated and cannot be evaluated except by skilled actuaries. Under
these circumstances surveillance by government authorities behind dosed doors
may be appropriate.
On the other hand, securities regulation places the evaluation and invest-
ment decision squarely on the consumer and attempts to secure for him adequate
information. The 1940 Act goes further to ensure for the consumer a stronger
bargaining position in his dealings with the investment adviser. The power of
the SEC is not primary, and the tendency of the courts is to encourage the bar
and the consumer to privately enforce the law. Unlike buyers of insurance,
investors in mutual funds are essentially contracting for investment advisory
services and the advantages of diversified investments. Their interest in con-
trolling the investment process is paramount.
The philosophy of securities regulation is justified mainly on the ground that
373 For a thought provoking work on insurance regulations, see Kimball, The Purpose of
Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L.
REv. 471 (1961). See also KIMBALL & DENENBERG, INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL
POLICY: STUDIES IN INSURANCE REGULATION (1969).
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other alternatives are not acceptable. The alternatives would be to leave manage-
ments of companies accountable to no one but their conscience and God, or to
permit government agencies to evaluate and control investments. Both solutions
are repugnant to the American tradition. Power must be checked, and govern-
ment should not interfere with business decisions. Securities regulation has, there-
fore, mainly a prophylactic effect.
Responsible insurance counsel are questioning the utility of a prospectus,
complain about the unnecessary expenses and burdensome paper work, and point
out that class actions are an incentive to champerty. The securities lawyer has
heard these arguments before. To him the issues are not debatable anymore.
But in the variable life insurance context some of the arguments may have a new
vitality. Purchasers may not be sufficiently sophisticated to understand the com-
plexities of the policies, and it is difficult to prepare a legible prospectus for them.
Yet the objections to government control of investments and freedom of manage-
ments from accountability are just as valid in the area of variable insurance as
they are in the securities area.
The 1940 Act involves additional considerations. Variable insurance
products cannot be treated as investments for the purposes of securities regula-
tion without qualification. Variable policies involve at least as much concern
with financial integrity as conventional policies. The policies are in their infancy.
They may entail unknown losses. Conventional policyholders are entitled to
protection. Variable life insurance policyholders also have an interest, as policy-
holders and as holders of investment guarantee, in the financial integrity of the
company. Thus, the regulation of the investment component in the policies
should not interfere or weaken the regulation of insurance.
The regulation of insurance is much more complex than the regulation of
mutual funds because it involves many and sometimes competing interests. Ordi-
nary policyholders and variable policyholders have been mentioned. To these
we must add the shareholders in stock companies, and the public that has an
interest in the efficient service of insurance companies. The balance among
these parties is not easy to achieve.
Thus, the automatic application of the 1940 Act is also not the solution.
This new type of policy should be governed by a new kind of regulation. While
preserving the features of conventional regulation it should add new dimensions
to match the synthesis between insurance and investment which the policy strives
to achieve.
The crucial question before the Commission was who should be primarily
responsible for legislating and enforcing the new regulation. The staff of the
Commission recommended that the Commission should regulate variable policies
under the 1940 Act with adjustments to be worked out between the staff and
the industry. The Commission chose another route. It granted exemption
from the 1940 Act to separate accounts funding variable insurance because it
recognized the difficulties in applying the Act to insurance and respected the ex-
pertise of the states in direct regulation of insurance. However, the Commission
recognized the inadequacy of state regulation. It therefore asserted its jurisdic-
tion over the accounts and issued to the states the following invitation:
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In adopting these exemptive rules, the Commission contemplates that
the states will develop a comprehensive regulatory structure to provide the
protections that would otherwise be available under these Acts. Accordingly,
if after a reasonable period of time the Commission observes the develop-
ment of variable life insurance products for which exemption from the In-
vestment Company Act or the Investment Advisers Act is not appropriate,
or that state insurance laws are not adequate to protect the public, it will
consider modification or revocation of the exemptions. In this regard, we
would expect that state regulation will be developed that will be substantially
equivalent in material respects to those relevant sections of the ... Acts 74
The Commission's decision is remindful of the solution which Congress
chose with respect to federal antitrust regulation of insurance in the McCarran
Act. There Congress gave states a three-year moratorium during which to pre-
pare adequate substitutes for the federal legislation. After that period, federal
law would have applied in states that did not preempt the field. A similar
provision appears in the 1964 Amendments to the 1934 Act.Y'7  States have the
opportunity to preempt the area of proxy solicitation, reporting, and insider trad-
ing concerning insurance companies. But unlike the McCarran Act, no mora-
torium is provided. The 1934 Act governs so long as states do not preempt the
field.
In exempting variable life insurance separate accounts, the Commission
went further than both the McCarran Act and the 1934 Act. The exemption
is for an indefinite period, a "reasonable time." There is no deadline, as in the
case of the McCarran Act, and there is no investor protection in the interim
period as is guaranteed in the 1934 Act. This part of the decision raises ques-
tions as to the scope of the SEC's discretion to exempt from the 1940 Act. It
is arguable that difficulties in adjusting the Act to insurance, and hopes that the
states will provide adequate protection to investors in the future, are not sufficient
to justify an exemption.
To sum up, the SEC agreed with the investment industry that variable
policies are securities, that the separate accounts are nonexempt investment com-
panies, that the SEC has jurisdiction over them, and that state regulation is not
presently a substitute to federal protection. The SEC agreed with the insurance
industry that it is appropriate to exempt the accounts from the 1940 Act, at least
for a while, to give the states an opportunity to provide an alternative to federal
protection. The process of resolving the issue has just begun.
374 Letter of Chairman William J. Casey to Robert J. Routier and Paul S. Mason, January
31, 1973.
375 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (Supp. 1971).
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Separate Account I is a separate investment account maintained by Equi-
table VLI. Assets will be allocated to Separate Account I to support the opera-
tion of this contract and certain other contracts. Assets may also be allocated to
Separate Account I for other purposes.
It is contemplated that investments in Separate Account I will, at most
times, consist primarily of common stocks and other equity-type investments.
However, Equitable VLI may, in its discretion, invest the assets of Separate
Account I in any investments permitted by applicable law. Equitable VLI may
rely conclusively on the opinion of counsel (including attorneys in its employ)
as to what investments it is permitted by law to make.
SEPARATE ACCOUNT INDEX
The Separate Account Index for the valuation period which included the
first day in which there were assets in Separate Account I was 100. The Separate
Account Index for each subsequent valuation period is the Separate Account
Index for the immediately preceding valuation period multiplied by the Net
Investment Factor for such subsequent valuation period. The Separate Account
Index for a valuation period applies to each day in that period.
VALUATION PERIOD. Each business day together with any non-busi-
ness day or consecutive non-business days immediately preceding such business
day will constitute a valuation period. A business day is any day on which both
the Equitable VLI Home Office and the New York Stock Exchange are open
for business and trading, respectively.
NET INVESTMENT FACTOR. The Net Investment Factor for a valua-
tion period is (a) divided by (b), minus (c), where
(a) is (1) the value of the assets in Separate Account I at the close of
business of the preceding valuation period, plus (2) the investment
income and the capital gains, realized or unrealized, credited to
the assets of Separate Account I in the valuation period for which
the Net Investment Factor is being determined, minus (3) the
capital losses, realized or unrealized, charged against such assets in
such valuation period, minus (4) any amount charged against
Separate Account I in such valuation period for taxes or for
amounts set aside by Equitable VLI as a reserve for taxes attrib-
utable to the maintenance or operation of Separate Account I;
(b) is the value of the assets in Separate Account I at the close of busi-
ness of the preceding valuation period;
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(c) is a charge not exceeding .00002063 for each day in the valuation
period (corresponding to .75% per year; this charge is for invest-
ment management, mortality and expense risks and other con-
tingencies).
The value of the assets in Separate Account I shall be taken at their fair
market value or, where there is no readily available market, their fair value
determined in accordance with accepted accounting practices and applicable
laws and regulations.
ACTUAL AND BASE NET RATES OF RETURN
ACTUAL NET RATE OF RETURN. The Actual Net Rate of Return
for a policy year is equal to the change in the Separate Account Index from the
first day of the policy year to the first day of the next policy year, divided by the
Separate Account Index for the first day of the policy year. The Actual Net
Rate of Return is negative if the Separate Account Index decreases. The Actual
Net Rate of Return for a period less than a year is determined on a correspond-
ing basis.
BASE NET RATE OF RETURN. The Base Net Rate of Return for this
policy is .03 (3%) per year. (For a period less than a year, it is a pro rata part
of the annual rate.) Assuming premiums are duly paid and there is no surrender
of benefits under this policy, the benefits and cash values of this policy have
been determined so that if the Actual Net Rate of Return for each policy year
equals the Base Net Rate of Return, the Death Benefit in each policy year will
equal the face amount and the cash value at the end of each policy year will
equal the tabular cash value.
DEATH BENEFIT
Provided premiums are duly paid and there is no surrender of any benefits
under this policy, the Death Benefit shall equal the face amount plus the Vari-
able Adjustment Amount for the policy year in which death occurs, except that
if the Variable Adjustment Amount is negative, a minimum Death Benefit equal
to the face amount shall apply. If a partial surrender is made, the Death Benefit
and the minimum Death Benefit are reduced as provided in the Partial Sur-
render provision on page ten. Upon default in the payment of a premium, the
Death Benefit shall be as provided in the Grace and Insurance Non-Forfeiture
Options provisions.
VARIABLE ADJUSTMENT AMOUNT
On each policy anniversary to which premiums have been duly paid, Equi-
table VLI will determine the Variable Adjustment Amount for the policy year
beginning on that anniversary, to take into account the investment experience of
Separate Account I for the preceding policy year. The Variable Adjustment
Amount is zero during the first policy year, and thereafter it may be positive or
negative. It remains at a constant amount during a policy year as long as pre-
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miums are duly paid unless during such year there is a partial surrender of
benefits.
If the Actual Net Rate of Return for the preceding policy year is different
from the Base Net Rate of Return, the Variable Adjustment Amount will change
on a policy anniversary. The change will be an increase or a decrease depending
on whether the Actual Net Rate of Return is greater or less than the Base Net
Rate of Return, and the amount of the change shall equal the product of (a)
and (b), divided by (c), where
(a) is the difference between the Actual and Base Net Rates of Return;
(b) is the sum of the tabular cash value on the previous policy anni-
versary and the non-forfeiture factor, increased or decreased by
the net single premium on the previous policy anniversary for the
Variable Adjustment Amount in effect just prior to the current
policy anniversary; and
(c) is the net single premium on the current policy anniversary for
$1.00 of Variable Adjustment Amount.
The tabular cash value and non-forfeiture factor are determined from the
table on page three. The net single premium for the Variable Adjustment
Amount is determined from the table on page six. If the Variable Adjustment
Amount is negative, the net single premium for it is negative.
The Equitable Life Insurance Co., Variable Whole Life Policy at 5.
Example 2
PREMIUM AND INVESTMENT ADJUSTMENT FACTORS
The premium and investment adjustment factors are used in determining
the daily variations in the variable benefits under the policy.
Premium Adjustment Factor
The premium adjustment factor for any day is equal to (A) divided by
(B), where
(A) is the sum of
(i) the mean of the reserve at the end of the policy year during which
such day occurs and the reserve at the end of the preceding policy
year, with each such reserve being for the face amount on the
day which immediately precedes the day for which the factor is
being calculated, and
(ii) the daily net premium element for the Initial Face Amount
and
(B) is the sum of
(iii) the same mean of reserves described in (A) (i) above, and
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(iv) the daily net premium element for the face amount on such im-
mediately preceding day.
The daily net premium element on any day for a specified face amount is
equal to the applicable daily net premium element, per $1,000 of face amount,
shown in the Table of Cash and Non-Forfeiture Values and Daily Net Premium
Elements, multiplied by the number of $1,000's in the specified face amount.
Investment Adjustment Factor
The investment adjustment factor for any day is determined as of the end
of that day by dividing (a) by (b), reducing the result by (c), and multiplying
the reduced result by (d), where
(a) is: (i) the value of the assets of the Separate Account as of the
end of the immediately preceding day less any tax reserves held
in the Separate Account as of the end of that day; plus (ii)
capital gains, realized and unrealized, and investment income
credited to the Separate Account since the immediately pre-
ceding day; minus (iii) capital losses, realized and unrealized,
charged against the Separate Account since the immediately
preceding day; minus or plus, respectively, (iv) any increase
or decrease since the immediately preceding day in any tax
reserves held in the Separate Account, with appropriate adjust-
ment for any such taxes actually paid;
(b) is: the value of the assets of the Separate Account as of the end of
such immediately preceding day less any tax reserves held in
the Separate Account as of the end of that day;
(c) is: .0000274, which is a deduction, at the rate of .01 per annum,
for investment management charges and for risks assumed by
the Company;
and
(d) is: .99991902, which is a factor to recognize the interest rate of
3% compounded annually used in computing net premiums
and reserves.
The term "tax reserves", as used above, means any amounts held for taxes and
reserves for taxes incurred by the Separate Account.
Although the variable benefits under the policy will be affected by the
deduction stated above, they will not otherwise be reduced because of adverse
experience with respect to the mortality and expense risks assumed by the Com-
pany.
Separate Account. The Separate Account is a separate investment account
established and maintained by the New York Life Insurance Company under
the laws of the State of New York. Although the assets of the Separate Account
are the exclusive property of the Company, that portion of such assets which
represents reserves and other contract liabilities with respect to such Separate
Account will not be chargeable with liabilities arising out of any other business
of the Company.
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The assets of the Separate Account will be valued at fair market value as
determined in accordance with a method of valuation established in good faith
by the Company. Brokerage fees, transfer taxes and other expenses directly
resulting from the purchase or sale of a security will be included as part of the
purchase price of the security or will be deducted from the sales price.
The Company reserves the right to transfer assets of the Separate Account,
in excess of the reserves and other contract liabilities with respect to such Sepa-
rate Account, to another separate account or to the Company's General Account.
New York Life Insurance Co., Variable whole life policy at 6.
Example 3
7. Net Investment Rate and Net Investment Factor
(a) The net investment rate for any period for the General Account is
guaranteed, and is equal to an effective interest rate of 3Y/% com-
pounded annually.
(b) The net investment rate for any valuation period for the Separate Ac-
count for Variable Settlement Options is equal to the gross investment
rate for that Account for the valuation period less a margin deduction of
.0000395 for each day of the valuation period. The gross investment
rate is equal to (i) the investment income and capital gains and losses,
both realized and unrealized, on the assets of the Separate Account for
Variable Settlement Options less a deduction for any applicable taxes
arising from such income and realized and unrealized capital gains,
divided by (ii) the amount of such assets at the beginning of the valua-
tion period. Such gross investment rate may be either positive or negative.
(c) The net investment factor for each Account is the sum of 1.0000000
plus the net investment rate for the Account.
8. Annuity Unit Value
(a) The value of a General Account annuity unit is fixed at $10.
(b) The value of a Separate Account for Variable Settlement Options
annuity unit was fixed at $10 for the valuation period ending May 17,
1966. The value of such annuity unit for any valuation period thereafter
is determined by multiplying the value of the annuity unit for the pre-
ceding valuation period by the product of (i) .9999058 for each day of
the valuation period and (ii) the net investment factor of the Separate
Account for Variable Settlement Options for the tenth valuation period
preceding the period for which the value is being calculated.
9. Annuity Tables
Under Modes 4 and 5 below the amount of each installment will depend
upon the sex of the payee and the payee's adjusted age at the time the
first installment is due (in the case of Mode 5 the sex of the co-payee
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
and the co-payee's adjusted age as well). Adjusted ages are determined
in accordance with the following:
Calendar Year of Birth Adjusted Age
Before 1916 Actual Age
1916-1935 Actual Age minus 1 year
1936- 1955 Actual Age minus 2 years
1956- 1975 Actual Age minus 3 years
1976 and thereafter Actual Age minus 4 years
Actual Age, as used in the table above, shall mean age nearest birthday
at the time the first installment is due.
The Tables on the following pages show the dollar amount of the first
monthly installment for each $1,000 applied whether applied to provide
fixed installments (General Account) or variable installments (Separate
Account for Variable Settlement Options). Monthly installments after
the first from the General Account shall be equal to the first monthly in-
stallment. Monthly installments after the first from the Separate Account
for Variable Settlement Options are not predetermined and may change
from month to month. The method of calculating the dollar amount of
all installments is described elsewhere in the Modes of Settlement pro-
visions.
The Table for Mode 3 is based on a net investment rate equal to an
effective interest rate of 31 % compounded annually. Tables for Modes
4 and 5 are based on the Progressive Annuity Table assuming births in
the year 1900 and a net investment rate of 3 2% compounded annually.
10. Interest Payments
MODE 1. The proceeds may be left on deposit with AETNA in its
General Account and interest will be paid annually, semi-annually, quar-
terly, or monthly, as selected, equal to the net investment rate for the
period multiplied by the amount remaining on deposit. Election of this
Mode constitutes election of a fixed investment rate. The time during
which interest shall be paid shall not exceed the lifetime of one payee
except with AETNA's consent.
11. Installments of Fixed Amount
MODE 2. The payment in advance of monthly installments of any fixed
amount specified in the election, provided the amount payable each
month is not less than $5 for each $1,000 of the sum payable under this
Mode. If the remaining balance at any time is less than the amount of
one installment, such balance will be paid and will be the final payment
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under the option. To determine the remaining balance in either Account
at the end of any valuation period such balance at the end of the previous
period is decreased by the amount of any installment paid during the
period and the result multiplied by the net investment factor for the
period. The time during which monthly installments shall be paid shall
not exceed the lifetime of one payee except with AETNA's consent.
Aetna Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., at 9.
